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EUROPEAN COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR RESEARCH
Commissioner: Janez Potočnik
Director General: J. M. Silva Rodríguez
The Directorate-General for Research initiates, develops and follows the Commission’s political initiatives for the continued advancement of the
  European Research Area. It conceives and implements the necessary Community actions, in particular the Framework Programmes of the European
Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities. It also contributes to the implementation of the revised Lisbon
Strategy for Growth and Jobs.
Directorate C “European Research Area: Knowledge-based economy” (Director: Isi Saragossi) is responsible for developing/coordinating policies
and measures to promote the realisation of ERA and promote investment in research at EU, national and regional level. This is achieved by under-
taking monitoring analyses, impact assessments and foresight studies to support policy initiatives, by enhancing the effectiveness and coherence of
national and EU research policies and their articulation with other policies (competition, intellectual property rights, education, innovation etc…)
and by developing actions for the modernisation of universities and the improvement of research careers. The overall aim of these actions is to make
  Europe more attractive for investments in research and to increase the effectiveness of its research system by improving framework conditions and
  increasing the leverage effect of public spending on private R&D. 
“Key Figures 2007” was prepared in Unit C03 “Analysis and monitoring of national research policies and the Lisbon strategy” of DG Research (Head
of Unit: Xabier Goenaga) by Vincent Duchêne (principal author), Matthieu Delescluse, Maud Skäringer, Antonio Puente Rodero and Dermot Lally. 
This Unit is responsible for the monitoring and assessment of national research policies in the context of the Lisbon Strategy. The Open Method of
Coordination is applied to the 3 % objective for more investment in Research in EU-27 by supporting mutual learning, peer review and concerted
policy actions between Member States and regions. It also contributes to the identification of important issues with a strong trans-national dimen-
sion which could benefit from mutually reinforcing actions at national and EU levels. Unit C03 would like to acknowledge their gratitude to the many
colleagues within Directorate C, DG Research and other Commission services for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this report. In
addition, DG Estat, Unit F04 (‘Science, Technology, Innovation, Education and Culture Statistics’) is thanked for its contribution to the drafting of two
sub-sections (sections II.2: ‘Human Resources in Science and Technology’ and II.4: ‘Technological Output’).
URL: http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/monitoring/statistical01_en.htm.EUROPEAN COMMISSION
STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EUROSTAT)
Commissioner: Joaquín Almunia
Director-General: Hervé Carré 
Eurostat –part of the European Commission – is the Statistical Office of the European Communities and is situated in Luxembourg. Eurostat’s mis-
sion is to provide the European Union with a high-quality statistical information service. The data and indicators produced for the European Union
should enable comparisons between countries and regions in Europe and beyond.
A solid base of reliable and objective statistical data is essential for decision-makers at EU level, in Member States, in local government and in all
business sectors. The public and media also rely on relevant statistics to provide an accurate insight into important aspects of contemporary society.
Eurostat Directorate F “Social Statistics and Information Society” (Director: Michel Glaude) includes unit F04, responsible for education, science and
culture statistics. This unit also carries the responsibility for EU Statistics on Science, Technology and Innovation. The latter statistical domain covers
R&D statistics, Community Innovation Statistics, statistics on Human Resources in Science and Technology, statistics on the Career Development of
Doctorate Holders, Patent statistics and statistics on High-Tech industries and Knowledge-Based services.  
Much of the data used in the Key Figures publication of the Directorate General for Research is taken from EU Statistics on Science, Technology and
Innovation (STI statistics). Beyond the data itself, Eurostat also contributed to the drafting of two sections of this year’s edition (sections II.2: ‘Human
Resources in Science and Technology’ and II.4: ‘Technological Output’).
All EU STI statistics are available free of charge from the Eurostat website under “Science and technology”. The data and tables disseminated are struc-
tured in the domains listed above, and are updated regularly. Furthermore Eurostat also releases its own publications, such as the Panorama on Sci-
ence, Technology and Innovation in Europe and periodical “Statistics in Focus” booklets on STI statistics.  
URL: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
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Preface 
The EU’s top priority is to improve quality of life, boost economic growth and create jobs – all in a sustainable way, of course!
This can only be achieved through far-reaching reforms that will transform Europe into a dynamic knowledge economy, providing
excellent education, undertaking top research and defining a space for creativity and innovation. Knowledge and innovation are
increasingly primary factors for European competitiveness.
The transformation of Europe into a dynamic knowledge-based economy is the objective of what is known as the “Lisbon” agenda of structural reforms since
2000. In this framework, at the European Summit held in Barcelona in March 2002, European Heads of State and Government set themselves the goal of
  increasing Europe’s overall level of investment in research to 3 % of GDP by 2010, and of raising the share of research funded by business. Since then, re-
search and innovation appears at the top of the agenda in almost all the National Reform Programmes prepared by the Member States as part of a renewal
of the Growth and Jobs Strategy. 
The 2007 edition of Key Figures presents official data on the evolution of R&D activities up to 2005 and the trends are worrying. After a period of slow but
continued growth at the end of the nineties, R&D intensity in the 27 EU countries stagnated in 2001-2002 and even decreased slightly after that. In 2005,
only 1.84 % of GDP was invested in R&D in the EU, well below the 3 % Barcelona objective. Of course, there are differences within the EU and some   Member
States have managed to make considerable headway in boosting their R&D investment in recent years.
Globalisation is a reality and knowledge is more evenly distributed than ever before. In 1993 the EU, Japan and the US dominated the world scene, ac-
counting for some 83% of total R&D expenditure. By 2005, that figure had declined to 72%. The EU is still the largest producer of scientific knowledge but
we lag behind the US in citation impact in all scientific disciplines and EU Universities are underrepresented in the rankings of the world’s top Universities.
Europe may indeed lose its opportunity to become a leading global knowledge-based economy, but I am convinced that the situation can be reversed if we
react quickly and strongly.
In 2005 and 2006, almost all EU Member States made a commitment to increase their R&D intensities, a very welcome development. There is no doubt that
the EU has many excellent research centres and many competitive firms. However, one of the main reasons for the EU’s mediocre R&D performance is the
fragmentation across national borders of the European research system. This has prevented the creation of a European ‘Internal Market’ for research, where
researchers, technology and knowledge can freely circulate. 
The creation of a true European Research Area would allow us to organise the European research system so that its full potential is harnessed. The result
would be a Europe where it is much more attractive to be a researcher and invest in research. Together we can make Europe into a dynamic, sustainable
knowledge-based economy, which will foster growth and create jobs and sustain our model of society. 
Janez PotočnikKey Figures 2007 6
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Two main trends
justify policy
action
Highlights
The diminishing weight of Europe in
the multi-polar world of Science and
Technology, and its implications for
research strategies
The EU is at a crossroads, where only decisive
policy actions will ensure that the route towards
increased long-term economic growth and pros  -
perity is the one that is followed. In particular two
trends can be identified which make such policy
actions necessary.
On the one hand, in spite of recent optimistic
prospects for EU economic growth in 2007 and
2008, there is evidence that the EU suffers from
astructural growth handicap. Since the mid-1990s,
the EU has no longer been catching up with the
US in terms of productivity. Indeed the EU’s labour
productivity growth rate has fallen below that of
the US for the first time since the end of World War
II. This probably reflects an under-performance in
the creation, diffusion and utilisation of new
knowledge over recent years.
On the other hand, with the rapid rise of – mainly
Asian – newly emerging economies, a ‘multi-polar
world’ is developing in which the sources of
competitiveness such as technology and human
capital are more evenly distributed than ever
before. The EU represents a diminishing share of
worldwide population, GDP and R&D investments
(EU-27 accounts for 25  % of global R&D ex  -
penditure compared with 29 % ten years ago), and
newly emerging economies are no longer
competing on the basis of low-cost activities only.
China is about to overtake the EU in terms of
world share in exports of high-tech products.
Since 2003, China has become the world’s main
exporter of computers. Regarding electronics and
telecom, China has been ahead of the EU since
2004 and will probably overtake the US in 2007.
Moreover, the increasing importance of newly
emerging countries in globalised R&D is not only
due to their rapid economic development and
rising share in world GDP, but is also due to
substantial increases in their R&D intensity (R&D
expenditure as percentage of GDP). 
One of the most visible features of the new, multi-
polar world is the internationalisation of R&D
beyond the traditional borders of the Triad. This
more global focus for R&D spending can be seen
in the increasing diversification of the outward
R&D investment of the US. US firms are targeting
all major regions of the world, and especially Asia,
with the result that the EU’s share in total US
outward R&D spending has been decreasing
significantly since the mid-1990s. This trend is
expected to continue as the new, emerging market
players continue to build up their science and
competitors and
more evenly
distributed
sources of
competitiveness…
On the one hand,
the EU suffers
from a structural
growth handicap
On the other
hand, a multi-
polar world is
arising, with new
…such as R&D,
which is
increasingly
conducted outside
the TriadHighlights Key Figures 2007 8
The EU therefore
needs to increase
the attractiveness
of the European
Research Area
and to capitalise
better on foreign
knowledge
development
technology systems and to open up their 
markets to foreign entrants. As a result, newly
emerging economies such as China and South
Korea already represent a non-negligible share 
of high-tech patent applications at the European
Patent Office (in 2003, these two countries were
responsible for 11% of EPO patent applications
in ‘Communication technology’, and 5.5  % in
‘Semiconductors’).
The EU therefore needs to respond to the
challenges and make the most of the oppor  -
tunities provided by the new international
division of labour. In particular, it has to take the
necessary steps to increase substantially the
efficiency and attractiveness of its internal
European Research Area in order to remain an
important location for internationally mobile
R&D investments. Given this new international
distribution of knowledge creation, Europe also
needs to be in a better position to capitalise on
foreign knowledge development.
Transition towards knowledge-intensive
economies: the need to intensify the
pace of Lisbon-driven reforms
A common policy trend across EU Member States
concerns the important place of R&D and R&D
investment in the overall policy agendas. Under
the influence of the Lisbon Strategy (2000), the
Barcelona ‘3%’ objective (2002) for more invest  -
ment in research in Europe (with increased
private sector funding) and the renewed Lisbon
Strategy (2005), R&D is increasingly considered
a key source for sustaining economic growth and
welfare. Member States are developing commonly
shared R&D policy objectives. Recently, and 
con  sequent to the renewed Lisbon Strategy of
mid-2005, 26 Member States have set targets for
their R&D intensities (i.e. R&D expenditure as
percentage of GDP – each target is not necessarily
3%) for 2010 or other years. Bulgaria is the only
Member State which does not have a target. If the
Member States reach their objectives, the overall
EU R&D intensity will have increased substantially
to about 2.6 % in 2010.
Recent evidence on trends up to 2005 shows,
however, that the EU is not yet on track to meet
these targets. Only a small number of Member
States (Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Germany and
Finland) have over recent years experienced rates
of growth which, if they are maintained, would be
sufficient to advance these countries significantly
towards their targets. A larger group of countries
has experienced a positive average rate of growth
since 2000, but will need to step up its efforts
significantly if it is to deliver on the level of
ambition reflected in these targets. An equally
large group of countries has experienced a neg  -
ative average rate of growth over the past five
years and will therefore need to reverse a de  -
clining trend if it is to start progressing towards
action to increase
R&D intensity…
Member States
increasingly
consider R&D a
key policy
priority and take
…but the EU as a
whole, as well as
most of its
Member States are
not yet on track to
meet their targetsHighlights Key Figures 2007 9
If the current 
– negative – trend
continues, by 2010
EU-27 R&D inten-
sity will have fallen
further behind,
back to its mid-
1990s level of less
than 1.80 % of GDP
these targets. For these countries, the targets set
are extremely ambitious: delivering on the ambi  -
tion reflected in them will require strong
commitment and radical reform packages.
Turning to the aggregate picture, EU R&D inten  -
sity, after a period of slow but continued growth
between the mid-1990s and 2001, stagnated in
2001-2002 and even decreased slightly after that.
In 2005, only 1.84  % of GDP was spent on R&D 
in EU-27. If the current -negative- trend continues,
by 2010 Europe’s R&D intensity will have
declined to its mid-1990s level of less than 1.80 %
of GDP.
As a result, R&D intensity in EU-27 remains at a
lower level than in most of the other major world
economies such as the US, Japan and South Korea.
In these countries, and in spite of some minor,
short-term fluctuations, the trend over the past
decade has been much more positive, outpacing
Europe’s performance in R&D intensity growth.
The R&D intensity gap with our main competitors
has, therefore, not been reduced at all. 
Moreover, new emerging economies such as
China are rapidly catching up. If current trends
persist, it is expected that China will have caught
up with the EU by 2009 in terms of R&D intensity.
The Russian Federation has also increased its
allocation of resources to R&D at a much faster
pace than the EU since the mid-1990s.
These recent trends show that the commitments
made by (almost) all Member States in mid-2005
to increase their R&D intensities significantly up
to country-specific targets were more than appro  -
priate. The fact that, on the whole, no significant
progress has yet been made should encourage the
Member States to intensify and/or deepen the
pace of Lisbon–driven reforms.
The nature and dynamics of the EU’s
industrial structure is the reason for the
R&D investment deficit with the US
More than 85 % of the R&D intensity gap between
EU-27 and its main competitors is caused by
differences in the contributions from the business
enterprise sector to the financing of R&D. There  -
fore, European Heads of State decided at the
Barcelona Summit of March 2002 to increase not
only the overall proportion of GDP devoted to
R&D, but also to improve the private sector
contribution to its financing. In particular they set
the target of increasing the share of R&D expen  -
diture funded by the business enterprise sector
to two-thirds by 2010. 
Despite increased policy attention, the private
sector contribution to the financing of R&D has
not increased substantially over the past 10 years
in the EU. R&D financed by the business sector
remained at about 1 % of GDP in the EU, without
any noticeable variation over the decade. 
The commitments
made by Member
States to increase
R&D intensity are
therefore more than
ever valid but
should be reflected
by intensifying the
pace of reforms
As a result, R&D
intensity in EU-27
remains at a
lower level than in
most other major
world
economies…
…and new,
emerging players
will soon catch up
with the EU
More than 85 % of
the R&D intensity
gap between EU-27
and its main
competitors is
caused by lower
contributions
from the business
sector to the
financing of R&D
Moreover, the
private sector
contribution has
not increased
substantially over
the past decade. Highlights Key Figures 2007 10
It has even been
decreasing since
2000
In 2004, the private sector financed 64 % of total
R&D in the US, 67  % in China and 75  % in both
Japan and South Korea, but only 55  % in the EU.
In the US, despite a reversal in 2001-2002 in
privately funded R&D, the trend over the past
decade is clearly positive. In China too (and to
a lesser ex  tent also in Japan), the private sector
has increa  sed its involvement in the financing of
R&D at a much faster pace than in the EU.
Moreover, since 2000, the private-sector
contribution to the financing of R&D has even
been decreasing in the EU.
Because of the importance of business-funded
R&D in explaining the EU’s R&D deficit, the
report takes a closer look at business sector R&D.
In spite of comparability problems between the
EU and the US regarding the share of services in
total business R&D, it can be estimated that at
least three quarters of business R&D is performed
by manufacturing industries in both regions. 
In the US, manufacturing R&D is more con  cen  -
trated in high-tech industries than in the EU. In
2003, 55 % of total manufacturing R&D in the EU
and 70 % in the US was carried out in high-tech
industries. European industrial R&D is more
likely to be concentrated in medium-high-tech
manufacturing.
The reason behind this different distribution of
manufacturing R&D is not a lower ‘industry-
specific’ R&D intensity in the EU. High-tech,
medium-high-tech and medium-low-tech manu  -
facturing industries appear to have very similar
R&D intensities in both the EU and the US (even
identical in the case of medium-high-tech and
medium-low-tech industries). 
Therefore, the higher concentration of business
R&D in high-tech manufacturing industries in
the US largely emanates from differences in
industrial structure between the EU and the US.
In the US, high-tech industries account for
a much larger share of both industrial value
added and GDP than in the EU. In the US, high-
tech manufacturing industries represent 28 % of
indu  strial value added (3.7 % of GDP) compared
with 19 % (3.1 % of GDP) in the EU. Conversely,
medium-high-tech industries in the EU account
for 24 % of industrial value added (3.8 % of GDP)
compared with 19  % (2.6  % of GDP) in the US. 
In the EU, the industrial texture is more con  -
centrated on medium-high-tech, medium-low-
tech and low-tech activities.
Examining differences within high-tech industries
between the EU and the US, it appears that ICT
manufacturing industries explain almost the
entire R&D funding gap between the EU and the
US, not necessarily because they tend to be more
R&D-intensive in the US, but mainly because of
their larger size. 
the EU are as
R&D-intensive as
in the US
The higher
concentration of
R&D activities in
high-tech industry
in the US largely
emanates from
differences in
industrial
structure (i.e. the
high-tech industry
is larger in 
the US)
At least 75 % of
business R&D is
performed by the
manufacturing
industries
In the US,
manufacturing
R&D is more
concentrated in
high-tech
industries…
…although high-
tech industries in
ICT manufacturing
industries explain
almost the entire
EU R&D funding
deficit, mainly
because of their
larger size in the
USHighlights Key Figures 2007 11
Similarly, the
higher
concentration of
R&D in medium-
tech industries in
the EU is mainly
explained by
structural
differences
Similarly, the higher concentration of R&D
expenditure in medium-tech industries in the
EU is primarily due to two sectors: ‘Machinery
and equipment’ and, to a lesser extent, ‘Elec  -
trical machinery and apparatus’. These two
sectors have similar R&D intensities on both
sides of the Atlantic, but they are twice as big in
the EU as in the US. Here again, structural
differences and the larger size of the industrial
sectors seem to account for the largest part of
the differences between the EU and the US.
SMEs represent a higher share of total business
R&D expenditure in the EU than in the US.
However, after adjusting for differences in
industrial structure between the EU and the US
(i.e. correcting for the higher share of SMEs in
GDP in the EU than in the US), it appears that
the situation of European SMEs vis-à-vis their
American counterparts in terms of average
R&D intensity does not significantly differ from
the situation of larger companies. In other
words, from a static point of view, there is no
SME-specific R&D intensity deficit. 
SMEs, however, can grow and become major,
critical players in their sector. Therefore,
differences in industrial structure have an
important dynamic component to be consi  -
dered: 22  % of the US companies which are
now in the world’s top 1000, in terms of market
capitalization, were created after 1980, com  -
pared with only 5  % of their European
counterparts. Of those US companies which
were created after 1980 and are now in the
world’s top 1000, 70 % are IT companies. These
figures reflect the fact that, in the US more so
than in the EU, many new, R&D-intensive firms
active in high-tech industries were able to
develop, grow rapidly and become key eco  -
nomic players. The lack of a similar dynamic in
the EU plays a significant role in the EU/US
R&D investment deficit.
The important role of the public sector 
Although domestic R&D efforts are largely
financed by the business enterprise sector in the
EU and the US, the role of government in the
financing of R&D should not be under  estimated.
High R&D-intensive countries such as Finland,
Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Germany, the United
Kingdom, the US and Japan are characterised by
a high level of involvement from the private
sector in the funding of their R&D activities. In
these countries, however, the level of gover  -
nment-funded R&D is also among the highest,
showing that the roles of the private and public
sectors are fully complementary.
Moreover, in low R&D-intensive countries,
government-funded R&D is higher than busi  -
ness-funded R&D. Government funding of R&D
is critical for creating and developing science
From a dynamic
point of view, the
growth path of
SMEs is crucial:
the lack of rapidly
growing SMEs 
in the EU plays
From a static
point of view,
there is no ‘SME-
specific’ R&D
intensity deficit
a significant role
in the EU-US R&D
investment deficit
High R&D-
intensive
countries
maintain
a relatively high
level of public
R&D support…
…while in low
R&D-intensive
countries publiclyHighlights Key Figures 2007 12
funded R&D is
critical for
creating and
developing S&T
infrastructures
Therefore, it
remains crucial to
increase public
funding of R&D to
help private R&D
to develop further
and technology (S&T) capabilities – a prere  -
quisite for catching up with countries at the
technology frontier – and for supporting re  -
search projects with high expected social
benefits, which the private sector may not find
sufficiently attractive.
R&D funded by government has remained very
stable in both the EU and the US, but at a lower
level in the EU (0.64 % of GDP) than in the US
(0.83  % of GDP). Therefore, the overall public
effort to fund R&D in the EU must be increased
as well, in order for private R&D activities to
develop further and grow on a solid science
base. 
Less opportunities for high-tech 
venture capital
In order to allow Europe to achieve its R&D
potential, the creation and expansion of new
firms in high-technology sectors is essential. 
It is therefore of utmost importance to ensure
that the right conditions exist for “New 
Techno  logy-based firms” to flourish in the same
way in the EU as they do in the US. There is,
however, some evidence of less will on the part
of the EU financial markets to fund new sectors
and new firms than is the case in the US. In
2005, US total venture capital investment (as
a percentage of GDP) was almost 40  % higher
than the amount invested in the EU. EU-US
differences are even more marked when only
early-stage investment is considered: early-stage
venture capital investment (as a percentage of
GDP) is 64 % higher in the US than in the EU.
Moreover, although the number of high-tech
companies benefiting from early-stage venture
capital investment is much larger in Europe
(twice as many as in the US in 2003), the ave  -
rage investment in a technology company is
much larger in the US (in 2003, the average deal
size in a high-tech company was about nine
times higher than in the EU), and there is
a significant disparity between the US and the
EU in the profitability of early-stage venture
capital investment (with average internal rates
of return about 30-50 times higher in the US).
Therefore, the main problem for Europe con  -
sists less of an underperforming venture capital
industry (supply side) than of the level of
development of projects prior to early-stage
financing (demand side). In other words, the
financing of the commercialisation of techno  -
logical innovation cannot be solved solely
through actions aimed at strengthening venture
capital funds specialised in early-stage invest  -
ment. It needs to be assessed in a more
systemic way, improving both the links be  -
tween universities and industry and the quality
of mechanisms for technology transfer.
High-tech venture
capital investment
in the US is
targeted at more
mature projects
generating higher
profits
Less venture
capital for start-
ups in the EU,
especially at
early-stage Highlights Key Figures 2007 13
The EU is the
world’s largest
producer of
scientific output,
but this
leadership is
forfeited when
one adjusts for
size and input
Research exellence: the EU remains
second behind the US, but excels in
traditional domains
The EU is the world’s largest producer of
scientific output, accounting for 38 % compared
with 33 % for the US, 9 % for Japan and 6 % for
China. However, this EU leadership disappears
when one adjusts for size and input: the US
produces significantly more scientific publi  -
cations per million population and per uni  -
versity researcher, or when comparing the
respective levels of public R&D expenditure. 
Moreover, the EU lags behind the US in terms of
citation scores and highly cited scientific
publications, two proxies used to assess the
impact of Europe’s scientific output in the
world. Compared to the US, the EU has lower
impact scores in all scientific disciplines
examined, and generates relatively less high-
impact scientific publications than the US.
Finally, EU universities are very much under  -
represented in the top rank of the world’s
largest universities (i.e. 386 world universities
having published at least 5,000 articles be  -
tween 1997 and 2004). In the group of the 25
universities with the highest citation impact, all
universities are from the US and, in the group of
76 universities with a citation impact score
above 1.5, 67 (88 %) are located in the US and
only 8 (11 %) in the EU.
The EU scores particularly well (i.e. field-
normalised citation impact score above 1.0) in
rather ‘traditional’ scientific fields, such as
chemistry, astronomy, physics and the engi  -
neering sciences (i.e. civil engineering and
materials sciences), while lagging most behind
the US in new, fast-emerging fields. In nano  -
technology, for instance, the EU is the most
active region (i.e. over the years 1998-2001, it
had the largest world share of scientific publi  -
cations in nanotechnology, almost twice that of
the US), but data on citation impact over the
period 1991-2000 reveals again a clear US
dominance.
Scientific output is more dispersed
across scientific disciplines in the EU
than in the US
Scientific output, as measured by scientific
publications, appears to be more evenly distri  -
buted across all fields of science in the EU than
in the US. This is a potentially rich resource in
the medium and long term, but supplementary
efforts are required to ensure that both public
research and industrial R&D are not too
fragmented. 
The EU scores
particularly well
in traditional
disciplines, but
has a much lower
impact in new,
fast-emerging
scientific fields 
Moreover, the EU
lags significantly
behind the US in
almost all
scientific
disciplines in
terms of citation
impact scores and
highly cited
publications
The scientific
knowledge base is
more dispersed in
the EU than in the
USHighlights Key Figures 2007 14
In the EU, the
linkage between
technology
(patented
inventions) and
the science base
is much weaker
than in the US,
particularly in
science-intensive
fields
Knowledge flows from Science to
Technology are weaker in the EU
There is strong evidence that, in recent years,
science has become increasingly important for
innovation. This trend is clear from the number of
citations in patents to scientific work, a number
which grew substantially in the 1990s, at both the
European (EPO) and US Patent offices (USPTO).
Comparing the EU with the US in this regard,
however, shows that in EU countries the linkage
between patented inventions and the science base
is much weaker than in the US: European science 
is relatively underrepresented among publi cations
that provide key contributions to technological
developments. This gap is particularly evident in
some fields with close science-technology inter  -
connectedness such as lasers, semi  con  ductors and
biotechnology. Moreover, the propensity of Euro  -
pean technology to build upon US scientific
developments is generally higher than the pro  -
pensity of US technology to rely upon European
science. 
The contribution of private companies to the
production of scientific publications highly
cited in patents is significantly lower in the EU
than in the US. Compared to the US, the EU is
characterised by a low degree of involvement
of private companies in the conduct of
research leading to publications cited in
patents.
Weaker high-tech performance 
in the EU
The EU’s relatively weak presence in fast-
emerging scientific fields with high promise
and the lack of efficient science-technology
linkages in the most science-intensive techno  -
logies largely explain why the US patents more
than the EU in high-tech areas. While, overall,
EU inventors apply for more patents at the
European Patent Office than their US counter  -
parts, they are less prolific when it comes to
patenting in high-tech areas. The EU’s share of
total EPO patents stood at 38  % in 2003, com  -
pared with 30  % for the US. However, the EU
share of high-tech patents was only 29  %
compared with 37  % for the US, even though 
EU inventors have a non-negligible ‘home
advantage’ at the EPO. The US is ahead of the
EU in four out of the six high-tech areas: (1)
computers and automated business equipment,
(2) micro-organisms and genetic engineering,
(3) lasers, and (4) semiconductors. 
The current development of the nanotech
market is a good illustration of Europe’s diffi  -
culty in breaking through in new, high-tech
industries. Notwithstanding the large public
support for nanotech R&D in the EU (similar to
or even larger than that of the US or Japan),
private investment in nanotech R&D remains
very low compared with the US and Japan: only
The US patents
more than the EU
in high-tech areas
at the European
Patent Office
Compared to the
US, the EU is
characterised by a
low involvement of
private companies
in publications
highly cited in
patents
The level of public
support for
nanotech R&D in
the EU is
comparable to
that in the US and
Japan, but private
investment inHighlights Key Figures 2007 15
nanotech R&D
remains much
lower
one third of the total funding for nano  -
technology R&D in the EU stems from private
sources, compared with 52 % in the US and two
thirds in Japan. Private funding for nanotech
R&D in the US is almost double that of the EU.
Moreover, the number of newly created
nanotech companies, in particular the number
of nanotech start-ups, has been significantly
lower in Europe than in the US over recent
years, leading to a much larger stock of
companies currently operational in the US.
Moreover, the majority of European nanotech
companies are much smaller in terms of
turnover than their US counterparts. With less
and smaller nanotech companies, research
efforts in the private sector are bound to be
smaller in Europe than in America. It is not
surprising therefore to find that America is by
far the most active region in the world for
registering patents in nanotechnology. In 2003,
American applicants registered about 1200
nanotech patents, compared with slightly more
than 400 from European applicants. Altogether,
the European nanotech industry is clearly
lagging behind.
In the US,
nanotech
companies are
much more
numerous and on
average bigger
than in the EUIntroduction Key Figures 2007 16
Introduction
The EU at a crossroads
The European Union is at a crossroads, where only decisive policy
actions will ensure that the route towards increased long-term economic
growth and prosperity is the one that is followed. In particular two trends
can be identified which make such policy actions necessary. 
On the one hand, in spite of recent optimistic prospects for EU economic
growth in 2007 and 2008, there is evidence that the EU suffers from
a structural growth handicap. Since the mid-1990s the Union has no
longer been catching up with the US in terms of productivity. Indeed,
the EU’s labour productivity growth rate has fallen below that of the US
for the first time since the end of World War II. The fact that the EU’s
productivity is no longer catching up with that of the US is mainly due
to the lower overall efficiency of the production process(1), which may
reflect an under-performance in the creation, diffusion, and utilisation of
new knowledge over recent years.
On the other hand, with the rapid rise of – mainly Asian – newly
emerging economies, a ‘multi-polar world’ is developing in which the
sources of competitiveness, such as technology and human capital, are
more evenly distributed than ever before. The EU represents a dimini  -
shing share of worldwide population, GDP and R&D investments, and
newly emerging economies are no longer competing on the basis of low-
cost activities only. The EU therefore needs to respond to the challenges
and make the most of the opportunities created by the new international
division of labour.
The structural growth handicap of the EU and the emergence of new
competitors, which are at the same time important partner countries,
have created a need for decisive policy actions to address the EU’s
structural weaknesses and to reposition the Union in the new reality of
a multi-polar world.  
Knowledge is a key engine for productivity 
and long-term economic growth
The diverging growth patterns in the output performances of the EU
compared to the US, together with the increasing challenges and new
opportunities created by the new major players, have been a source of
deep concern for policy-makers. This heightened level of concern has
led most notably to the initiation of the Lisbon process and its efforts to
encourage governments to launch employment- and productivity-
enhancing reforms. 
Economic performance is determined by a variety of macroeconomic
policies and structural conditions, and thus differs significantly across
regions and countries. Stability-oriented macroeconomic policies (e.g.
inflation, fiscal policy), trade policy, financial market conditions and
labour market institutions impact heavily on the framework conditions
that nurture higher growth regimes in a sustainable manner.
In the long run, however, the economic performance of countries is also
strongly determined by knowledge-related factors (e.g. technical change
and human capital). In particular, R&D and technological innovation have
contributed substantially to the strong US economic performance over
1.The so-called ‘total factor productivity’ (TFP). It is estimated that the reduced TFP growth accounts for
the largest share of the decline in productivity growth (60%) (the remaining 40 % being attributed to
a weakening growth of the capital-labour ratio, or ‘capital deepening’) (Denis, C., Havik, K. and Mc
Morrow, K (2006), ‘EU Growth Trends at the Economy-Wide and Industry Levels’, (DG Ecfin paper
submitted to the EPC meeting of April 2006), Brussels, 2006).Introduction Key Figures 2007 17
recent years. More generally, the contribution of knowledge investments
and activities to employment, productivity and economic growth has
been emphasised in many studies(2).
‘Activating’ knowledge for more growth: 
the need for a systemic approach
However, the relationship between investment in knowledge and
performance is complex and non-linear. What factors can explain the
differences in innovative performance across countries with rather
similar levels of knowledge investment? An important source of diversity
between industrialised economies relates to the respective roles of the
main actors (i.e. firms, universities, and government and other public
research institutions) in the process of knowledge production, diffusion
and utilisation, as well as to the forms, quality, and intensity of their
interactions. These actors are influenced by a variety of factors that
exhibit some degree of country specificity: industry structure, the
education and training system, the human resources and labour market,
the financial system, etc.
Competition policy, public intervention and the further integration of
the internal market should also be emphasised, as they play an across-the-
board role with regard to the influence of the other institutions involved
in the Science, Technology and Innovation system (STI system).  From  this perspective, the STI system covers infrastructure, the education
system, legislation (e.g. IPRs, anti-trust policy, labour market) and, broadly
speaking, corrective measures for market and system failures, as well as
policies aimed at ensuring macroeconomic stability.
By examining all the different institutions in a country that individually
and jointly contribute to the production, diffusion and utilisation of
knowledge, it is possible to identify the main building blocks of an STI
system (see Figure 1). In this system, science, technology/innovation and
2. For instance, according to the EU Economy Review 2004, a substantial increase in knowledge invest-
ment (R&D and education) could boost potential EU growth rates by between one half and three
quarters of a percentage point annually over a 5-10 years horizon. Regarding the US, the knowledge-
based economy appears to be more fully entrenched, with studies suggesting that investments in R&D
and education can explain almost as much as 75% of the US productivity growth rate over the period
1950-2003. The differences in EU-US productivity patterns are fundamentally driven by the superior-
ity of the US in terms of its capacity to produce and absorb new technologies, in particular Informa-
tion and Communication Technologies (European Commission (2004), EU Economy Review 2004,
Brussels).
Science-Technology-Industry
Industry 
structure
Science Technology / 
Innovation
Human resources & Labour markets Financial system
Education/
Training
Growth, 
competitiveness, 
and job creation
Source: DG Research 
Data: Adapted from Amable B., Barré R. and Boyer R., “Les systèmes d’innovation 
à l’ère de la globalisation”, Economica, Paris, 1997, p. 127.
Figure 1 The Science, Technology and Innovation system and its constituting building blocks
Key Figures 2007Introduction Key Figures 2007 18
industry are central but not sufficient to ensure economic growth,
competitiveness and job creation. The education and training system,
human resources and the labour market, and the financial system – all
have a substantial impact on the performance of ‘Science-Technology-
Industry’. From this perspective, the performance of an economy
depends not only on how the individual institutions perform in isolation,
but also on how they interact with each other as elements of a collective
system of knowledge creation, diffusion and use, and on their interplay
with other institutions.
Moreover, because national systems have developed at different times
and under different conditions, the characteristics of the STI system of
a country are often rather specific. These disparities between STI systems
are, in part, a product of history and a legitimate expression of national
preferences. However, it is crucial that unnecessary disparities do not
hamper the development of integrated markets for research, technology
and high-tech products towards a true ‘European Area of Knowledge’.
Business investment decisions are primarily determined by the size and
dynamism of these markets, which are thus becoming a crucial factor of
attractiveness in the global economy.
Such interactions between policies and, above all, the need for better
coherence between them, both at the Member State and European levels,
have been stressed since the re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy in the
“Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (2005-2008)” dealing with
macroeconomic, microeconomic and employment issues as proposed
by the European Commission in the framework of the revised Lisbon
Strategy adopted by the Council of Ministers (see Box 1)(3).
Box 1: the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs
(2005-2008)
On March 22-23 2005, the Heads of State and Government of
the EU endorsed the revision of the Lisbon Strategy as proposed
by the Commission. The Spring European Council approved the
simplified governance arrangement with one set of Integrated
Guidelines dealing with macroeconomic, micro  economic and
employment issues. Taking stock of the unsa  tisfactory results
half way to the 2010 target, the Commission proposed a
fundamental revision of the original strategy. To overcome the
rather limited implementation of reform in Member States so
far, the Commission has proposed focusing partnership with
Member States on growth and jobs, and has introduced a Lisbon
Action Plan that outlines actions to be taken at the EU and
national levels in three policy areas:
Making Europe a more attractive place to invest and
work
(1) Extend and deepen the internal market
(2) Ensure open and competitive markets inside and outside
Europe
(3) Improve European and national regulation
(4) Expand and improve European infrastructure
Knowledge and innovation for growth
(5)  Increase and improve investment in Research and
Development
(6) Facilitate innovation, the uptake of ICT and the sustainable
use of resources
(7) Contribute to a strong European industrial base
3. ‘Council recommendation of 12 July 2005 on the broad guidelines for the economic policies of the
Member States and the Community (2005 to 2008)’ (2005/601/EC), in: Official Journal of the European
Union, L205/28-37.Introduction Key Figures 2007 19
Intensifying the pace of reforms
The recent productivity growth performance of the EU in comparison
with that of the US, together with the increasing presence of major new
players,show that the 2005 relaunching of the Lisbon agenda was indeed
appropriate. Many countries now accept that the solution to the EU’s
growth problem requires a longer-term policy perspective, and that a
sustainable long-term recovery process needs to be built upon a Lisbon-
inspired structural reform agenda aimed at effectively addressing the
fundamental growth challenges posed by the accelerating pace of
technological change, globalisation and ageing populations.
In particular, it is essential that the transition of the EU economies
towards a knowledge-driven economy – within which education and
training, R&D and innovation, and ICTs play a critical role – is speeded
up. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the efficiency of R&D, improve
the transformation of new ideas into new products, processes, services
and solutions, and make the overall environment more supportive of
firms wanting to increase investment in R&D.
While the policy challenge of implementing Lisbon-driven reforms
remains a serious one for a large number of EU Member States, it should
be clear that the expected gains are considerable. For instance, a recent
CBS study estimates that the introduction of five key measures of the
Lisbon Strategy (i.e. the Services Directive, reduction of the administrative
burden, improving human capital, 3  % R&D target, increase in the
employment rate) can boost the EU’s economic and employment growth
rates by at least 0.8 % per year for more than a decade(4). 
Creating more and better jobs
(8) Attract more people into employment, increase labour supply
and modernise social protection systems 
(9) Improve the adaptability of workers and enterprises
(10) Invest more in human capital through better education and
skills.
The Commission proposal for the integrated guidelines package is
mainly based on the priority action areas as identified in its Lisbon
mid-term review. While the macroeconomic guidelines (covering for
instance budgetary policy, reduction of public debts and EMU issues)
have no counterpart in the Lisbon Action Programme, the micro  -
economic guidelines build on Lisbon action areas (1) to (7), and the
employment guidelines build on Lisbon action areas (8) to (10).
This integrated approach is intended to leverage the guidelines,
which are the cornerstones of EU economic policy, and make them
a driving force of the Lisbon Strategy. Modernising economic and
employment coordination in the EU will help deliver on the new
Lisbon objectives to create growth and jobs. The proposed integrated
guidelines constitute the beginning of a new governance cycle. On
the basis of the guidelines,Member States have in the course of 2005
drawn up three-year national reform programmes, and report on the
implementation of these on a yearly basis in a single national Lisbon
progress report.
The Commission publishes its assessment of progress on
implementation in its Annual Progress Report,indicating at the same
time where it deems further action is necessary at Member State or
Community level. On the basis of the Progress Report, the
Commission can propose amendments to the integrated guidelines,
if necessary.This integrated approach stimulates a policy-learning
cycle at both the Member State level and the Community level that
will enhance the quality of decision-making and implementation.
4.‘Gelauff, G.M.M. and Lejour, A.M. (2006), ‘The new Lisbon Strategy. An estimation of the economic im-
pact of reaching five Lisbon Targets’, (Industrial Policy and Economic Reforms Papers nr. 1), CPB
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague, January 2006.Introduction Key Figures 2007 20
The rest of this report takes a detailed look at the most important aspects
of EU investment and performance in the knowledge-based economy,
and in this regard benchmarks the EU and its Member States against their
main competitors. The set of benchmarking indicators used consists of
five broad categories – R&D expenditure, human resources, scientific
performance, technological performance, and the impacts of S&T
performance on competitiveness (e.g. high-tech trade performance) –
and is organised in two main parts.The first part compares the European
Union with the other main world regions. Here, the scope has been
broadened as much as possible to include ‘non-Triadic’ economies such
as China and South Korea. The second part examines intra-European
differences and similarities, convergences and divergences by analysing
the performances of the Member States in relation to each other and to
the EU average.I.1 Overall investment in Research an Development Key Figures 2007 21
Part I Europe’s place in the changing
world of Science and Technology
Introduction
Part I compares the scientific, technological and innovation performance
of the European Union as a whole with that of the other main world
regions.The geographical scope has been broadened as much as possible
to include new major world players such as China, South Korea and the
Russian Federation.An intra-European analysis is the subject of Part II of
the report. 
This part is structured as follows. Sections I.1 and I.2 examine the R&D
financing and expenditure patterns of the EU and the world, with the
main emphasis on business sector R&D. In particular, the first two
sections seek to identify the reasons for the EU’s relatively low R&D
intensity. Section I.3 focuses on human resources for science and
technology and assesses the implications for Europe of the changes in
international mobility patterns. Section I.4 presents indicators on
research performance including publication counts and citation scores.
Section I.5 explores the quality of linkages between the scientific base
and technological innovations, using citations in patents to the scientific
literature as a proxy. Section 1.6 elaborates on the emergence of new,
high-tech industries by looking at the case of nanotechnology. Finally,
Section I.7 compares the EU’s performance in high-tech patents and
high-tech trade with that of the rest of the world. 
I.1 Overall investment in Research and
Development
Europe’s investment in R&D is low and stagnating
Europe’s R&D intensity remains at a lower level than the R&D intensities
of most of the other major world economies such as the US, Japan and
South Korea.After a period of slow but continued growth between the
mid-1990s and 2001, the Union’s R&D intensity stagnated in 2001-2002
and even decreased slightly after that. In 2005, only 1.84 % of GDP was
spent on R&D in EU-27. In Japan, the US and South Korea, and in spite of
some minor short-term fluctuations, the trend over the past decade has
been much more positive, outpacing Europe’s performance in R&D
intensity growth. As a result, the R&D intensity gap with our main
competitors has not been reduced at all. On the contrary, if the current
trends as observed over the past five years continue, by 2010 Europe’s
R&D intensity will have declined to its mid-1990s level of under 1.80 %
of GDP.
Moreover, new emerging economies such as China are rapidly catching
up. If current trends persist, it is expected that China will have caught up
with EU-27 by 2009. The Russian Federation also increased substantially
its allocation of resources to R&D between 1995 and 2003. However,
since 2003, Russian R&D intensity has fallen back to its pre-2001 level.I.1 Overall investment in Research an Development Key Figures 2007 22
The weight of advanced economies 
in global R&D is shrinking
Advanced economies such as the European Union, the US and Japan
represent a shrinking share of global R&D expenditure worldwide.
According to OECD data, the EU-27 share declined from 29 % in 1995 to
25  % in 2005. Similarly the US and Japan have lost 4 and 3 percentage
points respectively of their shares over the same period.
Conversely, all emerging economies account for an increasing share of
global R&D activity, mirroring the rapid expansion of their science and
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Figure I.1.1 R&D intensity (GERD as % of GDP) in the major world regions, 1995-2005(1)
1995 2005
PPP$ % PPP$ %
mio (current) mio (current)
 Europe 147588 30.8 242102 26.7
   EU-27
 (1)
139438 29.1 227543 25.0
  EFTA
 (2)
6845 1.4 10905 1.2
   Turkey 1306 0.3 3654 0.4
 North America 195390 40.8 334309 36.8
   US 184077 38.4 312535 34.4
   Canada 11313 2.4 21774 2.4
 Asia 114025 23.8 282522 31.1
   Japan 76182 15.9 118026 13.0
   China 17399 3.6 115197 12.7
   South Korea 13681 2.9 31632 3.5
   Other Asia 
(3)
6763 1.4 17668 1.9
 Oceania 6248 1.3 12678 1.4
   Australia 5639 1.2 11590 1.3
   New Zealand 609 0.1 1089 0.1
   Russian Federation 7373 1.5 16669 1.8
   Israel 2977 0.6 8774 1.0
   Others
 (4) 5400 1.1 11340 1.2
 Total 479002 100 908394 100
 
Table I.1.1 Total R&D expenditure (GERD) for the major world regions, 1995 and 2005
Source: DG Research
Data: OECD
Notes: (1) EU-27 does not include BG.
(2) EFTA does not include Liechtenstein.
(3) Taiwan and Singapore.
(4) Argentina, South Africa and Mexico.
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technology systems. This is particularly true for China and, to a lesser
extent, for South Korea and other Asian economies such as Singapore
and Taiwan. These countries have more than compensated for the
declining share of Japan, and have allowed Asia to take over Europe’s
position as the second biggest region worldwide in terms of R&D activity.
Moreover, the growing share of emerging countries in global R&D is not
only due to their increasing weight in world GDP, but is also accounted
for by the fact that their R&D expenditure is growing at a much faster
rate than overall economic activity (Figure I.1.1). 
The gap in R&D intensity between the EU and its main
competitors stems mainly from the lower contribution
of the private sector to the financing of R&D
As R&D is a main driver of innovation, the EU’s relatively low R&D
intensity is a source of concern for policy-makers.As shown on Table
I.1.2,the business sector accounts for the largest part of the overall R&D
intensity gap between the EU and its main competitors. The deficit in
business-funded R&D explains almost 85 % of the gap between the EU
and the US, and an even larger part of the gap between the EU and the
two Asian countries.
Despite increased attention from policy makers, the
business funding of R&D remains low and has even
decreased since 2000
European heads of state decided at the Barcelona Summit of March 2002
not only to increase R&D intensity, but also to improve the private sector
contribution to the financing of R&D. In particular they set a target of
increasing the share of R&D expenditure funded by the business enter  -
prise sector to two-thirds of the total by 2010.
Box 2: Institutional classification of R&D
Research and experimental development (R&D) comprise creative work
undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge,
including knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of
knowledge to devise new applications.
R&D data are compiled in accordance with the guidelines laid down in the
proposed standard practice for surveys of research and experimental development
— Frascati Manual, OECD, 2002. R&D expenditure is broken down between the
following sectors of performance: business enterprise (BES), government (GOV),
higher education (HES), and private non-profit (PNP). It is further broken down
into five sources of funds: BES, GOV, HES, PNP and abroad. In this publication, R&D
expenditure funded from HES and PNP have been re-grouped under ‘other national
sources’. 
The business enterprise sector (BES) includes all firms, organisations and
institutions whose primary activity is the market production of goods or services
(other than higher education) for sale to the general public at an economically
significant price.
The government sector is composed of all departments, offices and other bodies
which furnish, but normally do not sell to the community, those common services,
other than higher education, that cannot otherwise be conveniently and
economically provided, as well as those that administer the state and the economic
and social policy of the community. (Public enterprises are included in the business
enterprise sector.)
The private non-profit sectorincludes non-market, private non-profit institutions
serving households (i.e. the general public), private individuals or households.
The higher education sector consists of all universities, colleges of technology
and other institutions of post-secondary education, whatever their source of finance
or legal status. It also includes all research institutes, experimental stations and
clinics operating under the direct control of or administered by or associated with
higher education institutions.
The abroad sector includes all institutions and individuals located outside the
political borders of a country, except vehicles, ships, aircraft and space satellites
operated by domestic entities and testing grounds acquired by such entities. It also
includes all international organisations (except business enterprises), including
facilities and operations within the country’s borders.I.1 Overall investment in Research an Development Key Figures 2007 24
As shown on Figure I.1.2, the private sector contribution to the financing
of R&D in the EU has not progressed substantially over the past 10 years.
R&D financed by the business sector remained at about 1 % of GDP in the
EU, without any noticeable variation over the decade. In 2004, the private
sector financed 64 % of total R&D in the US, 67 % in China and 75 % in both
Japan and South Korea, compared to only 55 % in the EU.In the US, the trend
over the past decade is clearly positive, despite a trend reversal in 2001-
2002. In China too, and to a lesser extent Japan, the financing of R&D by the
private sector has increased at a much faster pace than in the EU. Moreover,
since 2000, the private sector contribution to the financing of R&D has
actually been decreasing in the EU. As a result, the gap between Europe and
the US and Japan has widened significantly over the past decade.
R&D funded by government has in general remained very stable, although
slightly less stable in the US, and at rather similar levels (between 0.6 % and
0.8  % of GDP). This shows that the business sector is the funding sector
which is mainly responsible for the increasing R&D intensity gap between
the EU and the US over the past decade. 
When considering these figures, it is worth mentioning that the level of
domestic R&D financed from private sources is slightly under-estimated in
the EU, due to the unavailability of a breakdown in the category ‘funded
from abroad’ between private and public sources. However, since total
55% 55% 54% 55% 56% 56% 56%
53% 53% 54% 55%
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Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat, OECD
Notes: (1) The %’s on the graph refer to the share of GERD financed by business enterprise.
(2) US: GERD does not include most or all capital expenditure.
Figure I.1.2 GERD financed by business enterprise and by government 
as % of GDP, 1995-2005(1)
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R&D intensity Privately Publicly
(GERD  financed  financed
as % of R&D intensity R&D intensity
GDP) (GERD financed (GERD financed
by business) by government)
as % of as % of
 G DP) GDP)
   EU-27
 (1) 1.84 1.00 0.64
   US 2.67 1.70 0.83
   Japan 3.17 2.37 0.57
   South Korea 2.99 2.13 0.69
   US - EU gap 0.83 0.70 0.19
   Japan - EU gap 1.33 1.37 -0.07
   South Korea - EU gap 1.15 1.13 0.05
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat, OECD
Notes: (1) Funding from abroad and from other national sources is not shown on the Table.
(2) US, JP:2004.
Table I.1.2 Contribution of the main funding sectors (business, government)(1)
to the overall R&D intensity gap, 2005(2)
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R&D expenditure funded from abroad repre  sented only 0.16 % of GDP
in EU-27 in 2005, this margin of error does not invalidate the observation
that the bulk of the R&D intensity gap is caused by the low and
stagnating business sector contribution to the funding of R&D.
Private financing of R&D is more pro-cyclical 
in the US than in the EU
Not surprisingly, there is a positive correlation between the overall
business cycle and the involvement of the private sector in the funding
of R&D. This was evident, for instance, in the increasing level of privately
funded R&D during the second half of the mid-1990s in both the EU and
the US, followed by a decline after 2000 (Figure I.1.2). There are also
some interesting differences between the EU and the US in the cyclical
evolution of private investment (Figure I.1.3).
Up until 2000 business-funded R&D in the EU grew at a very high rate
which even outpaced the rate of GDP growth. This trend continued in
2001, even though growth weakened on both fronts. After 2001, the
economic slowdown translated into a sharp reduction in the growth of
business-funded R&D which, in 2002 and 2003, was negative and well
below the rate of GDP growth. 
A similar pattern was observed in the US, albeit with two noticeable
differences. Firstly, growth of privately financed R&D is much more 
pro-cyclical in the US: its growth rates were two to three times higher
than overall GDP growth until 2000, dropped more sharply than in the
EU in 2001-2002 and experienced subsequently a stronger recovery from
2003 onwards. Secondly, there seems to be a one year time-lag between
the EU and the US. The big decline in private investment growth
occurred in 2001-2002 in the US whereas, in the EU, it took place mainly
in 2002-2003. Conversely, the recovery of both economic growth and
the level of business-funded R&D started in 2003 in the US, but only from
2004 onwards in the EU. 
Given the stronger pro-cyclical behaviour of private R&D investment in
the US, one can expect US business-funded R&D expenditure to pull
further ahead of the EU after 2005. Although not fully comparable, data
from the ‘Industrial Scoreboard’ on global R&D investment by large
companies tend to confirm this cyclical evolution (Figure I.1.3). They
also tend to show a recovery of worldwide private R&D investment since
2005. However, private R&D investment continues to grow less strongly
in the EU than in the US. 
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I.2 R&D in the business sector
Two thirds to three quarters of all R&D activities worldwide are carried
out in the business enterprise sector(5). Therefore, the business sector is
not only the principal financing sector of R&D, it is also by far the main
performer of R&D. Moreover, within the ‘research fabrics’, the business
sector is the closest to consumers and therefore best positioned to
develop products based on new knowledge (or new combinations of
existing knowledge) and to exploit them commercially.The involvement
of the business sector in research-driven activities is therefore crucial for
Europe’s future economic growth and competitiveness. 
Business R&D expenditure remains low and is stagnating
As is the case with the overall R&D investment position of the EU, R&D
expenditure in the business sector, at about 1.2 % of GDP, remains at a
lower level than in most of the other main world regions. Whereas
business expenditure on R&D (as % of GDP) increased in the second
half of the 1990s, since 2001 the trend has been negative. 
Conversely, business R&D is increasing at a fast pace in Asia (even though
Japan’s rate of growth is diminishing) while, in the US, the downward
trend of 2001-2002 has come to an end and turned back into positive
growth. If these trends are maintained, private R&D investment in China
will have reached the same level as the EU by 2008.
Europe is losing its attractiveness 
for international R&D investments
In tandem with the overall process of globalisation, the ‘R&D fabric’ is
becoming increasingly internationalised. While there has been no drastic
variation in overall R&D intensities (with the exception of China), there
has been a significant shift in the level of internationally controlled
business R&D. According to the OECD, the share of domestic business
R&D controlled by foreign affiliates increased from less than 12 % in 1993 5. Part of them are financed from public sources.
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Figure I.2.1 Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) 
as % of GDP in the major world regions, 1995-2005(1)
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to 16.5  % in 2001 in the OECD area(6), an increase of almost 40  %. 
This growth shows that the progressive international relocation of R&D
facilities is fast becoming a key element in the overall process of
economic globalisation. 
Traditionally, R&D internationalisation has been an intra-Triad pheno  -
menon with the EU, but especially the US, as major locations. One of the
reasons for the EU’s low R&D intensity, compared to the US, is the
decision of large European companies to carry out R&D activities in the
US rather than in the EU.These companies probably have good reasons
for doing so: their principal market may be in the US or they may want
to benefit from American technical expertise.
Nevertheless, this phenomenon should normally be reciprocal, with US
companies deciding to do research in the EU in order to benefit from
local expertise or market openings. However, there is evidence that this
is not the case. EU companies tend to invest more in R&D in the US than
do their US counterparts in the EU. Between 1997 and 2003, US R&D
spending in EU-15 increased from 9.7 to 14.2 billion PPP$, while EU-15
R&D spending in the US increased from 9.9 to 18.7 billion PPP$, turning
a net outflow of 0.2 billion into one of 4.4 billion PPP$ (Figure I.2.2).
Although there is evidence to show that EU companies might benefit
from this “technology sourcing” by means of knowledge spillovers to the
parent company,resulting in increased marginal productivity at company
level in the region of origin(7), such a net increasing outflow reflects the
stronger attractiveness of the US research and innovation systems
compared with those of the EU.
Moreover, internationalisation of R&D is no longer limited to the intra-
Triad flows. More recently, this phenomenon has become more truly
global, with many emerging economies becoming important locations
for internationally mobile R&D facilities. A 2004 survey by the Economist
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Figure I.2.2 R&D expenditure flows between EU-15 and the US (billion PPP$), 1997 and 2003
7. See for instance Griffith, R., Harrison, R. and Van Reenen, J. (2006), ‘How special is the special rela-
tionship? Using the impact of US R&D spillovers on UK firms as a test of technology sourcing’, in:
American Economic Review, vol. 96-5 (Dec 2006), pp. 1859-1875.
Key Figures 2007
6. OECD (2005), ‘Measuring Globalisation: the OECD Economic Globalisation Indicators 2005’, Paris,
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Intelligence Unit, for instance, has shown that the favourite locations for
planned R&D investments by large European and US companies are
China, followed by the US and India. 
This more global focus of R&D spending can be seen in the increasing
diversification of the US’s own outward R&D investment. US firms are
targeting all major regions of the world, and especially Asia, with the
result that the EU’s share in US outward R&D spending has been
decreasing significantly since the mid-1990s (Figure I.2.3). This trend is
expected to continue as the new, emerging market players continue to
build up their science and technology systems and open up their markets
to foreign entrants.
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The role of service industries in the business R&D gap
As previously mentioned, EU business sector expenditure on R&D (as %
of GDP) remains at a significantly lower level than its main competitors.
Figure I.2.4 shows business R&D expenditure(8) performed in the
services sector and in manufacturing industry (expressed as a percentage
of GDP) in the EU and the US. 
Compared to the US, the EU has a much lower level of R&D performed
in the services sector.At first sight, this could lead us to conclude that the
EU R&D investment deficit with the US is almost exclusively located in
the services sector. Recent studies, however, have revealed comparability
problems with industry-level data on R&D expenditure. In particular 
they tend to show that services R&D expenditure is significantly
overestimated in the US compared with the EU.
One of the main factors that limit comparability across countries is
differences in the methods used to classify R&D by industrial activity.
Although the Frascati Manual provides some guidelines, it appears that
countries follow different practices in their national surveys when it
comes to classifying large, multi-activity enterprises or firms with R&D as
their main activity. 
As regards the classification of multi-activity companies, the Frascati
Manual recommends using the principal activity of the firm as the
classification criterion, but to subdivide its R&D when the activities are
heterogeneous, therefore using product field information (i.e. nature or
use of the product for which the R&D is conducted) in order to re-
distribute the R&D activities to the manufacturing industry concerned.
However, not all countries use product field data to the same extent to
reclassify R&D which, according to the OECD, ‘may result in similar
R&D expenditure being categorised in different industries across
countries, thus partially explaining the wide range of values for the
shares of services in BERD across countries’ (9). While, in the US, firms
are classified by principal activity only, the majority of EU Member States
use product field information to re-allocate R&D expenditure(10). 
This may explain a large part of the difference between the EU and the
US in the share of services in total R&D expenditure. For instance,
according to the NSF,the classification of much of the R&D expenditure
allocated to the ‘Wholesale and retail trade’ services industry (ISIC Rev3
50-52) in the US is a statistical artefact due to the US classification of
companies according to their principal activity. Because the sale and
marketing of goods and services is a trade activity,a large pharmaceutical
firm or electronics manufacturer (including its R&D expenditure) would
be classified in the trade services industry if the payroll associated with
its sales and marketing efforts outweighed that of any other industrial
activity in the company. The NSF estimates that 93  % of the R&D
expenditure recorded under the ‘Wholesale and retail trade’ industry
(i.e.33.5  % of total services R&D expenditure in the US) should be re-
allocated to manufacturing industry(11). In 2003, the R&D expenditure
recorded for the ‘Wholesale and retail trade’ services industry
represented 36 % of total services BERD in the US, compared with less
than 4 % in France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Sweden.
9. Ibidem, p. 5
10. Among the 13 EU-27 Member States covered in the OECD’s Anberd statistics, eight use product
field information to re-allocate industry-level R&D expenditure (BE, DK, DE, FI, FR, NL, SE, UK) and
five use the principal activity criterion (CZ, ES, IE, IT, PO) (Ibidem, p. 5 and 14-16).
11. National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics (2005), ‘National Patterns of
Research and Development Resources: 2003’, NSF 05-308, Brandon Shackelford (Arlington, VA
2005, 111 p) (see mainly pages 25-30)
8. For a recent overview of these studies and of the comparability problems in industry-level statis-
tics, see OECD (2005), ‘Business enterprise R&D data by industry – A review of Anberd and
other issues’, (DSTI/EAS/STP/NESTI(2005)12), May 2005, 22 p. I.2 R&D in the business sector Key Figures 2007 30
The methodological differences between the classification of R&D
expenditure in the EU and the US may also apply to other services
industries such as ‘Computer and related services’ (ISIC Rev3 72)(12). 
In the US, these represented 27 % of total services BERD, twice as much
as in those EU countries for which comparable data are available. 
Finally, firms with R&D as their main activity (‘Scientific R&D services
industry’, ISIC Rev3 73) are also treated differently across countries. The
scientific R&D services industry comprises companies that specialise in
conducting R&D for other organisations, such as biotechnology compa  -
nies. Although these companies and their R&D activities are classified as
non-manufacturing because they provide business services, many of the
industries they serve are manufacturing industries. This implies that the
R&D activities of a research firm that services a manufacturer would be
classified as R&D in manufacturing, if the same research firm were
a subsidiary of the manufacturer. Part of the services R&D recorded
under this industry may therefore reflect a more general pattern of manu  -
facturing’s reliance on outsourcing and contract R&D. 
In most of the EU Member States such as France, the United Kingdom,
Germany, Belgium and Denmark, the R&D performed by these service
companies is at least partially re-distributed to the manufacturing sector
for which the R&D has been conducted. In the US, the R&D expenditure
of these companies is largely included under the sector ‘Scientific 
R&D services’ (ISIC Rev3 73). In 2003, this sector represented 6  % of 
total BERD in the US compared with 2.5  % in those EU countries for
which comparable data are available. According to the OECD, redistri  -
buting the R&D of this sector could significantly alter the overall manu  -
fac  turing/services distribution in total BERD(13). 
For these reasons, and although it is at this stage impossible to quantify
the exact extent of the overestimation of services BERD in the US, it
would be unsafe to conclude from Figure I.2.4 that the EU/US R&D
deficit mainly emanates from the business services sector. 
In the EU, a smaller share of business R&D is taking
place in high-tech sectors compared to the US
Despite comparability problems, one can estimate that at least three
quarters of total business R&D is concentrated in manufacturing
industries in both the EU and the US(14). A comparison of the distribution
of manufacturing R&D across industrial sectors according to their level
of technology intensity shows that in the US, manufacturing R&D is more
concentrated in high-tech sectors than in the EU (see Table I.2.1).
In 2003, 55  % of total EU manufacturing R&D occurred in high-tech
sectors compared with 70 % in the US. European industrial R&D is more
likely to be concentrated in medium-high-tech and, to a lesser extent,
medium-low-tech manufacturing. 
As shown in Table I.2.1, high-tech industries show a slightly higher R&D
intensity in the US than in the EU. This, however, may be due to the
12. The case of IBM is well-known. Because of the increasing weight of its service activities, the company
switched in 1992 from being a manufacturing company to being a services company, which caused
a significant – artificial – increase in services R&D expenditure in the US.
13. OECD (2005), ‘Business enterprise R&D data by industry – A review of Anberd and other issues’,
(DSTI/EAS/STP/NESTI(2005)12), May 2005, p. 6.
14. If one considers that at least 33 % of services BERD in the US is misallocated and should be redis-
tributed to the manufacturing industry (see above NSF estimation of re-allocating ‘trade R&D’ to man-
ufacturing industries), the share of services in total BERD would be less than 25 % in the US. In the
EU, business services account for 16 % of total BERD.I.2 R&D in the business sector Key Figures 2007 31
inclusion of the sector ‘total chemicals’ in the high-tech category (see
note (1) underTable I.2.1). ‘Total chemicals’ is larger in the EU than in the
US but in both the EU and the US it is also less R&D intensive than high-
tech industries. Medium-high-tech and medium-low-tech industries have
very similar levels of R&D intensity in both the EU and the US. In
conclusion, it appears that R&D intensity by type of industry is very
similar in the EU and the US(15). 
Therefore, the higher concentration of business R&D in high-tech
industries in the US largely emanates from differences in industrial
15. Even though low-tech industries represent only less than 5 % of manufacturing BERD in both the EU
and the US, and therefore do not play any important role in explaining EU-US differences in business
R&D intensity, it is interesting to note that in the US low-tech industries are much more R&D-inten-
sive than in the EU. They also represent a lower share of GDP in the US.
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Figure I.2.5 Sectoral composition of R&D investment by EU and US companies, 2005
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Total of which :
manufacturing
High-Tech Medium-High-Tech Medium-Low-Tech Low-Tech
 Manufacturing BERD as % of total GDP
   EU-27
 (2)   1.02 0.56 0.35 0.07 0.04
   US 1.18 0.81 0.25 0.05 0.07
 Ratio US / EU-27 
(2) 115% 146% 70% 74% 154%
 Value Added as % of total GDP
   EU-27
 (2)   15.9 3.1 3.8 3.8 5.2
   US 13.4 3.7 2.6 2.8 4.3
 Ratio US / EU-27 
(2) 84% 121% 68% 73% 83%
 Manufacturing BERD as % of  Value Added 
   EU-27
 (2)   6.4 18.1 9.3 1.8 0.9
   US 8.8 21.9 9.5 1.8 1.6
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat, OECD, Groningen Growth and Development Centre
Notes: (1) In the absence of a breakdown for value added between pharmaceuticals (high-tech) and other
chemical products (medium-high-tech), total chemicals (i.e. pharmaceuticals + other chemical 
products) has been included in high-tech. 
(2) EU-27 does not include: BG, EE, LV, LT, LU, CY, MT, AT, PT, RO, SI, SK.
Table I.2.1 Manufacturing BERD and value added by type of industry, 2003(1)
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structure between the EU and the US. As shown in Table I.2.1, in the US,
high-tech industries account for a much larger share of both industrial
value added and GDP than in the EU. In the EU, the industrial texture is
more concentrated on medium-high-tech, medium-low-tech and low-
tech activities. 
Although not fully comparable with the ANBERD data used here to
analyse the distribution of business R&D across sectors, data from the
‘2006 Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard’ on the composition of
corporate investment made by the largest R&D spending companies
worldwide confirm the differences between the EU and the US.
According to the Scoreboard, EU companies considered sector by sector
appear to be as R&D intensive as their US counterparts(16).The deficit in
private R&D spending is mostly due to differences in industry structure
and the smaller size of the high-tech sectors. As illustrated in Figure I.2.5,
67 % of US corporate R&D investment is made by companies belonging
to high R&D intensity sectors, compared to just 36 % for EU companies.
Figure I.2.5 also illustrates how the ICT sector accounts for a large part
of the difference in the sectoral composition of R&D investment by US
and EU companies(17).
Which sectors account for most 
of the EU-US R&D funding gap?
Since the EU R&D deficit with the US appears to be primarily located in
the high-tech manufacturing industry, it is worth examining EU-US
differences in the composition of high-tech industry and the relative
importance of each sector in the R&D funding gap (Figures I.2.6 and
I.2.7). The heavier reliance of the EU on medium-high-tech industries
justifies a deeper analysis of the composition of this sector.
Figure I.2.6 shows both the R&D expenditure and the value added (as
percentage of GDP) for each sub-sector of the high-tech and medium-
high-tech industries. Figure I.2.7 shows the R&D intensity of each
individual sub-sector.The following observations can be made.
The sector ‘Chemicals’ does not play a significant role in explaining
differences between the EU and the US and the higher concentration of
R&D in high-tech sectors in the US. This sector is equally large in both
economies (somewhat bigger in the EU) and it is as R&D-intensive in the
EU as in the US (even slightly more R&D-intensive in the EU). 
‘Aircraft and spacecraft’ industries have equal R&D intensities on both
sides of the Atlantic, but in the US this sector is almost twice as large as
in the EU. It therefore contributes to the higher concentration of R&D
in the high-tech sector in the US, but only because of its larger size.
The ‘ICT manufacturing industries’(18) largely explain the higher con  -
centration of R&D in the high-tech sectors in the US, by virtue both of
their high R&D intensity and their larger size. ‘Office, accounting and
computing machinery’ is much more R&D-intensive in the US than in
the EU, but is equally small in both economies. ‘Radio, television and
communication equipment’ is slightly less R&D-intensive in the US, but
this industrial sector is 60  % bigger than in the EU. Finally, ‘Medical,
precision and optical instruments’ is twice as R&D-intensive and almost
50 % bigger in the US than in the EU. 
16. European Commission (2007), “Monitoring Industrial Research: Analysis of the 2006 EU industrial
R&D investment scoreboard”, (EUR LF-NA-22694-EN-C), Brussels, 2007, p. 9-10.
17. R&D investment by these EU (US) companies is not necessarily confined to the territory of the EU (US).
18. ‘ICT manufacturing industries’ refers to the following three sectors: radio, television and commu  -
nication equipment; office, accounting and computing machinery; medical, precision and optical 
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Two main conclusions can be drawn. First, it is clear that ICT manufa  -
cturing industries play a crucial role in explaining the R&D funding gap
between the EU and the US, not only because they tend to be more R&D-
intensive in the US, but also because of their larger size. To a much smaller
extent, ‘Aircraft and spacecraft’ industries also contribute to the EU R&D
deficit. Second, structural differences between the two economies (i.e.
the larger share of both the ICT manufacturing industries and the ‘Aircraft
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Figure I.2.6 High-tech and medium-high-tech industries (1) - BERD as % 
of GDP and value added as % of GDP, EU-27 (2) and the US, 2003
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Figure I.2.7 High-tech and medium-high-tech industries(1) - 
BERD as % of value added, EU-27(2) and the US, 2003
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and spacecraft’ industries in the industrial texture of the US) seem to be at
least as important as the ‘intrinsic effect’ (i.e. sector-specific R&D intensities). 
Similarly, one can examine which sectors are responsible for the higher
concentration of R&D expenditure in medium-high-tech sectors in 
the EU. 
The sector ‘Railroad and transport equipment’ does not play any
significant role in the explanation of the differences: this sector is much
more R&D-intensive in the US than in the EU, but it is equally very small
in both economies. ‘Motor vehicles’ also plays a rather limited role: it is
only slightly bigger and more R&D-intensive in the EU. The major
differences come from ‘Machinery and equipment’ and, to a lesser extent,
‘Electrical machinery and apparatus’. These two sectors have similar R&D
intensities in the EU and the US, but are twice as big in the EU as in 
the US.
Here again, structural differences and the larger size of sectors seem 
to account for the largest part of the differences between the EU and
the US.
The role of SMEs in the EU-US R&D deficit
Figure I.2.8 shows the business R&D expenditure (BERD) performed by
SMEs(19) and larger firms in the EU and in the US as % of GDP. BERD
carried out by SMEs is only slightly lower in the EU than in the US. 
It should be borne in mind, however, that SMEs represent a higher share
of total output in the EU than in the US. Due to this structural difference
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Figure I.2.8 Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) by type 
of enterprise as % of GDP
19. SMEs are here defined as firms with less than 250 employees.
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between the two economies, the best way to compare the level of R&D
efforts of SMEs in the EU and in the US is to calculate their average R&D
intensities (share of total SME R&D expenditure in total SME value
added). Correcting for differences in the industrial structure betweenI.2 R&D in the business sector Key Figures 2007 35
the EU and the US, and based on estimations of the shares of SMEs in
total output of 61  % in the EU and 41  % in the US(20), the average R&D
intensity of SMEs would be (0.21 % / 61 % =) 0.34 % in the EU compared
with (0.28 % / 41%=) 0.68 % in the US. 
This estimated ‘SME-specific R&D’ intensity reveals a clear deficit be  -
tween European SMEs and their US counterparts. This deficit, however,
is not significantly different from the overall BERD deficit. As shown in
Table I.2.2 the ratio between SME R&D intensities for the EU and the US
is similar to the ratio between the overall BERD intensities for the EU
and the US. 
This seems to indicate that the situation of European SMEs vis-à-vis their
American counterparts in terms of R&D intensity does not significantly
differ from the situation of larger companies. In other words, there is no
SME-specific R&D intensity deficit.
SMEs, however, can grow and become major, critical players in their
sector.As previously mentioned, EU companies are, sector by sector, as
R&D-intensive as their US counterparts, but they tend to be less involved
in some very R&D-intensive sectors/sub-sectors (especially the ICT
sector). In other words, the EU/US BERD deficit cannot be attributed to
the fact that individual European companies perform less R&D than their
US counterparts in the same sectors: the main reason for the deficit is
linked to differences between the European and American industrial
structures.
This difference in industrial structure involves an important time
dimension. 22 % of the US companies which are now in the world top
1000 in terms of market capitalisation were created(21) after 1980,
compared with only 5 % of their European counterparts(22). Of those US
companies which were created after 1980 and are now in the world top
1000, 70 % are ICT companies.
These figures reflect the fact that, in the US more than in the EU, many
new R&D-intensive firms, active in high-tech sectors (often labelled
‘New Technology-Based Firms’ or NTBFs) were able to develop, grow
rapidly and become key economic players. 
This difference between the EU and the US economies is not limited to
the ICT sector: similar trends can be seen in other emerging high-tech
sectors. For instance in the biotech sector, although the number of
companies created is similar in the EU and the US, the average turnover
and number of employees of these companies are much higher in the
US than in the EU(23). It seems that the US economy has the flexibility
20. European Commission (2002), ‘SMEs in Europe. Competitiveness, Innovation and the Knowledge-
driven society’, (KS-CJ-02-001-EN-N), Brussels, 2002, p. 13. 
21. This figure does not include creation of companies through mergers and acquisitions, but only 
ex nihilo creations
22. Cohen, E. and Lorenzi, J.-H. (2000), Politiques industrielles pour l’Europe, Paris: Conseil d’Analyse
Économique, p. 122-126.
23. Cohen and Lorenzi note that, in 1997, there were 1 274 biotechnology companies in the US com-
pared with 1 036 in the EU, but they generated revenue of $15.9 billion and employed 140 000 peo-
ple in the US compared to $2.7 billion and 39 045 people respectively for their European
counterparts (Cohen, E. and Lorenzi, J.-H. (2000), ibid, p. 126).
EU US Ratio EU / US
 R&D intensity of SMEs (estimated) 0.34 0.68 51%
 BERD intensity 1.17 1.87 63%
Source: DG Research
Data: European Commission
Table I.2.2 R&D intensity of SMEs
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to re-orient itself towards new promising sectors, especially through the
rapid growth of new R&D-intensive firms.
In conclusion, the role of SMEs in the overall EU/US BERD deficit has to
be assessed from a double perspective. From a static point of view, the
re-estimated R&D intensity of SMEs is lower in the EU than in the US,
but not significantly lower than in the case of large companies. The total
EU/US BERD deficit lies mainly with large firms; SMEs play a very
marginal role in it. However, from a dynamic point of view, it is
important to note that some of the large US companies which are now
key contributors to US BERD were in fact SMEs 20 years ago and that the
lack of a similar dynamic in the EU plays a significant role in the EU/US
deficit. 
In order to allow Europe to achieve its R&D potential, the creation and
expansion of new firms in high-technology sectors is essential. It is
therefore of the utmost importance to ensure that the right conditions
exist to enable ‘New Technology-Based Firms’ to flourish in the same way
in the EU as they do in the US. There is, however, some evidence of less
will on the part of the EU financial markets to fund new sectors and new
firms than is the case in the US.
Fewer opportunities for high-tech venture capital
Large firms tend to finance most of their R&D effort from profits. In their
case, public policy tends to stimulate activities at the margin only. For
smaller firms, however, access to venture capital is often a decisive factor
in R&D investment decisions. In other words, venture capital can play
a critical role in the creation and expansion of R&D-intensive SMEs,
because the anticipated research effort is likely to be beyond their
financial capacity. Venture capital (VC) investment can finance the seed,
start-up and expansion phases of a firm’s life cycle. It provides equity
capital and managerial skills for high-risk promising new companies,
which frequently are found in the high-tech and knowledge-intensive
sectors.
In terms of venture capital investment in relation to GDP, the EU is still
lagging behind the US. In 2005, the US’s total venture capital investment
was 1.8 euro per thousand GDP, almost 40  % higher than the amount
invested in the EU. EU-US differences are even more marked when only
early-stage investment is considered: early-stage venture capital in  -
vestment equals 0.35 euro per thousand GDP in the US compared with
0.21 in the EU, a difference of 64%.
A recent study by the European Commission, based on comparable data
but focusing on venture capital investment in high-tech sectors points to
three major differences between the EU and the US(24):
1) The number of high-tech companies benefiting from early-stage
venture capital investment is much higher in Europe (twice as much as
the US in 2003). 
2)The average investment in a technology company is much larger in 
the US (in 2003, the average deal size in a high-tech company was about
nine times higher than in the EU).
3) There is a significant disparity between the US and the EU in the
profitability of early-stage venture capital investment: in 2003, average
internal rates of return were 30-50 times higher in the US. 
24. European Commission (2005), ‘The shifting structure of private equity funding in Europe. What role
for early stage investment?’, (ECFIN/L/6(2005)REP/51515-EN). I.2 R&D in the business sector Key Figures 2007 37
This study concluded that the main problem for Europe consists less of
an underperforming venture capital industry (supply side) than of the
level of development of projects prior to early-stage financing (demand
side). In other words, the financing of the commercialisation of
technological innovation cannot be solved solely through actions aimed
at strengthening venture capital funds specialised in early-stage
investment. It needs to be enhanced in a more systemic way, improving
the links between universities and industry and the quality of
mechanisms for technology transfer.
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Figure I.2.9 Venture Capital by stage per 1000 GDP, 2005
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I.3 Human Resources for Science and
Technology: towards new mobility
patterns?
The international mobility of human resources for science and techn  -
ology comprises the mobility of both students at the tertiary level of
education and of graduates employed in S&T occupations. 
International mobility to and from Europe is marginal
The international mobility of human resources for S&T towards the EU,
albeit increasing continuously in absolute numbers, is rather marginal.
In the EU, foreign students enrolled in tertiary education (all fields)
represent only 3-4 % of the total number of tertiary students in 2004(25)
(this percentage increases to 7.6 % if intra-EU27 migration is included).
The share is even lower when one considers S&T employees: less than
2 % of the persons employed in S&T occupations in the EU were of non-
EU origin in 2000(26).International mobility of both graduates and tertiary
students in Europe is in fact primarily an intra-European phenomenon,
with almost half of foreign students and foreign S&T employees coming
from another EU Member State.
International mobility from Europe is mainly directed towards the US.
The scarce statistical evidence shows however that it is very limited. 
The number of science and engineering (S&E) PhDs awarded in the 
US to EU-born PhD recipients between 1991 and 2000 represented 
only 2-3  % of all S&E PhDs awarded in the EU (Reist2003: 226-227;
Estat/NC2006). Given that almost 60 % of these graduate scientists stay in
the US after completing their PhD, and assuming that they include the
EU’s best PhD students, these figures nevertheless show that the size and
impact of the so-called ‘brain drain’ should not be overestimated.
Looking beyond PhD graduates, it is also estimated that about 400 000
S&T graduates living in the US come from the EU. This figure represents
only 3.5 % of the total European stock of S&T-educated people(27).
Conversely, the US is highly dependent on large
inflows of foreign S&T human resources
During the 1990s, employment in S&E occupations in the US grew at 
3-4 times the rate of growth of other jobs. This sustained growth of the
US S&E workforce was made possible by three factors: 1) increases in the
numbers of S&E degrees earned by both native and foreign-born
students; 2) both temporary and permanent migration to the US of fo  -
reign S&E graduates, and 3) the relatively small numbers of scientists and
engineers old enough to retire(28). 
However, as the number of S&E graduates in the US was not sufficient
to meet the demand, the contribution of incoming foreign human
resources was crucial in sustaining the rapid growth of S&E jobs. The
number of foreign students enrolled in US S&E tertiary education more
than doubled between 1983 and 2003, rising from 19 % to 27 % of all S&E
tertiary students over that period(29). As a result, the share of foreign-born
individuals in the total number of US S&E jobs increased between 1990
and 2000 from 14 % to 22 %.
25. Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 2005/6. 
26. This percentage amounts to 4 % if mobility between Member States is taken into account (EC (2003),
Third European Report on S&T Indicators, p. 224).
27. EC (2003), Third European Report on S&T Indicators, p. 226.
28. US National Science Foundation (2006), Science and Engineering Indicators 2006, p. 3-5.
29. Ibidem, p. 2-5.I.3 Human Resources for Science and Technology: towards new mobility patterns? Key Figures 2007 39
At the doctorate level the US is even more dependent on foreign talent:
no less than 24  % of PhD degree-holders employed in US S&E occu  -
pations in 1991 were foreign-born and this share rose dramatically in the
subsequent years to 40  % in 2003(30). Most of these foreign human
resources working in the US had graduated in computer sciences (60 %
in the case of the foreign PhD-holders) and therefore they made a crucial
contribution to the recent ICT-induced economic success of the US.
But the US’s success in importing foreign talent has
significantly weakened since 2001. This, together with
trends in retirement and degree production, may point
to a slowdown in the growth of the US S&E workforce
The US reaction to the events of September 11, 2001 continues to affect
the inflow of foreign-born highly skilled S&T personnel into the US. The
numbers of temporary visas issued by the US Immigration administration
to students, exchange visitors and other highly skilled individuals
dropped sharply after 2001 (by 30% in the case of student visas between
2001 and 2003). Even though the numbers recovered somewhat after
2003, they are still significantly below the pre-2001 level(31).
Moreover, another leading indicator suggests declining foreign enrol  -
ments in advanced S&E studies in the US since 2001. The number of
foreign S&E graduates enrolled in advanced S&E studies declined in
2002 by 5 % and in 2003 by 8 %. The decline was most pronounced in
computer sciences (-28  % between 2001 and 2003) and engineering 
(-17 % between 2001 and 2003), two fields of education for which the
US traditionally has recourse to foreign graduates(32). 
Barring major trend reversals, many individuals in the US S&E work  -
force will retire between now and 2020: in 2003, 28 % of S&E doctorate
holders were 55 years of age or older. It is estimated that the number
of individuals in the US with S&E degrees will triple between 2012 and
2020. Furthermore, projected changes in the composition of successive
US college-age cohorts mean that increasing the number of S&E
degrees earned by US citizens will be a challenge. The share of whites
in the total population, for instance, is projected to decline from 71 %
in 1990 to 58 % in 2020, while historically that group has been more
likely than other groups to earn S&E degrees(33).
The convergence of these three factors – reduced immigration, higher
retirement, lower degree production – may hamper the sustained
growth in R&D employment and spending in the US from 2012
onwards, affecting both the technological progress and economic
growth of the country.
At the same time, Asia is to an increasing extent
retaining its own stock of human resources for S&T
Asian countries that have been a major source of mobile human re-
sources in S&T for both Europe and the US are developing their own
S&T infrastructures. During the past two decades, two-thirds of foreign
students earning a US S&E PhD were from Asia: about 20 % from China
and 10–11 % each from Taiwan, India, and South Korea (compared with
a meagre 13  % from the EU). In 2002, 25  % of all foreign students en-
rolled in tertiary education in the EU were of Asian origin. 
However, Asia is investing heavily in the development of knowledge-
based economies and higher education systems: S&E degree production
30. Ibidem, p. 0-14, 3-4 ; US National Science Foundation (2002), S&E Indicators report 2002, p. 3-4.
31. US National Science Foundation (2006), Science and Engineering Indicators 2006, p. 0-16.
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in China doubled and engineering degrees tripled over the past two
decades. Increasingly, graduates in China can depend on more and better
career opportunities due to the impressive development of both the
business enterprise and S&T system. Many indicators suggest that
countries such as China are already very close to EU and US levels in this
regard.
For instance, China will have caught up with the EU by 2010 in terms of
R&D intensity. Total R&D expenditure in China, after correction for
purchasing power disparities, is equal to about 40 % of the EU total, but
the number of business enterprise researchers (FTE) in China already
represents about 80  % of the equivalent numbers in the EU, with an
annual growth since 2000 that is about three times higher than that of
the EU (Figure I.3.1). Moreover, developed Asian countries such as Japan
are starting to import large numbers of Asian scientists and engineers
(in 2003, 92 % of foreign students enrolled in Japanese tertiary education
were from another Asian country). 
There is therefore no assurance of a continued influx of Asian S&T
personnel onto the world market.
South-East Asia: 
the new major player for tertiary education
When it comes to the domestic production of talented people (in
particular in the S&T fields), both the EU and the US find themselves
increasingly outperformed by countries in East Asia. Indeed, in many
Asian countries, the combined effect of growing populations and rising
access to education has resulted in a dramatic increase in student
numbers and will potentially result in increased attainment rates.
Between 1995 and 2004 the number of students attending university
more than doubled in China and Malaysia, and expanded by 83  % in
Thailand and 51 % in India. This translates into a vast graduate output in
absolute terms: in 2005, China already surpassed the EU with 4.4 million
graduates from tertiary education compared with 2.5 million in the
EU(34). It is obvious that these diverging dynamics are drastically changing
the distribution of human capital stocks around the world.According to
most recent estimates, Asian countries such as China, India, South Korea,
the Philippines and Thailand today account for more than one fifth of
the world’s tertiary educated population(35).
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34. OECD (2006), “Education trends in perspective. Analysis of the World Education Indicators”,Paris,
2006, p. 14-16.
35. US National Science Foundation (2006), S&E Indicators report 2006, p. 3-33.
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Furthermore, even though challenges remain, some indicators suggest
that Asian education systems have comparable quality outputs to the EU
and the US.According to the latest PISA assessment in 2003, 15-year-olds
in the US and in most of the EU’s large economies only performed at
around or below the OECD average. In contrast, the six East Asian
education systems which took part in PISA 2003 were among the top ten
performers.
The logical consequence: increased international
demand for EU-born human resources for Science 
and Technology
It is expected that the US will remain highly dependent on the inflow of
large numbers of foreign-born, highly-skilled immigrants. Domestic
problems (as already mentioned: ageing, reduced immigration, lower
degree production) may even increase the need for the US to attract
talented people from abroad. On the other hand, the tremendous
economic growth of the emerging economies and the concurrent
expansion of their science and technology systems, has created a large
and increasing pressure on their stock of human resources. Therefore,
and in spite of the expanding education system in the emerging
countries, there is no guarantee of a continued influx of talented people
from Asia onto the international markets. All of this will affect the
international production and mobility patterns of human resources and
may cause increased international demand for EU-born human resources
for science and technology. 
I.4 Research excellence(36)
The EU is the world’s largest producer of scientific output, as measured
by its share in the world total of peer reviewed scientific articles: in 2004,
the Union represented 38 % of world scientific output, compared with
33% for the US and 9 % for Japan. China is ranked fourth, representing 6%
of the world’s scientific output (Figure I.4.1).
However, the shares of both the EU and the US have been declining in
recent years, because of the rise of new global actors such as China and
India. The total number of scientific publications produced each year
grew by less than 10 % in the advanced economies between 1997 and
2004 (by 6-7  % in both the EU and the US) while, in the emerging
countries, it rose by more than 40  %. Chinese annual scientific output
almost doubled between 1997 and 2004, mirroring the rapid expansion
and internationalisation of the Chinese S&T system. 
Moreover, the leadership of the EU in terms of total scientific output
disappears when one adjusts for size and input: while the US and the EU
have similar levels of public R&D expenditure (in 2004, the EU spent
0.66 % of its GDP on public R&D, compared with 0.69 % for the US), the
36. This section summarises some trends on the quality of Europe’s scientific output based on biblio-
metric evidence (‘quality’ being primarily measured here by the citation impact scores of scientific
publications). The analyses are based on data extracted from the Science Citation Index (SCI) and re-
lated Citation Indexes on CD-Rom, produced by Thomson Scientific (formerly Institute for Scientific
Information) and covering some 7 000 international journals in all domains of scholarship, with
agood-to-excellent coverage especially in basic science. For more details on the SCI and the fields cov-
ered, see MOED, H. F. (2005), ‘Citation Analysis and Research Evaluation’,(Information Science and
Knowledge Management 9), Springer, Dordrecht, 2005, p. 119-136. I.4 Research excellence Key Figures 2007 42
US produces significantly more scientific publications per million
population (in 2004, 894 publications compared with 662 for the EU)
and per university researcher(37). 
Finally, being the world’s largest producer of scientific output does not
necessarily mean that the EU also ranks first as regards the impact of its
scientific output. 
The EU lags behind the US in terms 
of the citation impact of its scientific output
One of the most widely used proxies to assess the impact of scientific
work is citations. Citations of scientific articles give an indication of the
extent to which the scientific work of a research unit/university/country
has an influence and impact on the world scientific community. The
more citations a scientific oeuvre achieves, the bigger its impact and
relevance. 
In this section, the so-called ‘Field-Normalised Citation Impact Score’ per
scientific discipline is used as an impact indicator. This indicator is con-
sidered one of the most suitable measures for international comparisons.
It is the ratio of the actual number of citations received per publication
(excluding self-citations) in a scientific sub-field to the ‘expected’ (aver-
age) number of citations received by all papers published worldwide in
the same sub-field. If the ratio is above 1.0, this means that the scientific
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Figure I.4.1 World shares of scientific publications (%)(1), 2000 and 2004
37. DOSI, G., LLERENA, P. and LABINI, M.S., “The relationships between science, technologies and their
industrial exploitation: An illustration through the myths and realities of the so-called ‘European
Paradox’ ”, Research Policy 35 (2006), p. 1454.
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oeuvre is cited more frequently than the world average.The denomina-
tor (average number of citations per sub-field) is a weighted average tak-
ing into account differences in impact between the journals related to
the sub-field in question (thus high-impact journals receive a higher
weighting than low-impact journals).
The citation impact indicator normalised per scientific sub-field has been
preferred over an indicator normalised per journal. When normalising
by journal, one does not take into account the differing quality or impact
of journals.In other words, the factor ‘quality of journal’ is cancelled out,
because it is the journal’s mean average citation score that constitutes the
benchmark appearing in the ratio’s denominator.As a result, a country
publishing low impact publications in low impact journals may get a
similar score to a country publishing high impact publications in high
impact journals.The impact or quality of the journals in which a country
publishes should not be cancelled out but taken into account, as is the
case here, where a field-normalisation obtained by calculating a weighted
average of the citation rates of the journals appearing in the relevant
scientific sub-field is used.
Figure I.4.2 presents recent data on the field-normalised citation impact
scores per scientific discipline for both the EU and the US. It shows that
the EU’s scientific impact is around or below world average in almost all
scientific disciplines. 
Compared to the US, the EU has lower impact scores in all of the scientific
disciplines examined. The gap with the US is particularly striking (i.e.
difference in citation impact >0.5) in disciplines such as chemistry,
computer sciences and material sciences (in terms of number of
publications the most important sub-field of the engineering sciences).
In all of the largest publishing sub-fields (i.e. basic life sciences, biomedical
sciences, chemistry, clinical medicine and physics, which together account
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Figure I.4.2 Field-normalised citation impact score per scientific discipline, 2002-2004(1)
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for almost two thirds of the total number of scientific articles published
worldwide), the EU scores significantly lower than the US(38). 
The EU-US gap in citation impact scores has remained unchanged in 14
of the 25 scientific disciplines since the second half of the 1990s. The
gap increased even further in seven disciplines, including material
sciences, computer sciences, and mathematics, while in four disciplines
(including basic life sciences and chemical engineering), the EU has been
catching up with the US.
But compared to the world, 
the EU excels in the traditional disciplines
The EU scores particularly well (i.e. field-normalised citation impact score
above 1.0) in traditional scientific fields such as chemistry, astronomy,
physics and engineering sciences (i.e. civil engineering and materials
sciences).
These results are consistent with other recent analyses. The French
Observatoire des Sciences et des Techniques (OST), for instance, recently
published field-normalised citation impact scores for the EU and the US.
Even though the classification of scientific fields used by OST is not
entirely comparable with the classification used here, the results (e.g.
citation impact scores above world average for the EU in chemistry and
in physics, but impact scores significantly below the US in all fields) are
consistent with the findings mentioned above(39).
King (2004) computed a field-normalised citation impact score at
country level (across all disciplines) for 16 EU Member States, the US,
Japan and a few other countries(40). Even though the results are not fully
comparable (i.e. the period studied, 1993-2002, is longer and no EU-
aggregate is presented), the overall conclusion is consistent with the
findings presented above(41). The 2005 EC report on ‘Frontier Research’
also examined citation impact scores per discipline and came to very
similar conclusions(42). 
39. OST, Key Figures on Science and Technology 2006, Paris, p.47.
40. KING, D. A., ‘The scientific impact of nations. What different countries get for their research spend-
ing’, Nature (vol. 430), July 2004, 311-316.
41. According to King’s calculations, the citation impact scores increased in almost all countries. It in-
creased faster than in the US in eight out of the 16 EU Member States (Denmark, the UK, Germany,
Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain and Poland) and slower than in the US in the other eight EU
Member States (the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, France, Italy, Finland, Portugal and Greece). Both
groups of countries represent about half of the EU-16’s scientific output. One cannot thus derive
from these figures any improvement of the EU’s position relative to the US (KING (2004), 311-312).
42. ‘[…] the USA, although producing a broadly similar number of scientific publications to Europe,
leads both in terms of total number of citations (reflecting the total impact of research) and in
terms of the average number of citations per paper (reflecting the average impact per paper)’
(European Commission (2005) p. 26).
38. Although the possibility of a ‘US bias’ in citation practices (US authors over-citing US papers as com-
pared to other countries) is often presented as a potential cause of US superiority in citation impact
scores, it is still a heavily debated question in scientometric literature and no consensus seems to
emerge with regard to either the existence of such a bias or the extent of its impact (see for instance
VAN RAAN, A.F.J., “Fatal Attraction: Conceptual and methodological problems in the ranking of uni-
versities by bibliometric methods”, Scientometrics, Vol. 62, nr. 1 (2005), 133-143 (especially p. 138-
139)). According to Moed, ‘[…] detailed analysis […] found no empirical evidence supporting the
claim that US scientists overcite papers from their own country more than scientists from West-
ern European countries overcite papers from their countries. All countries overcite themselves, rel-
ative to what one would expect on the basis of their shares of citable papers in the database’
(MOED, H. F. (2005), ‘Citation Analysis and Research Evaluation’, (Information Science and Knowl-
edge Management 9),Springer, Dordrecht, 2005, p. 80, 291-300). A recent report by an EC High-Level
Expert Group which came to similar conclusions with regard to the EU deficit in citation impact
scores against the US stated that ‘while this […] may be influenced to a certain extent by a bias in
favour of the USA and other English-language countries in the original data source (SCI), this is
by no means sufficient to explain away the difference between the USA and Europe’ (European
Commission (2005), “Frontier research: the European challenge”, (Final report of the High-Level
Expert Group on ‘Maximising the wider benefits of competitive basic research funding at Euro-
pean level, EUR 21619), Brussels, Feb. 2005, p. 26).I.4 Research excellence Key Figures 2007 45
Using a citation impact indicator normalised by journal tends to show
better results for the EU as compared to the US(43) As already stated,
a normalisation by scientific sub-field (where differences in impact
between journals have been taken into account) has been preferred here
over the normalisation by journal. However, it is interesting to consider
this difference between the two types of indicators, since it demonstrates
that US scientists on average publish more frequently in high-impact
journals than EU scientists. 
The EU generates relatively less high-impact 
scientific publications than the US
An additional impact indicator reflects the contribution of a region to the
most frequently cited papers worldwide. Figure I.4.3 ranks the world’s
most important regions/countries according to this indicator. 
In spite of a contribution to the (top 10 %) high-impact publications that
corresponds more or less to what can be expected, given its publication
output (i.e. about 1.0), the EU lags significantly behind the US. The US has,
compared with the EU, a disproportionate number of highly cited
publications. A look at the top 1  % of the most cited publications
confirms this result(44).
43. For instance the 2002 report of the Expert Group on ‘Benchmarking S&T Productivity’ provided an
assessment of the citation impact performance of EU Member States as compared to the US (see Eu-
ropean Commission (2002), ‘Final report of the Expert group on Benchmarking S&T Productiv-
ity’, June 2002, p. 16-19). For various Member States the report demonstrates an improvement of the
citation impact compared with the US between the late eighties and 1996. Some Member States,
such as Germany and the United Kingdom, even show higher citation impact scores than the US.
44. ‘Analysis of the top 1 % of publications in terms of citations reveals even more discouraging evidence
for Europe [than when looking at citation impact scores]. In almost all fields, the US dominates in
terms of high-impact papers. Its share of highly cited publications is disproportionately much
larger than its share of total publications’ (European Commission (2005) p. 26).
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Figure I.4.3 Contribution to the 10 % most cited scientific publications, 2001-2004 - 
major world regions(1)
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The US dominates rankings of world’s 
biggest research universities
Figure I.4.4 shows the citation impact scores of the world’s largest
universities (in terms of publication output). The 386 universities
selected include 182 EU-25 universities and 122 US universities. The
universities plotted represent respectively 72 % (EU) and 83 % (US) of all
university scientific articles. 
As shown in Figure I.4.4, US universities are highly overrepresented, both
at the top of the ranking based on normalised citation impact and, to
a lesser extent, at the top of the ranking of the number of published
articles per year.In the group of 25 universities with the highest citation
impact, all universities are from the US and, in the group of 76 universities
with a citation impact above 1.5, 67 (88  %) are located in the US and
eight (11%) in the EU. 
Scientific output is more dispersed across scientific
disciplines in the EU than in the US
In order to assess the relative scientific strengths of regions and countries,
it is useful to examine their scientific specialisations.A country’s level of
specialisation in a given field of science is measured by comparing the
world share of the country’s publications for the particular field with
the world share of the country’s publications for all fields combined.
Multidisciplinary sciences and social sciences are not included. Moreover,
it should be borne in mind that,as the relative activity index is calculated
on the basis of the shares of each country in the world total per
discipline and across all disciplines, large countries/regions (in terms of
publication output) influence the average more than small countries,
and will thus tend to be less specialised than the small countries, as they
deviate less from the average. 
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Figure I.4.4 Number of published articles and normalised citation impact for 386 world
universities with at least 5000 articles published during 1997-2004
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However, even though the EU and the US are of comparable size and
therefore influence the average to the same extent, the EU’s scientific
output appears to be more evenly distributed across all fields of science
than that of the US. Although this is a potentially rich resource in the
medium and long term, additional efforts are required to ensure that
activities are not too fragmented. 
The EU shows no strong specialisation or under-specialisation in any par-
ticular field. Conversely, the US is under-specialised in chemistry and en-
gineering sciences; Japan specialises in physics and astronomy but is less
active in biological sciences, computer sciences, earth and environmen-
tal sciences, and mathematics and statistics. China is specialised in chem-
istry, engineering sciences, mathematics and statistics, and physics and
astronomy. It is under-specialised in clinical medicine, biomedical sci-
ences and agriculture and food science. 
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Figure I.4.5 Scientific publications - relative activity index, 2001-2004
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I.5 Knowledge flows from science 
to technology
There is strong evidence that, in recent years, science has become
increasingly important for innovation. This trend is clear from the number
of citations in patents to scientific work, a number which grew
substantially in the 1990s at both the EPO and the USPTO. Comparing the
EU with the US in this regard, however, shows that in EU countries the
linkage between patented inventions and the science base is much
weaker than in the US(45). A recent study conducted on behalf of the
European Commission and based on data for the period 1990-2003
confirms this for the most science-intensive technological fields(46). The
main findings can be summarised as follows.
High-quality scientific publications find their way into
a large number of technological developments
Publications that are (highly) cited in patents are not only cited in the
realm of technology, but are also heavily cited by other scientific
publications. Besides validating the methodological choice of using
patent citations to scientific publications as proxy of knowledge flows
from science to technology, this finding suggests that there is not
necessarily a conflicting logic between the scientific and industrial
communities. In this respect, however, it should also be noted that
45. European Commission (2003), Third European Report on Science and Technology Indicators, 
Brussels, p. 414-418.
46. Breschi, S. e.a., Highly cited patents, highly cited publications and research networks, (Research con-
tract carried out by CESPRI-University Bocconi on behalf of the European Commission (research
contract PP-CT-M2-2004-005), final report delivered in December 2006), 2006.
Box 3: ‘Knowledge flows from science to technology’: 
What can scientific references in patents tell us?
This section looks at one specific form of S&T interaction: the presence of
scientific research in the ‘prior art’ description of a patented invention. The
citations in patents of scientific work form a useful bridge from technology to
science, and vice versa. In particular, citations of scientific publications in patents
enable one to make a precise and detailed link between specific fields of
technology and the scientific disciplines they cite, allowing one to touch upon the
degree of diffusion of science into technology.
However, in interpreting the data, it is important to bear in mind a number of
factors:
1) references to scientific publications in patents represent just one of a number
of different forms of S&T interaction. The absence of paper citations cannot be
interpreted as a lack of scientific interaction with the technology involved,
because many knowledge flows are not visible in publications, patents or cross-
references; 
2) the mere presence of science citations in patent documents does not
necessarily imply a direct contribution to the invention, or a transfer of tacit
knowledge; 
3) patent examiners tend to restrict their reading to a narrow range of specialities,
and to be relatively unfamiliar with the wider literature;
4) the use of the same set of citations by one examiner in several different patents
suggests an occasional tendency to cite by rote, rather than by relevance.
Moreover, some examiners and applicants/inventors may be affected by a national
bias in their citing practice;
5) citations in EPO patents are primarily examiner citations (however, the
examiner sometimes takes over inventor citations, if they are relevant). Examiners
tend primarily to cite other patents for describing the state-of-the-art, as patents
have a clearer structure than papers and they are more easily searchable;
6) a high level of citations to publications primarily indicates a strong relationship
of a technology to basic research. However, in some areas (e.g. mechanical
engineering), the level of citations to publications is low, as research primarily
relates to applied issues, in respect of which the output is already documented in
patents.I.5 Knowledge flows from science to technology Key Figures 2007 49
European scientific publications cited in patents receive a lower average
number of citations in scientific literature than the corresponding articles
published by US authors.This evidence seems to suggest that high-quality
European publications face more obstacles in translating into techno  -
logical applications than comparable scientific output in the US.
But European science is relatively underrepresented
among publications that provide key contributions to
technological developments 
Table I.5.1 shows the shares of cited and highly cited publications in
patents held by both the EU and the US in five science-intensive tech-
nological fields, and respectively for the European (EPO) and American
(USPTO) patent offices. For both EPO and USPTO patents in the field,
the table is divided into three panels. The top panel reports the share of
all citations to publications cited in patents; the central panel reports
the share of highly cited publications (i.e. very frequently cited in
patents). The bottom panel simply reports the ratio between the latter
and the former shares. A ratio greater than 1 just means that a certain
area holds a share of highly cited publications that is higher than its share
of citations to all publications.
An inspection of the table produces a number of interesting results. If we
look at EPO data, out of five technology fields, Europe shows a relative
strength only in two sectors (transmission of digital information and
speech analysis), whereas in semiconductors, lasers and biotechnology
its share of highly cited publications is systematically lower than its
overall share of cited publications. The European shares of cited and
highly cited publications at the USPTO are lower than the corresponding
shares at the EPO. In addition to this, we also observe that the EU’s share
of highly cited publications at the USPTO is lower than its share of all
cited publications for all technology fields considered here.
As far as the other areas are concerned, the US leadership is quite evident,
especially in the fields of biotechnology, lasers and transmission of digital
information. In EPO data, the share of citations to highly cited
publications is, respectively, 64 %, 50 % and 52 %, compared to a share of
citations to all cited publications of, respectively, 53 %, 45 % and 46 %. Not
surprisingly, USPTO data show that the US share of citations is higher,
both for all cited and for highly cited publications.
Transmission Speech analysis Semiconductors Laser Biotechnology
 
EPO Patents
1. All cited publications 
          EU-27 
(1) 26.9 32.1 19.6 23.9 29.8
          US 45.9 39.7 46.1 45.5 53.4
2. Highly-cited publications
          EU-27 
(1) 28.3 55.7 10.1 11.4 24.9
          US 52.1 26.4 49.6 61.3 63.6
3. Ratio (2/1)
          EU-27 
(1) 1.1 1.7 0.5 0.5 0.8
          US 1.1 0.7 1.1 1.3 1.2
 
USPTO Patents
1. All cited publications 
          EU-27 
(1) 15.8 19.9 12.7 20.7 22.3
          US 60.1 61.2 60.7 53.6 64.2
2. Highly-cited publications
EU-27
(1) 11.0 18.7 9.7 14.7 19.7
          US 76.9 68.3 64.5 55.7 68.9
3. Ratio (2/1)
EU-27
(1) 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.9
          US 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1
 
Source: DG Research
Data: DG Research
Note: (1) EU-27 does not include BG and RO.
Table I.5.1 Share of the EU and the US in the total number of scientific publications cited in
patents, for five science-intensive technological fields, 1990-2003
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Broadly speaking, the empirical evidence suggests that European science
is relatively underrepresented in publications that provide key contri-
butions to technological development.A key issue is how far the fact
that Europe does not feature prominently among highly cited publica-
tions is due to the underlying quality of its scientific production or, con-
versely, has to be ascribed to weak transfer mechanisms from science to
technology, or to a combination of both.
Private companies account for a large share 
of scientific publications highly cited in patents
The role played by different types of institutions in the production of
scientific publications highly cited in patents varies across technology
fields, with universities accounting for a large share in biotechnology in
particular. However, private companies account for quite a large fraction
of highly cited publications in all technology fields. In particular, the share
of highly cited publications held by private companies is significantly
larger than their share of all scientific publications. This result suggests
that corporate labs contribute to a large extent to the scientific research
that is incorporated into technological applications.
But the contribution of European private companies 
to the production of scientific publications highly cited
in patents is significantly lower than the contribution
of private companies located in the US
A major feature of the European systems of research as compared to
other geographical areas, especially the US, is the low degree of
involvement of private companies in the conduct of research leading to
scientific publications cited in patents. Whereas the contribution of the
public system of scientific research, i.e. universities and public research
organisations, is generally comparable to the contribution of the
corresponding system in the US, the fraction of scientific publications
accounted for by the private system of research is considerably lower.
To the extent that the ability of private companies to profit from
scientific output generated in the sphere of science depends on the
possession of absorptive capabilities and especially on the existence of
boundary-spanning individuals, this characteristic represents a major
obstacle to the effective diffusion of knowledge from the realm of
science to that of technology.
The propensity of European technology to build 
upon US scientific publications is generally higher 
than the propensity of US technology to rely upon
European science
An analysis of the knowledge flows across geographical areas by origin
of citing patents and origin of cited publications reveals that European
patents tend to cite US scientific publications to a larger extent than US
patents cite European scientific papers (Table I.5.1). In other terms, the
empirical evidence shows the existence of an asymmetry in knowledge
flows between Europe and the US, with a larger amount of knowledge
flowing from the US to Europe than vice versa. Likewise, the propensity
of US inventors to rely upon the domestic science base is significantly
greater than the propensity of European inventors to exploit their
domestic science base.I.6 From science to industry: the case of nanotechnology Key Figures 2007 51
I.6 From science to industry: the case of
nanotechnology
Nanotechnology will have a major impact on the world economy,
because nanotechnological applications can be used in virtually all
sectors. Like ICT, it is a highly pervasive technology that will lead to the
improvement of many existing products and allow the production of
completely new ones. The impressive surge, in the mid-1990s, in the
creation of new nanotech companies worldwide may be a sign that
nanotechnology, in combination with biotechnology, might be a new
technological wave comparable to the ICT wave that has already
profoundly transformed the world. This section focuses on the R&D
performance of Europe in this emerging sector, in comparison with its
main competitors.
Public support for European nanotech R&D is large and
competitive at world level…
The level of public funding of nanotechnology in Europe is high and is
competitive at world level. Public expenditure on nanotechnology R&D
by EU Member States, along with the European Commission’s funding of
nanotechnology research, amounted to about 1.7 billion euro in 2006
(about 2.2 billion US$, Figure I.6.1), an amount which places the EU
ahead of the US (1.8 billion US$), and far ahead of Japan and other
competitors.The European Commission itself, with 532 million euro (665
billion US$) in 2006 and 1.3 billion euro between 2004 and 2006, is the
largest funding organisation of nanotechnology research in the world(47).
47. ‘The economic development of nanotechnology – An indicators based analysis’, Hullmann A., 
European Commission, DG Research, November 2006, p. 14.
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Figure I.6.1 Public and private funding of nanotechnology R&D, 2006
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Figure I.6.2 Evolution of public funding of nanotechnology R&D, 1997-2006
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Figure 1.6.2 shows the considerable increase in public funding of nan-
otechnology R&D in every world region, and particularly in the EU, since
1997. It shows that EU research policy reacted early to the new oppor-
tunities offered by nanotechnology and has been actively participating
in the ‘nano race’ since the beginning.
In fact, the number of universities and research institutes active in
nanotechnology in 2003 was substantially higher in Europe than in
North America (US and Canada combined)(48). As for scientific output,
over the years 1998-2001, Europe had the largest world share of scientific
publications in nanotechnology (41  %), followed by North America
(24%). In terms of impact of publications, as measured by the number of
citations per paper over the period 1991-2000, however, the EU is clearly
lagging behind the US (even though one Member State, the Netherlands,
is ahead of the US).
…but the industrial take-off has not yet occurred
Notwithstanding the large public support for European nanotechnology,
private investment in nanotechnology R&D remains very low compared
to Europe’s main competitors. Only one third of the total funding for
nanotechnology research in Europe stems from private sources (Figure
I.6.1); in the US, private sources account for 52 % and in Japan for almost
two thirds. In volume, private funding for nanotechnology R&D in
Europe is equal to about half of private funding for nanotechnology R&D
in the US.
In fact, the number of new nanotech companies created over the last
25 years (and in particular since the mid-eighties, which saw the
nanotech boom(49) and still active in 2005 is significantly lower in Europe
than in North America (US and Canada combined). Consequently, the
number of nanotech firms is now much larger in America than in Europe.
In particular, the number of nanotech start-ups is several times higher in
America than in Europe(50).Moreover, the majority of European nanotech
companies, mainly located in Germany and the United Kingdom, are
much smaller in terms of turnover than their counterparts in the US(51).
With less and smaller nanotech companies, research efforts in the pri-
vate sector are bound to be smaller in Europe than in America. It is 
not surprising therefore to find that America is by far the most active re-
gion in the world for registering patents in nanotechnology. In 2003,
American applicants(52) registered about 1200 nanotech patents, com-
pared to slightly more than 400 from European applicants. Altogether,
the European nanotech industry is clearly lagging behind.
Moreover other countries, such as Japan, China, India and the Russian
Federation in particular, are emerging in the field of nanotechnology.
Although they may still lag behind on most indicators, they are in
a position to develop and expand and bridge the gap with Europe. They
will very probably become serious competitors on the world market and
attractive locations for research activities.
Europe has missed the ICT wave and may now be about to miss the
nanotechnology wave, in spite of a strong commitment from public
authorities to finance and develop nanotech research in Europe.
48. Ibidem, p. 20.
49. Ibidem, p. 26.
50. Ibidem, p. 20.
51. Ibidem, p. 19. This observation is based on a sample of 357 companies all over the world, from a sur-
vey by Fecht et al., ‘Nanotechnology Market and Company Report – Finding Hidden Pearls’,
WMtech Center of Excellence Micro and Nanomaterials, Ulm, 2003.
52. Ibidem, p. 23.I.6 From science to industry: the case of nanotechnology Key Figures 2007 53
European industry has not yet been able to build upon the strong and
competitive European science base in nanotech and to substantially
increase its research efforts. The nanotechnology field is undoubtedly a
very good example of Europe’s difficulty in translating science into
innovation and in creating innovative products and commercial activities
from scientific results. This difficulty is revealed by the massive gap in
Europe between the development of the science base and that of the
nanotech industry.  
I.7 S&T performance and competitiveness
EU, US and Japan account for most of the most
important (Triadic) patents
Europe, the US and Japan are the most important producers of Triadic
patents. These relate to those inventions for which patent protection is
sought simultaneously at the three main patent offices of the Triad(53). 
However,a number of emerging countries, mainly in Asia, have seen rapid
growth in such patent applications, most notably China in respect of
which Triadic patents rose ninefold between 1995 and 2003 (Table I.7.1).
Indeed, China has now joined the top ten countries filing international
patents, according to the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), with filings for 2005 increasing by 47  % over 2004(54). South
Korea, India and Singapore have also expanded their patenting activities
very significantly since the early 1990s. 
Europe lags behind the US and Japan in terms of 
patent intensity
Of course it is important to relate the volume of patenting to the size of
the country. In terms of Triadic patents per capita, Europe lags behind the
US and Japan, with 34 Triadic patents per million population in 2003,
compared to 68 for the US and 106 for Japan (Figure I.7.1). 
The US patents more than Europe in high-tech areas
While, overall, EU inventors apply for more patents at the European
Patent Office than their US counterparts, they are less prolific when it
comes to patenting in high-tech areas. The EU’s share of total EPO patents
stood at 38 % in 2003, compared with 30 % for the US; however, its share
53. The European Patent Office, the US Patent and Trademark Office and the Japanese Patent Office. Be-
cause it is expensive to apply for patents in several offices, such patents generally relate to inventions
which promise a high economic return.
54. PCT international applications (see http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/
1990 1995 2000 2003
 US 11062 11999 17440 19701
 EU-27 (1) 9903 11328 16057 16108
 Japan 9904 9389 13086 13557
 South Korea 67 325 644 839
 China 12 19 90 184
 Taiwan 10 23 77 108
 India 12 12 58 87
 Singapore 4 2 47 98 4
 Russian Federation 21 51 66 59
 Hong Kong 11 20 33 40
 South Africa 14 24 37 36
 Brazil 11 13 27 35
Source: DG Research
Data: OECD
Note: (1) EU-27 does not include BG.
Table I.7.1 Triadic patents by priority year and residence of inventor
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of high-tech patents was only 29 % compared with 37 % for the US (Table
I.7.2). A more detailed analysis of these data (Table I.7.3) confirms that
the US is ahead of the EU in four out of six high-tech areas: (1) computers
and automated business equipment, (2) micro-organisms and genetic
engineering, (3) lasers, and (4) semi-conductors. On the other hand, the
EU leads in aviation and in communication technology.
Once again one sees the emergence of the Asian economies such as
China, India, South Korea and Singapore in various fields of patenting, as
well as other new players such as Brazil, South Africa and the Russian
Federation. While these economies still have rather modest numbers of
patents in absolute terms, their patent applications have grown at a very
rapid rate.
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Figure I.7.1 Triadic patents per million population by priority year and residence of inventor
Total patent applications High-tech patent applications
Total   % share Total   % share
1995 2003 1995 2003 1995 2003 1995 2003
 World - total 83817 163011 100.0 100.0 14826 37644 100.0 100.0
 EU-27 35335 62250 42.2 38.2 4405 10840 29.7 28.8
 US 28293 48786 33.8 29.9 6453 13845 43.5 36.8
 Japan 13301 27987 15.9 17.2 3055 6834 20.6 18.2
 South Korea  551 5400 0.7 3.3 135 1924 0.9 5.1
 Switzerland 1872 3113 2.2 1.9 115 331 0.8 0.9
 Canada 1217 2736 1.5 1.7 263 793 1.8 2.1
 Australia 905 1958 1.1 1.2 134 396 0.9 1.1
 China
 (1) 120 1898 0.1 1.2 12 703 0.1 1.9
 Israel 502 1587 0.6 1.0 92 490 0.6 1.3
 India 41 1003 0.05 0.6 2 164 0.02 0.4
 Russian Federation 309 641 0.4 0.4 38 108 0.3 0.3
 Taiwan 107 572 0.1 0.4 15 119 0.1 0.3
 Norway 358 533 0.4 0.3 24 90 0.2 0.2
 Singapore 61 416 0.1 0.3 17 196 0.1 0.5
 South Africa 125 415 0.1 0.3 10 54 0.1 0.1
 New Zealand 158 376 0.2 0.2 8 59 0.1 0.2
 Brazil 87 348 0.1 0.2 6 36 0.04 0.1
 Mexico 40 145 0.05 0.1 ::::
Source: DG Research 
Data: Eurostat, OECD
Note: (1) CN: Hong Kong is not included.
Table I.7.2 Patent applications at the European Patent Office (EPO) by priority year 
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Total % share
1995 2003 1995 2003
 World - total 4360 12584 100.0 100.0
 US 2191 5479 50.3 43.5
 EU-27 881 3242 20.2 25.8
 Japan 1064 2088 24.4 16.6
 South Korea  32 395 0.7 3.1
 Canada 43 230 1.0 1.8
 Australia 34 189 0.8 1.5
 China
 (1) 5 131 0.1 1.0
 India 1 84 0.01 0.7
Computer and automated business equipment
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat, OECD
Note: (1) CN: Hong Kong is not included.
Table I.7.3 Patent applications at the European Patent Office (EPO) by high technology field
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Total % share
1995 2003 1995 2003
 World - total 1764 4315 100.0 100.0
 US 690 1520 39.1 35.2
 Japan 559 1351 31.7 31.3
 EU-27 451 943 25.6 21.9
 South Korea  12 207 0.7 4.8
 China
 (1) :2 8:0 . 6
 Singapore 3 27 0.2 0.6
 Taiwan 2 25 0.1 0.6
 Canada 12 24 0.7 0.5
Semiconductors
Total % share
1995 2003 1995 2003
 World - total 218 475 100.0 100.0
 EU-27 77 256 35.3 54.0
 US 106 153 48.4 32.3
 Japan 8 18 3.7 3.8
 Canada 10 11 4.4 2.3
 Russian Federation 5 10 2.3 2.1
 China
 (1)
15 0 . 5 1 . 1
 South Korea  : 2 : 0.4
Aviation
Total % share
1995 2003 1995 2003
 World - total 2679 4857 100.0 100.0
 US 1331 2060 49.7 42.4
 EU-27 831 1349 31.0 27.8
 Japan 278 704 10.4 14.5
 Canada 74 125 2.8 2.6
 South Korea  10 102 0.4 2.1
 Australia 63 99 2.3 2.0
 China
 (1) 3 89 0.1 1.8
 India 2 40 0.1 0.8
Micro-organism and genetic engineering
Total % share
1995 2003 1995 2003
 World - total 280 422 100.0 100.0
 US 88 158 31.3 37.4
 EU-27 117 118 41.7 27.9
 Japan 65 90 23.3 21.4
 South Korea  1 15 0.4 3.6
 Canada 3 8 1.1 1.9
 Australia 1 4 0.4 0.9
 Russian Federation 0 2 0.1 0.6
 Singapore : 1 : 0.2
Laser
Total % share
1995 2003 1995 2003
 World - total 5525 14991 100.0 100.0
 EU-27 2048 4932 37.1 32.9
 US 2047 4475 37.1 29.8
 Japan 1081 2583 19.6 17.2
 South Korea  79 1203 1.4 8.0
 China
 (1) 3 449 0.0 3.0
 Canada 122 395 2.2 2.6
 Australia 29 86 0.5 0.6
 Singapore 8 71 0.1 0.5
Communication technologyI.7 S&T performance and competitiveness Key Figures 2007 56
Europe’s share of trade in high-tech products is stable,
while China’s market share has grown significantly
The EU’s share of the global high-tech market has remained more or
less stable since 1999, at about 17 % (Figure I.7.2). The main feature of
the last few years has been the rapid emergence of China, not just as
a trading nation, but also as a major exporter of high-technology goods.
China’s share of high-tech exports rose from 3  % in 1999 to 15  % in
2005, overtaking Japan whose share fell to 9 % in 2005. Chinese high-
tech exports have grown by nearly 30 % annually since 1999. Over the
same period, the US has seen its international sales of high-tech
products fall significantly, from 26 % to 19 %. South Korea continues to
be one of the important exporters of technology products, with a still
rising share of the global market. India and Brazil have also registered
increases in their high-tech trade, although their share of world
exports is still very small.
China is now the top exporter of computers, 
and second to the US in electronics and telecoms
Looking in more detail, one sees that the growth in Chinese high-tech
exports has been particularly significant in two key areas: computers,
where it is now the world’s number one exporter, and electronics and
telecoms, where it is now second only to the US (Figures I.7.3 and
I.7.4). In the latter area, South Korea is still a significant exporter, with
nearly 5  % of the global market in 2005. Although Europe’s share of
these two markets has remained fairly stable, but still significantly
below the US and China, the shares of Japan and the US have declined
markedly since 1999.
However, when it comes to exports of pharmaceuticals (Figure I.7.5),
the EU ranks number one with a market share of 46 % in 2005, double
that of the US. This is a sector still dominated by the traditional players,
notably the EU, US and Switzerland. Other countries have much lower
shares of the global market, but some emerging countries such as
China and India are gradually expanding their export sales.
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Key Figures 2007
EU-27 
(1)
JP
CN
US
IN 0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
%
Figure I.7.5 World market shares - exports of pharmaceuticals, 1999-2005II.1 Expenditure on R&D Key Figures 2007 58
Part II The EU and the 
European Research Area
Part II examines intra-European differences, similarities, convergences
and divergences within the European Research Area (ERA), by analysing
the performances of the Member States in relation to each other and to
the EU average. Other European countries including the EFTA countries
of Iceland, Norway and Switzerland and the EU candidate countries of
Turkey and Croatia, as well as countries associated with the European
Commission’s Framework Programmes such as Israel are included in the
analysis in so far as is possible. 
Part II is structured as follows. Section II.1 deals with patterns of R&D
funding and performance within the EU. Section II.2 focuses on human
resources for science and technology. Sections II.3 and II.4 regroup
indicators on scientific and technological output; they include an analysis
of scientific specialisation profiles within the ERA. Finally, Section II.5
explores the impacts of science and technology on the competitiveness
of European countries, by looking at indicators such as high-tech trade,
value added in high-tech industries and labour productivity.
II.I Expenditure on R&D
II.I.1 Overall investment in R&D and its
financing
Introduction
A common policy trend across EU Member States concerns the
important place of R&D and R&D investment in the overall policy
agendas. Under the influence of the Lisbon strategy (2000), the Barcelona
‘3 %’ objective (2002) for more investment in research in Europe (with
increased private sector funding) and the renewed Lisbon strategy
(2005), R&D is increasingly considered a key source for sustaining
economic growth and welfare. Member States are developing commonly
shared R&D policy objectives: recently, and consequent to the renewed
Lisbon strategy in 2005, almost all Member States have set targets for
R&D investment. 
This section takes a look at the latest developments in R&D investment.
The volume of financial resources allocated to R&D is an indicator of the
level of commitment to the production and exploitation of new
knowledge, as well as an indirect measure of a country’s innovation
capacity. Both the evolution of R&D intensity (i.e. total R&D expenditure
as % of GDP) in the EU and its Member States, as well as the structure of
the financing of R&D in the different national research systems, are
examined.II.I Expenditure on R&D Key Figures 2007 59
R&D intensity in Europe:  
large disparities and limited convergence
In 2005, EU R&D intensity amounted to 1.84  %. Broadly speaking, one
can distinguish three groups of countries according to the share of their
GDP devoted to R&D (Figure II.1.1).
The three Nordic countries, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, as well as
Germany and Austria, top the EU ranking with values above 2.4 % of GDP
and therefore form the group of high R&D-intensive Member States. In
fact, Sweden and Finland spend significantly more than 3  % of the
national wealth on R&D. A second group consisting of five countries –
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg
– is close to the EU average with values between 1.5 % and 2.2 % of GDP.
Among them, France is the only Member State scoring above average. A
third large group, including the southern European countries and the
new Member States, shows R&D intensities below 1.5  %. Differences
within that group are still large, with countries such as the Czech
Republic and Slovenia showing intensities well above 1  % and others
such as Romania devoting less than 0.4 % of GDP to R&D.
Figure II.1.2 compares the 2005 level of R&D intensity of each Member
State with its recent growth performance (2000-2005). After a period 
of slow but continued growth from 1.80  % in 1998 to 1.88  % in 2001, 
EU-27 R&D intensity stagnated in 2001-2002 and decreased slightly after
that to fall back to its pre-1999 level. 
An examination of the individual Member States’ pace of progress since
2000 reveals a distinction between four groups of EU countries. With the
exception of Sweden, all high R&D-intensive Member States (Finland,
Denmark, Austria and Germany) have been able to increase their already
high R&D intensities between 2000 and 2005. These countries, among
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Figure II.1.1 R&D intensity (GERD as % of GDP), 2005(1)
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat, OECD
Note: (1) IT, NL, RO, UK, HR, TR, IS, CH: 2004; AT, FI: 2006.
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which Austria demonstrates the most impressive rate of growth, are
pulling further ahead of the EU average. For Sweden, a clear trend
reversal occurred in 2001-2002: after having increased sharply from
3.59% in 1998 to 4.25  % in 2001, Sweden’s R&D intensity declined
significantly after that and is now 3.86 %.
The group of Member States with average R&D intensities (France, the
United Kingdom and the Benelux countries of Belgium, the Netherlands
and Luxembourg) all experienced declining R&D intensities between
2000 and 2005. France, whose R&D intensity is still above average, is
losing momentum. The majority of the low R&D-intensive Member States
(i.e. R&D intensity below 1.5 %) is catching up with the remainder of the
Union,albeit at different speeds.Finally,a group of six low R&D-intensive
Member States, including Greece, Bulgaria, Poland, Slovenia, Malta and
Slovakia, has been falling further behind since 2000. 
Member States’ targets for increased R&D investment
are often very ambitious
As a consequence of increased commitments to the renewed Lisbon
strategy and the 3 % objective, 26 Member States have set targets for their
R&D intensities for 2010 or other years (the target is not necessarily 3 %).
Bulgaria is the only Member State which does not have a target. If the
Member States reach their objectives, the overall EU-27 R&D intensity will
have progressed substantially to about 2.6 % by 2010. 
By comparing the annual rate of growth in R&D intensity necessary to
meet each Member State’s national target, under the revised Lisbon
strategy, with the rate of growth experienced over recent years (2000-
2005), we can assess the level of ambition of these targets (Figure II.1.3). 
A number of countries close to the bisector (Austria, Denmark, Ireland,
Germany and Finland) have experienced rates of growth which, if they
are maintained, will be sufficient to advance significantly towards their
targets.A larger group of countries has experienced a positive average
rate of growth since 2000, but will need to step up its efforts significantly
if it is to deliver on the level of ambition reflected in these targets. 
An equally large group of countries has experienced a negative average
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rate of growth over the past five years and will therefore need to reverse
a declining trend if it is to start progressing towards these targets. 
For these countries, the targets set are extremely ambitious: delivering on
the ambition reflected in them will require strong commitment and
radical reform packages.
If, however, the current negative trend persists as observed since 2000,
EU-27 R&D intensity will have further declined by 2010 to its mid-1990s
level of below 1.80 % of GDP.
Contribution from the private sector to the financing 
of R&D: large disparities in the EU
The Barcelona objectives target an increase in both the overall
expenditure on R&D (to approach 3 % of GDP allocated to R&D by 2010)
and the share of R&D expenditure funded by the private sector.
According to the Barcelona objectives, two-thirds of total R&D
expenditure should be funded by the business enterprise sector. 
In 2005, the business enterprise sector financed 54.5  % of total R&D
expenditure in EU-27. Government accounted for slightly more than one-
third of the Union’s R&D spending (34.5  %), while 8.5  % of total R&D
expenditure was funded from abroad (both from private and public
sources). High R&D-intensive Member States such as Germany and the
Nordic countries of Finland, Sweden and Denmark are characterised by
a high involvement of the private sector in the financing of domestic
R&D activities. Conversely, the government sector accounts for a large
share of R&D funding in most of the new Member States and in the
southern European countries.In 2005, more than 60 % of R&D in Poland,
Bulgaria, Lithuania and Cyprus was funded by the government sector.
It should be borne in mind, however, that the shares of domestic R&D
expenditure financed from private and public sources are subject to
a certain margin of error, due to the non-availability of a breakdown
between private and public sources in the category ‘funded from
abroad’. At EU-27 level, funding from abroad represents 8.5 % of total R&D
expenditure. Since it can be assumed that an important part thereof
comes from private sources (from abroad), it is very likely that the share
of the private sector in the financing of domestic R&D is in reality
significantly higher than 54.5 %.
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Source: Eurostat, Member States
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At country level, this margin of error is likely to be large for Member
States where a substantial share of domestic R&D expenditure is funded
from abroad, such as the United Kingdom, Austria, Estonia, Latvia, Greece
and Malta. In these countries, around one-fifth of domestic R&D is funded
from abroad. Unfortunately, an accurate monitoring of the total private
sector contribution to the financing of R&D will not be possible until
statistical data on the breakdown between private and public funding
of R&D from abroad become available from all Member States.
Changes in R&D intensity and the contribution 
of the funding sectors
How did the contributions of the business enterprise sector and the
public sector to the financing of R&D activities evolve over recent years?
At EU-27 level, the declining R&D intensity is exclusively due to the
diminishing contribution from the private sector, while the amount of
R&D expenditure funded by the government sector has remained
extremely stable at 0.64 % of GDP between 2000 and 2005. 
For the countries with established high R&D intensities, the further
growth of R&D intensity was mainly driven by the business sector in
Austria and Germany, and by both the private and public sectors in
Finland and Denmark. Sweden’s declining R&D intensity after 2002 was
exclusively caused by the sharply reduced contribution from the
business enterprise sector. 
Among the low R&D-intensive Member States that are catching up (i.e.
those where the overall R&D intensity is increasing faster than the EU
average), the catching-up process has been largely driven by the business
sector in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Cyprus, Estonia and
Portugal, whereas in Spain, Ireland, Romania and Lithuania it largely
reflects an increased contribution from the public sector. 
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Among the low R&D-intensive Member States where overall
R&D intensity has been falling further behind the EU average,
this has been primarily caused by the weakened contribution
from the private sector in Greece and Slovakia, whereas in
Bulgaria, Slovenia and to a lesser extent Poland, it has been
exclusively due to reduced funding from the government sector.
High R&D-intensive Member States maintain
relatively high levels of government-funded R&D
Although domestic R&D efforts are largely financed by the busi-
ness enterprise sector in the EU, the role of government in the fi-
nancing of R&D should not be underestimated. As has already
been said, the high R&D-intensive Member States of Finland, Swe-
den, Denmark, Austria and Germany are characterised by a high
level of involvement by the private sector in funding these ac-
tivities. In these countries, however, the level of government-
funded R&D is still very substantial, showing that high private
involvement in R&D financing does not preclude government
funding (see Figure II.1.6). No substitution effect seems to occur;
on the contrary, high contributions from the private sector go
hand-in-hand with high levels of public funding. 
Moreover, in low R&D-intensive countries, government-funded
R&D is more important than business-funded R&D. Government
funding of R&D is critical for creating and developing science
and technology (S&T) capabilities – a prerequisite for catching
up with countries at the technology frontier – and for supporting
research projects with high expected social benefits, which the
private sector may not find sufficiently attractive. 
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Figure II.1.5 GERD financed by business enterprise and by government 
as % of GDP - average annual growth, 2000-2005 (1)
Source: DG Research
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Notes: (1) IL: 2000-2002; BE, LU, NL, PT: 2000-2003; BG, DE, EE, ES, FR, CY, RO, FI, UK, TR, CH: 2000-2004; 
AT: 2000-2006; DK, EL, SE, NO, IS: 2001-2003; HR: 2002-2004.
(2) IT and MT are not included due to unavailability of data.
Key Figures 2007II.1 Expenditure on R&D Key Figures 2007 64
II.I.2 R&D in the business enterprise sector
Introduction
The level and intensity of overall expenditure on R&D are key
determinants of the future competitiveness of an economy. In the short
term, the business sector is probably the most important sector of the
economy in this regard: it is closest to consumers and is best positioned
to significantly improve or develop products based on new combinations
of existing knowledge, or knowledge newly developed through research
in-house or elsewhere, and to exploit them commercially. Business R&D
expenditure is market-driven and accounts for an important share of
innovation expenditure. In a direct way and also by stimulating other
sectors, it contributes directly to employment and economic growth.
Trends in the performance of business sector R&D are therefore a key
concern for policy-makers. That is why the European Council of Ministers
has stipulated that two-thirds of R&D expenditure should be financed
by the business sector. 
Trends in business R&D: business R&D intensity 
did not grow in 2005 …
In 2005, the EU had a business R&D intensity of only 1.17  % (Figure
II.1.7), a value which was the same in 2004. Even more worrying is the
fact that this value has decreased since 2000 (with an average annual
growth of -0.6  %), despite the acknowledged importance of business
R&D for the future competitiveness of the European economy.
Four groups of countries may be distinguished in Figure II.1.7. Countries
in the upper right panel of the graph have business R&D intensities
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Figure II.1.6 GERD financed by business enterprise and by government 
as % of GDP, 2005(1) 
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat, OECD
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above the EU average and are still experiencing a further growth in these
intensities. Germany, Denmark, Austria and Finland, as well as Iceland,
Switzerland and Israel, are pulling further ahead (see below for a more
detailed analysis of the sectors driving these increases).
Another group of countries have business R&D intensities above the EU
average in 2005 but have experienced decreases in these intensities since
2000 (lower right panel of Figure II.1.7). Belgium, France and Luxem-
bourg are losing momentum; their business R&D intensities will fall
below the EU average very soon if the current trend continues. Sweden
also has experienced a comparable decrease since 2000 (see below for
a sectoral analysis of this fall), but its current business R&D intensity 
of 2.92  % is the highest in the EU and is far above that of France and 
Belgium.
A number of countries are falling further behind, with both decreasing
business R&D intensities between 2000 and 2005, and below EU average
business R&D intensities in 2005 (lower left panel of Figure II.1.7). In
the case of the United Kingdom, business R&D intensity was above the
EU average in 1999, but has been declining since and is now significantly
below the EU average(1).The Netherlands, with a business R&D intensity
of 1.02 %, is still close to the EU average; with a decrease that is both small
and similar to that of the EU, its relative position remains much the same.
Norway is now clearly losing momentum.
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Figure II.1.7 BERD as % of GDP, 2005 and average annual growth, 2000-2005
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat, OECD
Notes: (1) RO, UK, HR, TR, IS, CH: 2004; IT, FI: 2006.
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1. It must be noted, however, that the United Kingdom has experienced a relatively high GDP growth
in recent years. The decrease in business R&D intensity since 1999 is due to the fact that business
R&D expenditure grew more slowly than GDP.
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More worrying is the persistent negative trend of five new Member
States – Bulgaria, Malta, Poland, Romania and Slovakia – and Turkey, all of
which already have extremely low business R&D intensities (less than
0.45 % for all of them in 2005). The decrease is very marked in all of them
except Bulgaria. The very weak business R&D activity in these countries
is in the process of disappearing entirely. 
The situation is different for all of the other new Member States which
have been catching up between 2000 and 2005 (upper left panel of
Figure II.1.7), some of them like Cyprus and Estonia at a very fast pace
(Estonia has an average annual growth of business R&D intensity of
25.5%). However, all of them still lag well behind the EU average. The
Czech Republic was the top performer of this group in 2005, with
a business R&D intensity of 0.92 %.
Greece and Portugal, while increasing their business R&D efforts, have
already been overtaken by several of the new Member States. Italy too has
been caught up by some new Member States: it now has a lower business
R&D intensity than the Czech Republic and Slovenia and a lower average
annual growth of business R&D intensity than all of the countries in this
group except Ireland. Spain is in the same situation regarding business R&D
intensity as the bulk of the Member States that are currently catching up.
BERD in services: low but growing business R&D
intensity in the services sector
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) in the services sector
in EU-27 amounts to 0.18 % of GDP (Figure II.1.8), compared to 0.13 %
in 1998, i.e. a growth of almost 40 % in less than 10 years. It remains low,
however, compared to total EU-27 business R&D expenditure, which
amounts to 1.17 % of GDP. Only 15 % of all EU-27 business R&D is thus
performed in the services sector. 
For most EU and EFTA countries, business R&D expenditure in the services
sector expressed as a percentage of GDP has increased since 1998. The
only exceptions are Latvia and Slovakia, which experienced a substantial
decrease, and France and Norway where BERD performed in the services
sector remained stable over the last 10 years (not shown).
The highest shares of the services sector in BERD are to be found in small
and open economies with average-to-high R&D intensities: Iceland,
Luxembourg, Denmark,Austria, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Norway
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Figure II.1.8 BERD performed in the manufacturing sector and in the services 
sector as % of GDP, 2004 (1)
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and Ireland. In Germany and France, in particular, BERD is almost totally
performed in the manufacturing sector(2).
In a majority of low business R&D-intensive countries, the share of the
services sector in BERD is relatively high, comparable to the share of the
manufacturing sector (Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria) or higher
(Croatia, Estonia, Slovakia, Portugal, Cyprus). In these countries, the level
of business R&D expenditure in the services sector has rapidly reached
the level of manufacturing business R&D over the last 10 years. 
In view of the limited share of BERD performed in the services sector in
the EU, it is relevant to focus on the sectors driving business R&D in the
manufacturing sector.
Manufacturing BERD by technology intensity: the EU
countries with the highest R&D intensities also have
the highest shares of R&D performed by high-tech
manufacturing industries
In 2003, the share of high-tech manufacturing industries in total manu-
facturing R&D expenditure in the EU was 46.7 % with a wide distribution
of shares across the Member States, ranging from 8.7 % for Lithuania to
70.3 % for Slovenia. European industrial expenditure on R&D is concen-
trated with almost equal force on medium-high-tech manufacturing, with
a share of 42 % at EU level and shares for individual Member States rang-
ing from 18.9 % for Slovenia to 66.6 % for the Czech Republic.
There are therefore marked national differences within Europe in the
distribution of manufacturing R&D in terms of technology intensity. 
The countries where the share of manufacturing R&D performed 
in high-tech industries is the highest are Slovenia, Finland, Ireland, 
the United Kingdom and Hungary with more than 60  %, followed by
Sweden, Denmark, France, Cyprus and the Netherlands with more than
50%(3). 
In general, countries with the highest shares of R&D performed by high-
tech manufacturing industries also have the highest business R&D in-
tensities. 
There are exceptions to this rule. Germany has one of the highest busi-
ness R&D intensities in Europe (see Figure II.1.7), while spending only
33.5% of manufacturing R&D expenditure on high-tech manufacturing.
In fact, Germany’s business R&D is very much concentrated in medium-
high-tech manufacturing (58.6 %). On the other hand, there are countries
with low to very low business R&D intensities, but with reasonable or
even high shares of R&D expenditure on high-tech manufacturing. This
is the case for Ireland, Greece(4), Cyprus(5), Hungary, and also for Slovenia.
It must be noted however that, the low to very low business R&D in-
tensities for these countries are all growing. The high-tech sector is there-
fore a driver of the business R&D intensity growth in these countries.
It is interesting to compare the manufacturing BERD in the different
types of industry in terms of share of GDP (these figures are not shown).
Manufacturing BERD in the high-tech industry amounts to 0.47 % of GDP
3. It must be noted that the manufacturing BERD in Cyprus is close to zero, so that the distribution
among industry types is subject to great variations and therefore is not very relevant.
4. The previous footnote also holds for Greece.
5. Ibidem.
2. It must be borne in mind, however, that differences in the way R&D expenditure is allocated to
industrial sectors (e.g. manufacturing versus services industries) in the national surveys may limit
the comparability of the data on services BERD between European countries (see for instance
OECD (2005), Business enterprise R&D data by industry – A review of Anberd and other 
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for EU-27. In all countries except Sweden (1.5  % of GDP) and Finland
(1.34 % of GDP) it is less than 0.65 % of GDP. In the new Member States,
manufacturing BERD in high-tech industry is less, often much less, than
0.16  % of GDP, except for Slovenia which is comparable to the older
Member States (0.55 % of GDP).
Manufacturing BERD in medium-high-tech industry amounts to 0.43  %
of GDP for EU-27.All countries except Germany (0.94  % of GDP) and
Sweden (0.88 % of GDP) are below the EU average.
Finally, manufacturing BERD as a percentage of GDP in the medium-low
and low-tech sectors is less than 0.14 % in all countries. 
BERD growth is driven by a few key sectors
Business funding of R&D has stagnated in the EU for many years at
around 1 % of GDP,far below the 2010 target of 2 % set by the European
Council in Barcelona in 2002. However, the aggregate situation at EU
level conceals a very different picture at the level of individual Member
States. Some Member States have experienced strong growth in
business-funded R&D.
The strongest growths are linked to the process of catching up by
countries starting from an extremely low starting point: Cyprus, Estonia,
Portugal, Latvia and Greece. However, other countries – Austria, Finland,
Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic
– have been able to combine an existing level of business-funded R&D
(as a percentage of GDP), above or not far below the EU average, with
significant additional growth. This section explores the reason for the
success of these countries by examining the contributions of the
various economic sectors to the growth of their business R&D
expenditures.
All the seven countries analysed below fulfil the two combined criteria
of featuring (1) a level of business-funded R&D that corresponds to at
least 0.6 % of GDP for the latest available year and (2) an average annual
real growth of business-funded R&D of more than 3 % since 1995.
High-Tech Medium-High-Tech Medium-Low-Tech Low-Tech
 Lithuania 8.7 60.5 7.0 23.8
 Czech Republic 18.8 66.6 10.8 3.9
 Malta 28.5 42.8 14.3 14.3
 Turkey 29.4 44.2 18.9 7.5
 Poland 30.5 48.2 11.8 9.5
 Norway 31.6 32.5 16.1 19.8
 Germany 33.5 58.6 5.7 2.1
 Spain 35.9 39.1 13.8 11.2
 Croatia 37.7 19.5 20.8 22.1
 Latvia 39.0 39.1 13.6 8.3
 Iceland 45.1 29.8 6.2 18.9
 Italy 46.5 41.0 6.7 5.8
 EU-27 (2)   46.7 42.3 6.6 4.4
 Greece 47.2 32.7 4.9 15.3
 Belgium 49.5 29.9 14.1 6.5
 Netherlands 50.9 36.9 4.2 8.0
 Cyprus 51.0 23.3 2.4 23.3
 France 51.8 34.8 8.8 4.6
 Denmark 57.9 26.5 4.0 11.6
 Sweden 58.5 34.1 3.9 3.5
 Hungary 60.2 32.1 4.2 3.4
 UK 62.5 28.2 5.6 3.6
 Ireland 62.7 22.3 5.6 9.4
 Finland 66.4 19.5 7.1 6.9
 Slovenia 70.3 18.9 7.0 3.7
Table II.1.1 Manufacturing BERD by type of industry, 2004(1)
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat, OECD
Notes: (1) MT, TR: 2002; EL, FR, CY, LV, LT, HU, SE, EU-27, HR, IS: 2003.
(2) EU-27 does not include: BG, EE, LU, MT, AT, PT, RO, SK.
(3) There is an element of estimation involved in the data for DK, LV and LT.
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Figure II.I.9 Evolution of business enterprise expenditure on R&D by sector
2
Finland
Denmark(2) Germany
SwedenII.1.2 R&D in the business enterprise sector Key Figures 2007 70
Electrical machinery 
and apparatus
(2)
(2)
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat, OECD
Notes: (1) DK: The data for 2000 were estimated by DG Research.
(2) Computer and related services has been abbreviated from ‘Total services - Computer and related
activiies’.
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Figure II.I.9 (contd.) Evolution of business enterprise expenditure on R&D by sector
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Austria is the only Member State which fulfils both criteria but is not
analysed below, due to the unavailability of historical data on business
R&D expenditure by sector. 
The graph presented for each of the seven countries shows the evolution
of business R&D expenditure (BERD) in real terms (PPS2000) since the
beginning of the 1990s. Each graph also shows a breakdown of BERD by
economic sector. In order to simplify the graphs, only the sectors with 
the most interesting evolution are shown as distinct sectors for 
each country, while the others are aggregated in categories such as ‘other
manufacturing’,‘other services’ or ‘other’.
In Finland BERD has almost tripled in the last decade.As shown by the
graph, this dramatic increase is explained by one sector: radio, TV and
communication equipment. This sector alone accounts for 45 % of BERD
in 2004 (compared to 15 % in 1990). 
In Sweden, business expenditure on R&D more than doubled during the
1990s,thanks to three sectors: radio,TV and communication equipment,
pharma  ceuticals, and motor vehicles. The fall in the radio, TV and
communication equipment sector since 2000 explains the decrease in
total BERD since then. 
In Denmark, pharmaceuticals and computer and related services were the
main sectors behind the strong increase in business expenditure on R&D. 
Without the strong growth that Germany experienced in the R&D
expenditure of the motor vehicles sector in the second half of the 1990s,
BERD in the manufacturing sector would be lower now than in 1991. 
In Ireland there are two successive phenomena which explain the growth
of BERD: (1) during the 1990s there was strong growth in the radio, 
TV and communication equipment sector and also in the tele  -
communications services sector; and (2) since 2000 these two sectors
have experienced a downturn, but this downturn has been more than
compensated for by the surge in computer and related services and the
increases in various manufacturing sectors, notably pharma  ceuticals and
instruments, watches and clocks.
Without the strong growth that Slovenia experienced in the R&D
expenditure of the pharmaceuticals sector, especially in recent years, its
total BERD would be lower now than in 1991. The share of the pharma  -
ceuticals sector in total BERD (41 % in 2004) almost doubled in a decade.
The two sectors which successively played a key role in the growth 
of BERD in the Czech Republic are motor vehicles, in the second half 
of the 1990s, and computer and related services more recently. 
These two sectors represent 35 % of total BERD in 2004 (compared to
25% in 1995).
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of these countries.
First, in each of these countries, we find a very limited number of sectors
which have played a key role in the growth of BERD. In other words, the
growth of BERD has not been across the board, but is related to an
increased concentration of BERD in specific sectors. 
Second, although their contributions to the growth of BERD vary from
country to country, these key sectors are generally the same four ones:
1) pharmaceuticals; 2) motor vehicles; 3) radio, TV and communication
equipment; and 4) computer and related services. Clearly, there are
technological and market trends which, at some point in time, create the
conditions in specific sectors that can lead to a very significant increase
in BERD.II.1.2 R&D in the business enterprise sector Key Figures 2007 72
The analysis performed above can be furthered by determining whether
an increase in the BERD of a specific sector in a particular country is due
mainly to an increase in the importance of that sector or to the R&D
intensity of the sector. Doing this reveals that changes in the industrial
structure of the country often play a predominant role in significantly
increasing BERD. Two notable exceptions can be found, however, in the
German and Czech car industries where the increase in R&D expen  -
diture reflects an increase in the R&D intensity of that sector. 
Such changes in the industrial structure can be the result of various kinds
of development. Two opposing cases are those of Finland and Ireland. In
Finland, the key development was the emergence of a domestic
company as a global leader in a fast-growing market segment (Nokia in
mobile communication equipment). In Ireland, the key development was
the attraction of foreign direct investments (FDIs) into a number of high-
tech growth sectors.
The main overall conclusion is that industrial structure and the evolution
of this structure are key determinants of both the level and the trends of
business-funded R&D for a given country. 
From an analytical point of view, this means that the evolution of the
level of business-funded R&D in a country cannot be correctly under  -
stood without paying attention to the sectoral breakdown of BERD.
Sectoral analysis should be a key constituent of any analysis of a country’s
business R&D intensity. 
From a policy point of view, it means that the Barcelona targets should
be seen as an industrial policy objective as much as a research policy
objective. It also means that the range of policy tools to be taken into
account in reaching the Barcelona targets goes well beyond research
policy.
II.I.3 Trends in the financing of business R&D
Business R&D remains largely funded 
by the private sector
R&D in the business enterprise sector is mainly funded by the sector
itself: in 2005 it financed almost 82 % of private sector R&D activities in
the EU. 
High R&D-intensive Member States such as Germany and the Nordic
countries of Sweden, Finland and Denmark demonstrate higher private
sector shares in the funding of business R&D but several low R&D-
intensive countries, such as Bulgaria, Portugal and Slovenia, enjoy
relatively high support from the business sector for their domestic
private R&D.
It is, however, important to mention that these figures contain a margin
of error due to the non-availability of a breakdown between public and
private sources of funding within the category ‘funded from abroad’. 
At EU level, this category accounts for about 10 % of the financing of total
domestic business R&D but, in some countries such as Austria, the United
Kingdom and Latvia, around one-quarter of total business R&D is
financed from abroad.II.1.3 Trends in the financing of business R&D Key Figures 2007 73
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Figure II.1.10 BERD by main sources of funds, 2005 (1)
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat, OECD
Note: (1) MT, IL: 2002; BE, DK, EL, LU, NL, PT, SE, IS, NO: 2003; BG, DE, EE, ES, FR, IT, CY, AT, RO, 
FI, UK, HR, TR, CH: 2004
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Public support for business R&D is changing
The government sector finances less than 8 % of business R&D in EU-27. 
In low R&D-intensive countries such as Romania, Slovakia and Malta, it
accounts for a much larger share of the funding than in higher R&D-
intensive countries, where it represents a small share of business R&D
funding. Moreover, the share of government funding has decreased
significantly over recent years.
In the early-1990s, governments were financing about 12  % of total
domestic business R&D activities, compared to less than 8 % in 2005. The
gradual reduction of direct subsidies to private R&D, however, was
accompanied by the increasing use of fiscal incentives to encourage R&D
activities in the sector, allowing companies to reduce tax payments and
the cost of research. 
In general, fiscal incentives have evolved progressively in the EU Member
States since the beginning of the 1990s, even though individual Member
States choose very different combinations of the two policy tools (subsidies
versus tax incentives) (see Figures II.1.11 and II.1.12). Moreover, the trend
towards more fiscal stimuli has accelerated over the past five years.
Interestingly, while in the 1990s the shift towards more favourable tax
treatment of R&D went, without exception, hand-in-hand with a reduction
in direct subsidies (the substitution effect) (Figure II.1.11), after 2000 the
level of direct subsidies was in most cases no longer reduced but main  -
tained, translating into a net reinforcement of the policy mix. Most Member
States have chosen to focus on the strengthening of the whole portfolio by
maintaining their level of direct funding while expanding their battery of
R&D tax incentives. In some of them – mainly Spain and, to a lesser extent,
Portugal and the United Kingdom – this expansion has even been
combined with an increase in direct subsidies.II.1.3 Trends in the financing of business R&D Key Figures 2007 74
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Figure II.1.11 Direct subsidies versus tax incentives, 1991 and 2000 Figure II.1.12 Direct subsidies versus tax incentives, 2000 and 2006
Source: DG Research, Warda (2007)
Data: Eurostat, OECD
Notes: (1) See annex for definition of the B-index. 
(2) The tax subsidy for EU-27 was calculated as a weighted average, the weights being the share of
a country’s BERD in total BERD for EU-17 in a given year.
Source: DG Research, Warda (2007)
Data: Eurostat, OECD
Notes: (1) See annex for definition of the B-index. 
(2) The tax subsidy for EU-27 was calculated as a weighted average, the weights being the share of
a country’s BERD in total BERD for EU-17 in a given year.
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In conclusion, even though there is no convergence towards one
‘optimum’ level of tax treatment of R&D across EU countries, national
governments increasingly recognise the importance of fiscal incentives
for R&D as a complement to direct subsidies.
By examining a typology of policy mixes that distinguishes four different
classes (as shown in Figures II.1.11 and II.1.12 and in Table II.1.2), one
can further analyse the shift between direct and indirect fiscal incentives
1991
2000
2000
2006
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in the EU. Each graph is divided into four areas bounded by two thres  -
holds: a direct subsidisation rate of 10 % on the vertical axis and a tax
subsidy rate of 0 on the horizontal axis(6).
6. For more details on the justification of these thresholds for categorising policy-mixes, see method-
ological note. See also Warda, J. (2001), Measuring the Value of R&D Tax Treatments in OECD Coun-
tries, STI Review, No. 27, OECD, Paris, 2001; Guellec, D. and van Pottelsberghe, B. (2000), The Impact
of Public R&D Expenditure on Business R&D, STI Working Paper 2000/4, OECD, Paris, 2000.II.1.3 Trends in the financing of business R&D Key Figures 2007 75
First of all, there has been a movement from ‘strong’ direct funding
towards ‘favourable’ fiscal incentives in the EU. While there were four
countries located in that quadrant in 1991, only one (Italy) remains there
in 2006. The weighted average of EU-17 was also located in this category
in 1991.
In the category ‘little direct funding and less favourable tax treatment’
there was a significant drop in the number of EU countries (from eight
in 1991 to six in 2000 and four in 2006); this is largely a reflection of the
trend towards a greater use of tax incentives for R&D. Interestingly, the
high R&D-intensive EU countries of Germany, Finland and Sweden have
featured consistently in this quadrant since 1991.
Eight EU countries, as well as the weighted average of EU-17, are now
categorised as policy mixes with ‘little direct funding and favourable tax
treatment’, supporting an overall policy-mix trend toward fiscal incen-
tives. This quadrant has experienced a significant ‘boom’ since 1991,
when Austria was the only country represented in this category.
Finally, the policy mix quadrant ‘strong direct funding and favourable tax
treatment’ appears to be the least occupied, even though it is experi-
encing a relative comeback. Since 2000, this category has added four EU
countries, of which the United Kingdom and Spain have increased their
direct subsidies for R&D while keeping their fiscal incentives at
a favourable level.Another two – the Czech Republic and Poland – are
characterised by historically strong direct funding, and have added sig-
nificant R&D tax incentives in recent years(7).
Analytical category 1991 2000 2006
  Strong direct funding and 
unfavourable tax treatment
4 EU countries : DE, IT, 
SE, UK and EU-17
3 EU countries : CZ, IT, 
PL 1 EU country : IT
  Little direct funding and 
unfavourable tax treatment
8 EU countries : BE, DK, 
IE, EL, HU, NL, PT, FI
6 EU countries : BE, DE, 
EL, FI, SE, UK
4 EU countries : DE, EL, 
FI, SE
  Little direct funding and 
favourable tax treatment 1 EU country : AT 8 EU countries : DK, IE, 
ES, FR, HU, NL, AT, PT
8 EU countries : BE, DK, 
IE, FR, HU, NL, AT, PT 
and EU-17
  Strong direct funding and 
favourable tax treatment 2 EU countries : ES, FR No countries 4 EU countries : CZ, ES, 
PL, UK
Table II.1.2 Typology of policy-mixes with regard to direct funding and fiscal incentives for
business R&D in the EU, 1991, 2000 and 2006
7. The data used in this section on the evolution of fiscal incentives for private R&D were taken from
Warda, J., (2007), An evolution of EU ‘Direct Subsidy – Fiscal Incentives’ Policy Mix (1991-2006),
(report prepared for EC, DG Research, January 2007) (A/125332).
Source: DG Research, Warda (2007)
Data: Eurostat, OECD
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II.I.4 Venture Capital investment 
for private R&D
Introduction
Large firms are able to finance most of their R&D and innovation effort
internally. On the contrary, entrepreneurs wanting to start new high-tech
and knowledge-intensive activities need to have access to external fi-
nancing. Such new business plans require high and risky investment, the
hoped-for returns from which may never be realised or only in the long
term. Venture capital (VC) investment can finance the seed, start-up and
expansion phases of a firm’s life cycle, as well as replacement, manage-
ment buy-outs and buy-ins. In other words, VC can play a critical role in
the creation and expansion of R&D-intensive SMEs whose anticipated
research effort is far beyond their financial capacity. By supporting the
creation and expansion of new high-tech businesses, VC establishes new
R&D performers, allows the commercialisation of research results, and
thereby intensifies the exploitation of existing scientific and technolog-
ical know-how. In this sense, VC is crucial for the creation and expansion
of the knowledge-based economy. 
Recourse to venture capital varies 
widely across Europe
The total investment in VC at national level varies in 2005 from 0
(Greece) to 0.52 (Sweden) per thousand GDP for seed and start-up
(‘early-stage’) activities, with an EU-27 average of 0.21 (Figure II.1.13).
For expansion and replacement activities, the total investment in VC at
national level ranges from 0.006 (Greece) to 3.5 (Denmark) per thou-
sand GDP, with an EU-27 average of 1.1. VC is therefore primarily used to
finance expansion and replacement of already existing businesses.
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Figure II.1.13 Venture capital by stage per 1000 GDP, 2005 
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat
Notes: (1) EU-27 does not include BG, EE, CY, LV, LT, LU, MT and SI.
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Recourse to VC varies widely across Europe. The United Kingdom and
the Nordic countries, with the exception of Finland which is below the
EU-27 average, have the most developed VC industry. Portugal is the only
low R&D-intensive country using VC more intensively than the EU-27
average. All of the new Member States for which data are available have
weak VC investment rates. Germany and countries in southern Europe
(with the exception of Portugal) have medium-to-low VC investment
rates. Interestingly, in some countries (the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy,
the Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia), VC does not finance early-stage
activities, or only very marginally.
It should be noted that the VC industry for high-tech start-ups (supply
side) can only develop if there is a reasonable level of project
development prior to early-stage financing (demand side). Therefore,
these figures not only reflect the performance of the VC industry in each
country, but also the efficiency of their respective mechanisms for
technology transfer. 
II.I.5 Foreign R&D investment 
in the private sector
Increasing importance of foreign funding 
of domestic R&D
The globalisation of R&D has clearly been gathering strength for a number
of years. R&D expenditure by affiliates of foreign companies is
increasingly contributing to R&D spending in all EU Member States. Figure
II.1.14 shows that the share of foreign affiliates in total R&D expenditure
by enterprises has expanded considerably in a number of new Member
States – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – as well as in
Sweden. In Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Finland and the United Kingdom the increase has been less
marked but still substantial. Only Turkey experienced a decrease.
In other words, business R&D in EU Member States increasingly relies on
foreign investment. In 2004, foreign affiliates accounted in the majority
of the Member States for 20-50 % of total domestic business R&D. This
share was below 20% only in Greece, Poland, and Finland, and above 50%
in Ireland and Hungary. In these two countries, business R&D is therefore
extremely dependent on foreign sources of funding. It must be noted
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Figure II.1.14 R&D expenditure by foreign affiliates, 1995 and 2004
as % of R&D expenditure by business enterprise
Source: DG Research
Data: OECD (Activity of Foreign Affiliates database)
Notes: (1) CZ, SK: 1996; NL, FI, TR: 1997; PT: 1999.
(2) EL: 1999; NL, TR: 2002; DE, IE, IT, HU, PT, SE: 2003.
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that intra-EU foreign spending also contributes to these high shares of
foreign R&D investment.
These shifts in R&D spending by foreign affiliates from 1995 to 2004
may be largely explained by the more general process of globalisation.
The share of foreign affiliates in domestic value added has (sometimes
considerably) increased since 1995, and this tends to have a direct impact
on the share of R&D spending by foreign affiliates. Mergers and
acquisitions, in particular when national R&D-intensive firms pass into
the control of foreign firms, also have a strong influence on this indicator.
Therefore, the share of R&D spending by foreign affiliates does not alone
reflect the attractiveness of a country for R&D. This is linked to a large
extent to the industrial mix of foreign affiliates relative to domestic firms
within a country (see below).
Finally, it is noticeable that the level of R&D intensity does not seem to
be correlated to the share of R&D performed by foreign affiliates, as there
are countries with high and low R&D intensities at each end of Figure
II.1.14.
R&D intensity of foreign companies however remains
below that of national firms in most countries…
Figure II.1.15 displays the ‘R&D intensity’ (R&D expenditure as a per-
centage of value added in industry) of national and foreign companies(8).
The R&D intensity of domestic companies varies greatly across Europe
(Figure II.1.15): from 0.01 % in Greece to 2.59 % in Sweden and 3.06 % in
Finland. In Finland, the R&D intensity of national firms is almost twice as
high as that of national firms in Germany and France and three times as
high as that of national firms in the United Kingdom (1.05 %). In all other
countries, it is lower than 1 %. 
In most countries, national firms on average carry out more R&D than
foreign affiliates. This is particularly true for Germany, France and Finland
(far below the bisector), but it is also the case in Greece, Spain, Italy, Poland,
Portugal and Slovakia, though for much smaller R&D intensity values. 
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Figure II.I.15 R&D intensity of foreign companies and of national firms (R&D 
expenditure as % of value added in industry), 2004(1)
8. ‘R&D intensity’ as defined here is not the average R&D intensity of foreign companies, but the share
of their aggregate R&D expenditure in total industry value added. Therefore, the ‘R&D intensity’ of for-
eign companies as examined here can be influenced by both their specific R&D intensity and their
overall weight in total value added.
Source: DG Research
Data: OECD 
Note: (1) EL: 1999; NL, TR: 2002; DE, IE, IT, HU, PT, SE: 2003.
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The contrary holds true, however, for Belgium, Ireland and Hungary
where the R&D intensity of foreign companies outpaces that of domestic
firms (all three countries are above the bisector). As previously
mentioned, these R&D intensities (of foreign versus national companies)
are closely related to the respective shares of foreign affiliates and
national firms in the value added of the country (see below for a
comparison of these shares).
Finally, it is worth noting that some companies prefer to transfer
technology directly to their affiliates. These intra-company transfers do
not appear as R&D spending by foreign affiliates, but they do bring new
technologies into the country concerned.
… thus reflecting the industrial mix of foreign affiliates
relative to national firms in these countries
The attractiveness of a country for R&D can be gauged by comparing the
share of R&D expenditure of foreign affiliates to their share of turnover
in that country. This has been done for the manufacturing sector in Figure
II.1.16. A country in which foreign companies contribute more to total
R&D expenditure than to total turnover will be considered relatively
attractive for R&D activities.
In Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom, the share of foreign
affiliates in total R&D is very similar to their share in overall turnover
(these countries are located on or very close to the bisector): therefore
these countries are attractive to the same degree for both R&D and
production activities. The contribution of foreign companies to total
manufacturing R&D perfectly reflects the weight of these foreign
companies in the industrial structure of the country.
Countries where the share of foreign companies in total manufacturing
R&D expenditure is significantly higher than the share of these compa  -
nies in total manufacturing turnover may be more attractive for R&D
than for production activities. This is primarily the case for Portugal and,
to a lesser extent, the Czech Republic, Spain, Italy, Hungary and Sweden.
However, for some of these countries, this observation could also be
explained by the limited R&D efforts of national firms. It could also be
due to the location of foreign affiliates in R&D-intensive sectors.
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Figure II.1.16 Shares of R&D expenditure and turnover of affiliates under foreign control in
total manufacturing R&D and total turnover, 2004(1)
Source: DG Research
Data: OECD
Notes: (1) HU: 1997; FI, TR: 2001; IT, NL, PT: 2002; DE, IE, SE: 2003.
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On the other hand, countries where the contribution of foreign firms to
turnover significantly exceeds their contribution to manufacturing R&D
may be less attractive for R&D than for production activities. 
This is primarily the case for Poland and, to a much lesser extent, France,
the Netherlands, Finland and Turkey. Foreign companies may prefer to
transfer technology to these countries directly, rather than to set up local
R&D activities.
However, on the whole, most countries do not deviate significantly from
the bisector demonstrating that, with the exception of Poland and
Portugal, the contribution of foreign and national companies to the
domestic R&D effort largely mirrors their respective weights in the
industrial structure of the country.
II.I.6 Public sector R&D and its relationship
with the business sector
The rationale for government involvement in R&D has traditionally been
to rectify market failures, such as its inability to fulfil the public health and
defence-related needs of society. Public sector research provides scien-
tific and technological knowledge that can be disseminated and utilised
in the economy. It encourages exploration of new and challenging areas
with long-term perspectives and unforeseeable economic returns. It pro-
vides new instruments and research infrastructures that can be used for in-
dustrial R&D activity. The higher education sector trains highly skilled
graduates for industry. Public-private partnerships can boost innovation
and help create new firms.
All of these factors create suitable conditions for investments by foreign-
owned companies. In low R&D-intensive countries, government-funded
R&D is of crucial importance for the development of the science and tech-
nology (S&T) capabilities necessary to catch up with countries at the tech-
nology frontier (see section I.2 of this chapter). Finally, governments are
also responsible for promoting scientific education and culture in the pop-
ulation, fostering the dialogue between science and society to increase so-
ciety’s confidence in and demand for scientific research and technological
development.
Public sector R&D is largely 
university-oriented in the EU …
In EU-27, R&D expenditure in the higher education sector has been
increasing only very slightly from 0.37 % of GDP in 1998 to 0.41 % in 2002
(Figure II.1.17). Since then, up to 2005, it has remained stable at 0.41  %. 
The intensity of R&D performed in government institutions, measured as
a percentage of GDP, has decreased in EU-27 from 0.27 % in 1998 to 0.24%
in 2004. In 2005, it remained at the same level as in 2004, i.e. at a much
lower level than the intensity of R&D performed in the higher education
sector. At EU level therefore, if the overall level of public R&D expenditure
has remained very stable since 1998, its centre of gravity has been more
and more directed towards the higher education sector over that period
of time.
Within the EU, the relative positions of Member States have not funda-
mentally changed since the end of the 1990s. Three main groups of coun-
tries may be considered.
The three Nordic countries of Sweden, Finland and Denmark, as well as
Austria, still stand out with the highest intensity of higher education R&D
in 2005 (0.58 % and above). The public R&D expenditure of these coun-
tries is largely university-oriented. This choice has been confirmed over
the years: since 1998 Denmark and Finland clearly transferred part ofII.1.6 Public sector R&D and its relationship with the business sector Key Figures 2007 81
public R&D expenditure from government R&D to higher education
R&D while, in the period 1998-2005, Austria increased its higher educa-
tion R&D share of GDP by one-third.
In a majority of European countries, expenditure on higher education
R&D is at around the EU level, within the range of 0.3 % to 0.5 % of GDP,
whereas expenditure on government R&D amounts to 0.1 % to 0.4 % of
GDP. In this group of countries, old Member States have basically the
same R&D intensity as in 1998, both in higher education and in govern-
ment institutions (except for the Netherlands, where the percentage of
GDP devoted to government and higher education R&D decreased). In
2005, as in 1998, France and Germany had the highest government R&D
intensities in the EU, almost at the same level as their higher education
R&D intensities. Government R&D maintains a remarkably strong posi-
tion in these two countries, whereas in the two other largest Member
States, the United Kingdom and Italy, university R&D prevails.
… except for most new Member States where public
research is mainly conducted in the government sector
The third group of countries is composed of Luxembourg and most of
the new Member States. Unlike the situation at EU level, public R&D in
these countries is mainly conducted in the government sector. However,
a modest shift has taken place since 2003 in all of these Member States,
with a slow convergence towards a more widespread breakdown of
public R&D. This shift is primarily due to a diminishing share of GDP
devoted to government R&D while, in the Czech Republic and Latvia,
this is combined with an increase in the resources allocated to higher
education R&D. In the two newest Member States, Bulgaria and Romania,
almost all public R&D is still performed by government institutions.
Declining government R&D budgets at EU level in spite
of increased commitments by some Member States
In 2005, the EU Government Budget Appropriations or Outlays for R&D
(GBAORD) amounted to 1.56  % of general government expenditure
(Figure II.1.18). Over the period 2001-2005, the R&D share of the
government budget slightly decreased in EU-27, with an annual growth
rate of -0.5 % on average over this period. 
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Figure II.1.17 Public R&D in relation to GDP, 2005(1)
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat OECD
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Fifteen European countries have a GBAORD of 1-2 % of the government
budget, with a cluster of countries in the 1.5-1.7  % range. All new 
Member States devoted less than 1.3 % of their budgets to R&D. Among
old Member States, only Ireland, Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg have
R&D shares below 1.3 % of the government budget.
In many European countries, the share of the government budget
allocated to R&D has evolved considerably since 2001. Spain committed
a much larger part of its government budget to R&D in 2005 than in
2001, and is now first in the EU. At the other end of the scale, Slovakia and
the United Kingdom significantly cut their public R&D budgets, as did
France to a much lesser extent.
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Figure II.1.18 GBAORD as % of general government expenditure, 2005(1); 
in brackets: average annual growth rates (%), 2001-2005(2)
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat
Notes: (1) PL, IS, EU-27: 2004.
(2) PL, IS, EU-27: 2001-2004; CZ, SK: 2002-2005; CY, MT: 2004-2005.
(3) EU-27 does not include BG and RO.
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The structure of government R&D budgets largely
unchanged since 2000
Table II.1.3 shows the structure of GBAORD in the EU. The generic
category ‘Research financed from General University Funds’ (GUF)
amounted to 32 % of total GBAORD in 2005. Together with ‘Non-oriented
research’ and ‘Defence’ it accounted for 60  % of total GBAORD at the 
EU level.
Within the EU, the GBAORD structure differs from country to country. 
For a majority of European countries, GUF has the largest share of GBAORD.
For some Member States, though, (Belgium, Spain, Hungary, Romania and
Finland) the most important GBAORD objective is ‘Industrial production,
and technology’. In most of the new Member States, the most important
GBAORD objective by far is ‘Non-oriented research’.
The major part of the European budget allocated to ‘Defence’ is to be found
in the United Kingdom and France and, to a much lesser extent, in Spain. In
fact, for the United Kingdom and for France, ‘Defence’ is the first priority in
terms of GBAORD, followed by GUF and ‘Non-oriented research’. For all
other EU Member States, ‘Defence’ is a relatively minor priority.
The structure of GBAORD at EU level in 2005 was remarkably similar to
that of 2000. In fact, the distribution of government appropriations across
the various socio-economic objectives has remained relatively stable for
a majority of countries in Europe since 2000. 
Socio-economic objective BE CZ DK DE (2) EE IE EL ES FR IT
  Exploration and exploitation of the earth 0.6 2.4 0.8 1.8 0.3 2.6 3.6 1.4 0.9 2.0
  Infrastructure and general planning of land-use 0.7 4.4 0.7 1.8 8.1 0.0 2.9 4.0 0.8 0.9
  Control and care of the environment 2.5 3.2 1.7 3.4 5.4 0.9 4.0 3.0 2.8 2.5
  Protection and improvement of human health 1.7 7.4 6.7 4.3 4.3 5.9 6.9 8.7 6.0 10.0
  Production, distribution and rational utilization of energy 2.0 2.6 1.9 2.8 2.2 0.0 2.1 1.6 4.6 4.1
  Agricultural production and technology 1.3 5.3 5.3 1.8 13.5 9.9 5.5 5.2 1.5 3.8
  Industrial production, and technology 30.9 12.4 5.8 12.6 5.8 15.8 9.2 25.2 7.4 10.2
  Social structures and relationships 4.1 3.0 5.3 3.9 6.4 2.7 5.7 2.1 0.7 5.0
  Exploration and exploitation of space 8.8 0.8 1.7 4.9 0.0 1.7 2.1 3.2 8.8 9.5
  Research financed from general university funds (GUF) 18.5 25.6 41.5 40.6 0.0 59.4 47.6 18.1 27.1 44.2
  Non-oriented research 25.2 27.0 26.9 16.3 49.2 1.0 9.2 8.6 9.1 6.3
  Other civil research 3.2 3.2 1.1 0.7 4.0 0.0 0.7 2.8 2.2 0.0
  Defence 0.4 2.8 0.6 5.8 1.0 0.0 0.5 16.1 28.0 1.4
  Total 100 100 100 101 100 100 100 100 100 100
  Total appropriations (million euro) 1714 625 1749 17221 45 676 558 7740 14556 8655
  Exploration and exploitation of the earth 1.6 0.6 2.6 : 2.3 3.7 0.7 2.0 1.3 1.6
  Infrastructure and general planning of land-use 1.6 2.3 3.7 : 2.0 0.0 4.3 2.8 1.3 4.5
  Control and care of the environment 0.8 0.6 9.6 : 10.3 0.1 1.4 2.2 1.4 3.5
  Protection and improvement of human health 10.0 4.0 11.0 : 14.6 5.5 4.0 4.8 1.4 7.7
  Production, distribution and rational utilization of energy 0.0 1.7 3.2 : 11.5 0.0 1.9 1.1 1.7 0.9
  Agricultural production and technology 20.5 7.3 8.0 : 15.0 1.8 5.6 2.4 1.4 9.8
  Industrial production, and technology 0.0 5.1 13.0 : 21.5 4.4 10.8 13.7 5.0 16.5
  Social structures and relationships 8.2 1.7 29.6 : 8.9 18.7 2.1 2.7 1.4 3.4
  Exploration and exploitation of space 0.0 1.1 : : 2.3 0.0 2.4 0.8 : 0.2
  Research financed from general university funds (GUF) 31.8 : : : 6.4 63.9 48.9 53.0 : 37.4
  Non-oriented research 25.4 74.6 : : 4.8 2.0 10.6 14.0 65.1 10.4
  Other civil research 0.0 : 18.8 : 0.3 0.0 6.0 0.4 15.0 3.4
  Defence 0.0 1.1 0.4 : 0.1 0.0 1.5 0.0 5.0 0.5
  Total 100 100 100 : 100 100 100 100 100 100
  Total appropriations (million euro) 40 25 77 93 367 9 3609 1640 639 1148
EU-27  (4)
  Exploration and exploitation of the earth 2.2 0.4 0.0 1.2 0.7 2.3 1.7 : 2.5 0.3
  Infrastructure and general planning of land-use 2.9 0.8 2.3 2.0 4.0 1.1 1.8 8.4 2.4 0.6
  Control and care of the environment 4.8 3.1 0.8 1.6 1.8 1.8 2.7 0.4 2.0 0.1
  Protection and improvement of human health 5.4 2.0 2.6 6.2 1.2 14.7 7.3 7.3 7.8 1.8
  Production, distribution and rational utilization of energy 2.9 0.5 0.4 4.6 3.6 0.4 2.8 2.2 3.4 1.0
  Agricultural production and technology 9.0 3.2 9.5 5.8 2.2 3.3 3.4 21.3 8.7 2.8
  Industrial production, and technology 25.0 22.6 4.5 26.9 5.7 1.7 10.9 2.3 8.1 3.4
  Social structures and relationships 11.3 2.7 0.8 5.5 4.6 3.5 3.1 8.9 6.4 1.9
  Exploration and exploitation of space 1.4 0.0 : 1.7 0.9 2.0 5.0 : 2.0 4.0
  Research financed from general university funds (GUF) : 0.0 23.0 25.4 45.2 21.7 32.0 33.1 37.5 58.9
  Non-oriented research 13.2 59.7 47.9 16.2 13.3 16.0 14.5 16.1 13.1 9.8
  Other civil research 18.9 0.2 3.3 : : 0.5 1.4 0.0 : 14.9
  Defence 3.0 4.9 5.0 2.8 16.9 31.0 13.6 0.0 6.1 0.4
  Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
  Total appropriations (million euro) 285 167 129 1680 2618 12950 79425 186 1813 2189
Socio-economic objective CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT (3) PL PT
Socio-economic objective RO SI SK FI SE UK IS NO CH
Table II.1.3 GBAORD by socio-economic objective (%), 2005(1)
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat
Notes: (1) PL, CH: 2004; CZ, FR, IT, LT, LU, NL, AT, PT, RO, SK, FI, SE, NO: 2006; DK: 2007.
(2) The sum of the values by socio-economic objective is not equal to the total.
(3) Federal or central government only.
(4) EU-27 does not include BG and RO.
(5) Values in italics are estimated or provisional.
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Private enterprise finances a substantial and relatively
stable part of public R&D
The share of public (higher education and government) sector R&D
financed by business enterprise remains substantial in 2005 in EU-27,
amounting to 6.4 % of the total (Figure II.1.19). The largest shares (more
than 10  %) are found in a group of seven countries: Turkey, Latvia,
Romania, Slovenia, Hungary, Belgium and the Netherlands. For all other
countries, business support for public R&D ranges from 3 % to 10 %, with
a cluster of countries at around 5-7 % (Cyprus is an exception with less
than 3 %). 
Half of the countries had a positive – and half a negative – annual average
growth rate in the level of private funding of public sector R&D over the
2000-2005 period (Figure II.1.19). 
Since 2000, the share of public sector R&D financed by business enter-
prise has increased most in Cyprus, Portugal, and Luxembourg, as well as
Israel and Switzerland, whereas it has decreased considerably in Den-
mark, Lithuania, Poland and Estonia. This share has remained relatively sta-
ble in half of the countries (annual average growth rate within the range
of -5 % to +5 % and, in EU-27 as a whole, -0.5 %).
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Figure II.1.19 Share of public sector R&D financed by business enterprise - latest year and
average annual growth
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat, OECD
Notes: (1) NL, IL: 2002; BE, EL, LU, PT, SE, IS, NO: 2003; BG, DK, DE, ES, FR, CY, AT, RO, FI, UK, HR, TR, 
CH: 2004.
(2) NL, IL: 2000-2002; BE, LU, PT: 2000-2003; BG, DE, ES, FR, RO, FI, TR, CH: 2000-2004; EL, SE, IS, 
NO: 2001-2003; CY, UK: 2001-2004; DK, AT, HR: 2002-2004. 
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II.2 Human resources in Science and
Technology
Introduction
R&D and other S&T activities are not possible without human resources.
If the R&D expenditure target of 3 % of GDP is to be achieved, ensuring
there are sufficient human resources for research is a preliminary step in
the right direction. To this end, the European Commission advocates
increasing the proportion of researchers in the labour force from five to
eight per thousand. 
This section first analyses investment in education and, more specifically,
investment in tertiary education. This is followed by an assessment of
the number of graduates from tertiary education and the participation of
foreign students in tertiary education. Finally, we provide an overview of
human resources in science and technology and of R&D personnel and
researchers.
Investment in education
Education and in particular tertiary education, not only renews stocks
of human capital but also promotes economic growth. Therefore,
investment in education can be seen much more as an investment in
future economic well-being rather than as an investment in individual
success.
Within the EU, total public expenditure on education in 2003 amounted
to 5.17 % of GDP. Only 1.14 % of GDP was allocated to tertiary education.
However, wide differences exist between the EU Member States, both at
all levels of education and specifically at the tertiary level. In terms of
public expenditure as a percentage of GDP on tertiary education, the
Nordic countries have the highest shares, with Denmark at the top
(2.50%), followed by Sweden (2.16  %) and Finland (2.05  %). Public
expenditure on tertiary education also accounts for more than 2  % of
GDP in Norway (2.32 %).
All levels Tertiary Public sources Private sources
 Belgium 6.06 1.31 5.74 0.35
 Bulgaria 4.24 0.84 3.91 0.67
 Czech Republic 4.51 0.94 4.30 0.37
 Denmark 8.33 2.50 6.70 0.32
 Germany 4.71 1.19 4.36 0.92
 Estonia 5.43 1.05 5.11 :
 Ireland 4.41 1.09 4.11 0.31
 Greece 3.94 1.22 3.86 0.22
 Spain 4.28 0.99 4.16 0.54
 France 5.88 1.19 5.65 0.60
 Italy 4.74 0.78 4.53 0.40
 Cyprus 7.30 1.55 6.43 1.35
 Latvia 5.32 0.74 4.90 0.83
 Lithuania 5.18 1.00 4.81 0.46
 Luxembourg 3.80 : 3.71 :
 Hungary 5.85 1.21 5.46 0.56
 Malta 4.78 0.83 4.33 1.42
 Netherlands 5.07 1.33 4.50 0.48
 Austria 5.50 1.29 5.21 0.30
 Poland 5.62 1.03 5.57 0.66
 Portugal 5.61 1.01 5.53 0.09
 Romania 3.44 0.68 3.38 :
 Slovenia 6.02 1.34 5.44 0.86
 Slovakia 4.34 0.85 4.21 0.46
 Finland 6.41 2.05 5.91 0.13
 Sweden 7.47 2.16 6.55 0.19
 UK 5.38 1.06 5.11 0.97
 EU-27 5.17 1.14 4.88 0.63
 Croatia 4.53 0.84 4.49 :
 Turkey 3.74 1.21 3.56 0.05
 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  3.39 0.51 3.31 :
 Iceland 7.81 1.35 7.21 0.71
 Norway 7.62 2.32 6.45 0.10
 Switzerland 6.04 1.64 5.91 0.63
Total public expenditure 
on education as % of GDP
Expenditure on educational 
institutions by source as % of GDP
Table II.2.1 Expenditure on education as a % of GDP, 2003
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat
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Expenditure on educational institutions from public sources represented
4.88  % of GDP in EU-27 in 2003, compared with 0.63  % of GDP for
expenditure from private sources. Among Member States, Malta and
Cyprus were the only countries where expenditure on educational
institutions from private sources was higher than 1 %.
Graduation from tertiary education
New technologies are developed and applied very quickly and, thus, the
renewal of a highly skilled workforce is crucial to manage these rapid
changes in science and technology. The number of new graduates from
tertiary education, particularly graduates in Science and Engineering
(S&E), is a measure of the supply of human resources. In EU-27, the 
total number of graduates from all fields of education amounted to 
3.57 million in 2004.
Across all disciplines the United Kingdom and France had the largest
number of new tertiary graduates, together corresponding to one-third
of the EU-27 total, whereas Poland had the third highest number of new
tertiary graduates in the Union. In Science and Engineering, the other
large countries such as Germany, Italy and Spain accounted for a much
larger share than Poland in the total production of new graduates.
Women accounted for almost 60  % of new graduates from all fields of
tertiary education. Moreover, the share of women exceeded 50 % in all
Member States, as well as Iceland and Norway. However, women
represented only 40 % and 24 % respectively of European graduates from
the fields of Science and Engineering. In Science, the share of women
graduates exceeded 50  % in only four Member States. In the case of
Engineering, the share of women graduates failed to exceed even 40 % for
any Member State. In fact, Greece with a share of 38 % was the Member
State with the highest share of women engineering graduates.
Total % Total % Total %
(000s) women (000s) women (000s) women
 Belgium 77 57.1 7 30.3 8 20.8
 Bulgaria 46 58.3 2 56.4 7 37.2
 Czech Republic 54 58.0 4 39.5 8 24.2
 Denmark 47 58.8 4 33.5 5 31.1
 Germany 320 52.7 32 34.9 54 17.1
 Estonia 10 71.6 1 47.9 1 33.1
 Ireland 56 57.0 8 43.0 7 17.5
 Greece 48 60.9 8 41.9 5 38.0
 Spain 298 57.7 33 37.2 50 25.8
 France  585 56.6 76 41.0 95 21.7
 Italy 325 58.1 24 53.7 50 28.7
 Cyprus 4 59.7 0 42.9 0 20.2
 Latvia 24 69.2 1 39.3 2 28.2
 Lithuania 38 66.5 2 43.9 6 33.3
 Luxembourg ::::::
 Hungary 68 63.5 3 37.6 5 23.7
 Malta  2 57.3 0 30.0 0 31.3
 Netherlands 97 56.1 7 24.1 9 15.9
 Austria 31 50.6 3 35.7 6 17.2
 Poland 486 65.5 25 41.1 34 27.6
 Portugal 69 65.9 7 50.8 10 33.9
 Romania 147 57.3 8 58.8 26 32.4
 Slovenia 15 60.4 1 40.0 2 21.2
 Slovakia 35 56.7 3 41.1 5 31.6
 Finland 39 62.0 3 48.8 8 21.8
 Sweden 54 61.0 5 45.9 12 28.6
 UK 596 57.7 87 37.4 48 20.1
 EU-27 3570 58.7 355 40.3 465 24.3
 Turkey 259 44.0 25 45.1 50 23.2
 Iceland 3 66.6 0 42.0 0 29.7
 Norway 32 60.3 3 26.2 3 22.7
 Switzerland 60 44.1 6 21.8 7 11.4
All fields of education Science Engineering
Table II.2.2 Number of graduates from tertiary education by field of education, 2004(1)
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat,
Notes: (1) FR, MT, FI: 2003.
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International mobility flows of foreign tertiary students
With the free movement of people within the European Union and also
with the progress of economic globalisation, the international migration
of students and/or human capital has become more and more important. II.2 Human resources in Science and Technology Key Figures 2007 87
At the European level, almost eight out of every hundred students
participating in tertiary education in 2004 were foreigners. After 
Cyprus, where 32 % of students in tertiary education were foreign, the
United Kingdom had the highest European share with 16.2 %. Only two
other Member States – Germany and Austria – had shares of foreign
students higher than 10  %. Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia and
Slovakia had very low shares of foreign students participating in tertiary
education. Shares were also low in Greece, Spain, Italy, Latvia and Finland.
In the field of Science the situation was similar, with Cyprus and the
United Kingdom also having the highest shares of foreign students. In
the field of Engineering, the share of foreign students participating in
tertiary education was lower at EU-27 level. However, this was not the
case for several countries, including the United Kingdom, where more
than one-quarter of the students in this field were foreign.
S&T labour Force
The role of human resources educated and employed in science and
technology occupations (‘highly-qualified S&T workers’) is fundamental
in knowledge-driven economies, because these people contribute
directly to the expansion of R&D activities and to the development of
technological innovations.
Within EU-27, half (50.6 %) of the S&T human resources with a tertiary
education were also employed in S&T. The highest shares were found 
in Luxembourg (64.5 %), Sweden (62.5 %), Romania (62.4 %) and Portugal
(61.4%), while outside the EU Iceland’s share of 71.7 % was noticeably
high.
In 2006, highly-qualified S&T workers represented 15.4 % of the EU-27
labour force.At the national level, they accounted for more than one fifth
of the labour force in Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Finland and Sweden, as well as in Norway. As one might expect, highly
R&D-intensive countries have the largest shares of core S&T workers in
the total labour force.
All fields 
of education
Science Engineering
 Belgium 9.6 9.7 7.7
 Bulgaria 3.6 2.1 2.7
 Czech Republic 4.7 5.6 3.2
 Denmark 7.9 11.3 12.9
 Germany 11.2 12.1 12.9
 Estonia 1.7 : :
 Ireland 5.6 : :
 Greece 2.4 : :
 Spain 2.3 1.0 1.0
 France :::
 Italy 2.0 1.7 1.8
 Cyprus 32.0 21.5 8.9
 Latvia  2.0 1.0 0.4
 Lithuania 0.4 0.1 0.4
 Luxembourg :::
 Hungary 3.1 3.7 3.1
 Malta 5.6 2.4 2.6
 Netherlands 3.9 5.0 4.8
 Austria 14.1 14.1 13.6
 Poland 0.4 0.1 0.2
 Portugal 4.1 5.2 3.7
 Romania 1.5 0.5 0.6
 Slovenia 1.1 1.9 1.0
 Slovakia 1.0 0.7 0.8
 Finland 2.6 2.5 2.9
 Sweden 8.5 11.3 10.0
 UK 16.2 16.3 26.4
 EU-27  7.6 7.6 5.9
 Turkey 0.8 0.9 0.8
 Iceland 3.3 4.1 2.4
 Norway 5.8 9.3 6.2
 Switzerland 18.2 23.0 20.4
Table II.2.3 Share of foreign students (%) participating in tertiary education 
by field of education, 2004(1)
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat,
Notes: (1) EE, IE, LV, RO: 2003
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Women represent more than half of highly-qualified S&T workers in
Europe (51.4  %). They were highly represented in Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania, with more than 70 % of the total. Conversely, women were less
numerous than men among highly-qualified S&T workers in six Member
States – the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and Austria – and also in Switzerland.
At EU-27 level, 35.3 % of highly-qualified S&T workers were aged 45-64
years. Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Germany – the four Member States
with the highest R&D intensities – had the oldest population of highly-
qualified S&T workers with the 45-64 years age group exceeding 40 % of
   
as % of  as % of  share of Age distribution (%)
labour HRSTE women 25-34 35-44 45-64
force (%)
 Belgium 21.1 46.9 53.0 31.9 30.6 30.9
 Bulgaria 14.7 45.2 67.7 24.9 29.2 42.8
 Czech Republic 10.8 59.3 45.6 31.6 25.8 37.8
 Denmark 23.6 58.9 56.6 27.2 30.1 40.6
 Germany 15.8 49.0 43.0 20.9 34.1 42.4
 Estonia 16.8 41.7 71.6 27.6 25.9 36.2
 Ireland 16.9 44.1 54.2 37.1 25.8 27.8
 Greece 15.8 53.4 49.6 29.9 33.8 33.0
 Spain 16.6 43.8 50.6 36.8 29.5 28.3
 France 17.1 47.8 52.0 35.8 28.0 30.5
 Italy 11.0 57.0 50.8 27.7 33.8 35.2
 Cyprus 18.8 49.3 50.0 41.4 24.3 27.1
 Latvia 13.8 50.0 71.1 29.6 24.5 32.7
 Lithuania 16.6 45.3 71.2 35.2 27.7 28.8
 Luxembourg 24.3 64.5 44.9 36.7 32.7 30.6
 Hungary 14.1 53.2 57.2 34.3 23.6 37.6
 Malta 12.0 58.8 50.0 45.0 20.0 25.0
 Netherlands 20.4 54.7 48.1 28.6 28.4 37.8
 Austria 11.2 48.2 46.6 28.0 33.2 35.6
 Poland 13.7 53.7 59.1 43.1 23.6 28.1
 Portugal 9.8 61.4 61.5 38.3 28.6 28.3
 Romania 9.8 62.4 52.0 35.6 24.1 36.4
 Slovenia 16.6 59.6 59.6 33.9 29.2 33.9
 Slovakia 10.6 57.0 50.0 33.7 23.0 39.0
 Finland 20.1 49.1 59.0 25.5 30.3 43.0
 Sweden 21.6 62.5 59.0 28.9 25.7 41.8
 UK 17.0 50.3 51.6 28.9 27.3 36.6
 EU-27 15.4 50.6 51.4 30.6 29.3 35.3
 Iceland 19.5 71.7 54.5 30.3 27.3 36.4
 Norway 23.2 62.2 54.9 27.9 29.2 39.0
 Switzerland 18.3 55.3 35.0 26.7 31.6 38.2
 
Box 4: Researchers and human resources in science 
and technology
According to the OECD Frascati Manual, researchers are professionals
engaged in the conception or creation of new knowledge, products,
processes, methods and systems and also in the management of the
projects concerned. Researchers are classified in ISCO-88 Major Group
2 (sub-major groups 21, 22, 23, 24), ‘Professionals’, and in ‘Research
and Development Department Managers’ (ISCO-88, 1237). 
Human resources in science and technology (HRST) comprise people
who have successfully completed education at the third level in an S&T
field of study (natural sciences, engineering and technology, medical
sciences, agricultural sciences, social sciences and humanities –
Canberra Manual, §71) and also people who, although not formally
qualified in this way, are employed in an S&T occupation where such
qualification is normally required (corresponding to professionals 
and technicians – ISCO-88 International Standard Classification of
Occupations levels 2 and 3 and also certain managers, ISCO 121, 122
and 131). Human resources in science and technology – Core (HRSTC)
comprise people who have successfully completed education at the
third level in an S&T field of study and are employed in an S&T
occupation. HRSTE refer to human resources educated in science and
technology, but not necessarily employed in an S&T occupation.
Table II.2.4 Highly qualified scientific and technical workers (HRSTC)(1) as % of labour 
force and as % of total S&T human resources with tertiary education (HRSTE), 
share of women and age distribution, 2006(2)
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat
Notes: (1) Highly qualified scientific and technical workers (HRSTC) refer to the group of people both edu-
cated AND employed in scientific and technical occupations (see box).
(2) LU, IS, CH: 2005.
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the total. By contrast Cyprus, Malta and Poland had shares of more 
than 40 % of highly-qualified S&T workers in the youngest age group of
25-34 years.
R&D personnel and researchers
If S&T is a key element of knowledge, the numbers of R&D personnel
and in particular, researchers are key indicators of its dissemination and
development as they demonstrate the human resources going directly
into R&D activities.
In 2005, the EU employed more than two million R&D personnel
measured in Full Time Equivalent (FTE).This unit is a measure of the real
volume of R&D performed.
Germany and France were the most important R&D employers in the EU,
with more than 40 % of the EU’s R&D personnel employed in these two
countries.  Among the new Member States, the main countries employing
R&D personnel were Poland, Romania and the Czech Republic.
With the exception of the Czech Republic, Malta and Romania, most of
the R&D personnel in the new Member States were employed in the
public sector (government and higher education). This is in contrast to
most of the other Member States, where the private sector accounted
for the highest share.
Of the two million R&D personnel in the EU, approximately 60  % are
employed as researchers, i.e. professionals who are engaged in the
conception or creation of new knowledge, products, processes, methods
and systems. 
The most important European employers of researchers are, again,
Germany and France but the highest proportions of researchers among
R&D personnel are to be found in Portugal, Poland and Slovakia.
R&D 
personnel
Researchers R&D 
personnel
Researchers R&D 
personnel
Researchers R&D 
personnel
Researchers R&D 
personnel
Researchers
 Belgium 52911 31465 31436 16322 3813 2124 17062 12742 600 277
 Bulgaria 15647 9827 2158 1239 10384 6168 3036 2362 69 58
 Czech Republic 28765 16300 15064 7297 7422 4661 6104 4274 175 68
 Denmark (2) 42687 26167 28040 15877 3250 2287 11139 7846 258 157
 Germany 470971 270749 298017 162339 76862 42646 96092 65764 : :
 Estonia 4735 3369 1083 661 810 486 2752 2162 90 60
 Ireland 15713 10910 9650 6200 1222 559 4841 4151 : :
 Greece 34004 17024 11099 4328 5509 2307 17189 10251 206 138
 Spain 161933 100994 71123 32054 27166 17151 63331 51616 313 173
 France (3) 352485 200064 197223 106439 51931 24779 97036 65498 6295 3350
 Italy 164026 72012 67519 27594 32401 14237 60694 28226 3412 1955
 Cyprus 1017 583 224 108 352 104 368 349 72 22
 Latvia 5103 3324 881 448 1013 490 3208 2385 1 1
 Lithuania 10557 7356 981 484 3041 1676 6535 5196 : :
 Luxembourg 4318 2031 3655 1546 512 342 151 143 : :
 Hungary (3) 22826 14904 6704 4309 7595 4693 8527 5902 : :
 Malta 717 436 383 199 45 19 288 218 0 0
 Netherlands 91594 : 49915 23158 13579 7752 28100 : : :
 Austria 42891 25955 29143 16508 2035 1030 11502 8281 212 137
 Poland 78362 60944 12978 8334 19685 12804 45572 39716 127 90
 Portugal 25590 20623 6166 3954 4545 3194 11520 10600 3360 2875
 Romania 33361 21257 16368 9092 9853 6326 6917 5654 223 185
 Slovenia 7132 4030 3855 1657 1750 1124 1482 1204 45 45
 Slovakia  (3) 14329 10718 3473 1815 3493 2345 7285 6509 77 49
 Finland 58281 41004 32612 23397 7337 4200 17822 13037 510 370
 Sweden  77925 54041 56941 34055 3391 2844 17223 16792 370 350
 UK : : 151908 96747 20796 9205 ::::
 EU-27 2089675 1248608 1114016 609407 312422 172102 642266 453796 20972 13302
 Croatia 11162 7140 2831 1015 3634 2420 4697 3705 : :
 Iceland 3050 1987 1422 879 794 479 746 576 88 54
 Norway 29745 21161 16260 11061 4985 3300 8500 6800 : :
 Switzerland (4) 52250 25400 33085 12640 810 425 18355 12335 : :
 
             
Private non-profit All sectors Business enterprise Government Higher education
Table II.2.5 Total R&D personnel and researchers (FTE), by sector of performance, 2004(1)
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat
Notes: (1) EL, SE: 2005.
(2) DK: Data on researchers in the private non-profit sector refer to the number of 
university graduates.  
(3) FR, HU, SK:  Defence is not included in the data for the government sector.
(4) CH: Government sector refers to federal or central government only.
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II.3 Scientific Output
Introduction
The aim of countries to maintain and develop their scientific knowledge
base has led to an increasing focus on a number of indicators related to
scientific output. These indicators relate to questions such as: What is 
the importance of a country in the overall production of scientific
publications? What is the impact of these scientific publications?  To what
extent, and how, do certain countries specialise in research in certain
scientific fields?
Bibliometric indicators are currently the most easily available and widely
used proxies for measuring the scientific production of different actors
such as universities, public research institutes and, to some extent, private
enterprise. Using this type of information, it is possible to get an insight
into the degree of specialisation and into the specialisation profiles of
different countries. In particular, by looking at international scientific
journals as the basis for bibliometric indicators, one has not only
a tangible representation of scientific knowledge, but also the means to
compare the research performance of different countries.  As such, these
journals provide a significant amount of information for the European
Research Area, giving an indication of the level of Europe’s science base
as well as that of its individual Member States.
EU-27 world shares of scientific publications
The EU is the world’s largest producer of scientific output, as measured
by its share in the total world number of peer reviewed scientific articles
(see Figure II.3.1). Its world share in 2004 was 38.1 %, showing a slight
decline compared to 2000. Among individual EU Member States, the
United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy were the largest producers
of scientific publications in absolute terms, accounting for more than
70% of the EU’s scientific publication output in 2004, and some 27 % of
the world share (double countings are not excluded when aggregating
the world shares of individual countries in Figure II.3.1). 
The majority of the Member States contribute only very small shares to
worldwide publication output. In fact, sixteen Member States contribute
with less or, in many cases, very much less than 1 % each. Taken together,
these sixteen Member States only contribute some 6  % of the world’s
scientific output (possible double countings not excluded).
Publications in relation to population and public
expenditure on R&D
However, adjusting for size gives a different picture (Figure II.3.2). Ac-
cording to the number of publications per million population, Switzer-
land has a dominant position. The ratio is also particularly high in the
Nordic countries. Israel is also ranked high, as are the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, Belgium and Austria. The new Member States can be
found at the lowest end of the scale, the exception being Slovenia which
is well above the EU average.II.3 Scientific Output Key Figures 2007 91
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Figure II.3.1 World shares of scientific publications (%), 2004(1); in brackets: average annual
growth rates (%), 2000-2004
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Public expenditure on R&D as % of GDP, 2002 (2)
Figure II.3.2 Scientific publications in relation to public expenditure on R&D(1)
Source: DG Research
Data: Thomson Scientific / CWTS, Leiden University,
Notes: (1) Full counting method was used at country level. At the aggregate level, 
double countings were avoided.
(2) EU-27: BG and RO are not included.
Source: DG Research
Data: Thomson Scientific / CWTS, Leiden University, Eurostat, OECD
Notes: (1) In order to take into account the gap between R&D input and scientific output, 
a two year lag between public expenditure on R&D and scientific publications 
per million population has been applied.
(2) EL, LU, SE: 2001.
(3) EU-27 does not include BG and RO. Full counting method was used at country level. 
At the aggregate level, double countings were avoided.
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There is a positive relationship between the level of public expenditure
on R&D (relative to GDP) and scientific output (relative to population).
The countries with a high number of scientific publications in relation
to their population also tend to be the countries with a high level of pub-
lic expenditure on R&D in relation to their GDP.This is particularly evi-
dent for the Nordic countries and also for the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, Belgium and Israel. Switzerland is the country showing the
clear  est divergence from this global pattern, with a relatively high sci-
entific output level compared to its public R&D expenditure.
However, it should be noted in this context that different scientific fields
are characterised by different publication tendencies. The position of
a country on the graph, therefore, largely depends on its scientific spe-
cialisation, meaning that countries specialised in ‘publication-intensive’
scientific fields (such as basic life sciences or clinical medicine) will tend
to have a higher level of publication per capita for a given level of in-
vestment than countries more specialised in domains generating lower
publication output (such as computer sciences or engineering sciences).
The relative specialisations of the Member States are further described
below.
Scientific publications – Relative specialisation index
In order to assess the areas of relative specialisation of countries, it is
useful to examine their scientific activity profiles. A country’s level of
activity in a given scientific field is measured by comparing the world
publication share of the country in the particular field to the world share
of the country for all fields combined. Figure II.3.3 shows the relative
activity index for the EU Member States. Multidisciplinary sciences and
social sciences have been left out, as well as the smallest Member States
in terms of publication output: Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus and Latvia. 
Moreover, it should be borne in mind that, as the relative activity index
is calculated based on the shares of each country in the world total (per
discipline and across all disciplines), large countries (in terms of publi-
cation output) influence the average more than small countries, and will
thus tend to be less ‘specialised’ than the small countries (as they devi-
ate less from the average).
The EU countries show diversity with regard to their scientific activity
profile. Among the largest publishing Member States, Germany is
particularly active in physics and astronomy, but less involved in
agriculture and food science. France and Italy are relatively active in
mathematics and statistics as well as in physics and astronomy, but Italy
shows under-specialisation in agriculture and food science and in
biological sciences. The United Kingdom, finally, is relatively under-
specialised in chemistry, engineering sciences, and mathematics and
statistics.
  DE  FR   IT  UK  NL   AT  SE   FI  DK  BE   IE   EL  ES   PT  CZ  EE  BG   LT   PL  RO   SI  HU  SK 
 Agriculture and food science                        
 Basic life sciences                        
 Biological sciences                        
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 Clinical medicine                        
 Earth and environmental sciences                        
 Chemistry                        
 Engineering sciences                        
 Mathematics and statistics                        
 Physics and astronomy                        
Computer sciences                        
   under-specialised    specialised    no specialisation
 
Figure II.3.3 Scientific publications - relative specialisation index, 
2001-2004 - EU Member States (1)
Source: DG Research
Data: Thomson Scientific / CWTS, Leiden University
Notes: (1) CY, LV, LU and MT are not displayed due to low overall publication numbers.
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A group of medium-sized (in terms of publication output) R&D- intensive
countries consisting of the Netherlands, Austria and the three Nordic
Member States of Sweden, Finland and Denmark appear to be specialised
in clinical medicine. For Denmark, this is coupled with a relative
specialisation in basic life sciences and biological sciences. 
Both Finland and Denmark also belong to a group of countries
specialised in agriculture and food science, together with Belgium,
Ireland, and the southern European countries of Greece, Spain and
Portugal. Finland and Denmark, together with Estonia, form a smaller
group of northern European countries specialised in earth and
environmental sciences.
The new Member States show a high level of similarity with regard to
their scientific activity profiles. The eastern European countries indeed
represent a large cluster relatively specialised in physics and astronomy,
mathematics and statistics and chemistry.  To a lesser extent, they are also
relatively active in engineering sciences. In this regard, their scientific
activity profiles show some similarities with those of the southern
European countries of Greece, Portugal and Spain.
II.4 Technological output
Introduction
The potential output of R&D activities can be both scientific and
technological. Patent-based indicators are among the most frequently used
proxies to measure technological output. Patents allow inventors to
protect and exploit their inventions over a given time period, and provide
a valuable measure of the inventiveness of countries, regions and
enterprises. Moreover, since they disclose information about new
inventions, patents also play a role in the diffusion of knowledge. Patent
indicators not only help to shed light on patterns of technological change,
but also measure activities that are closely associated with competitiveness
in many important international markets. 
Large differences in patenting intensity 
across Member States
Figure II.4.1 shows the number of patent applications submitted to the
European Patent Office (EPO), standardised per million inhabitants to allow
a better comparison between countries. 
The overall picture is heterogeneous but nevertheless there are some
distinct tendencies. Not surprisingly, countries with high R&D intensities
show a ratio above the EU-27 average. Germany leads with 312 patent
applications per million inhabitants, followed by Finland and Sweden with
respectively 306 and 285 applications per million. Conversely, low R&D-
intensive countries such as the new Member States and the southern
European countries of Portugal, Greece and Spain are at the lower end ofII.4 Technological output Key Figures 2007 94
the scale. Slovenia, with 50 patent applications per million inhabitants, is
the most active patenting country among the new Member States.
No less than eight Member States produced less than ten patent
applications per million inhabitants in 2003. When the other countries
of the European Research Area (ERA) are taken into account, we find
that Switzerland is far ahead with 426 patent applications per million
inhabitants. Israel is also among the top-performing countries, with 237
patent applications per million inhabitants in 2003.
Technological specialisation profiles 
within the EU: diversity rules
In order to assess the relative technological strengths and weaknesses
of countries, it is useful to examine their technological specialisations. 
A country’s level of specialisation in a given field of technology is
measured by comparing the world share of the country in that particular
field to the world share of the country for all fields combined. The
number of patent applications submitted to the EPO, analysed by
economic activity (NACE Rev 1.1), is used as base data for the calculation
of the relative technology activity index.
Technological specialisation within EU-27 shows a high degree of
diversity. An examination of the EPO patent applications in the
manufacturing sector over the period 2000-2003 reveals that the EU is
specialised in traditional industries such as leather products, wood
products, rubber and plastic products, and transport equipment.
Although not significantly diverging from the world average, Europe’s
technological output seems to be under-specialised in the electrical and
optical equipment industry. This is also the manufacturing sector where
the largest number of under-specialised Member States can be found.
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Figure II.4.1 EPO patent applications per million population, 2003 (1)
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat
Notes: (1) By priority year.
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A closer look at the technological specialisation of each Member State
does not reveal any clear pattern. The United Kingdom does not show
any specialisation at all, nor any under-specialisation. Sweden specialises
in only one economic activity (wood and wood products), whereas
Ireland (wood and wood products, electrical and optical equipment),
Lithuania (food products, beverages and tobacco, other manufacturing),
the Netherlands (food products, beverages and tobacco, electrical and
optical equipment) and Finland (electrical and optical equipment, pulp,
paper and paper products, publishing and printing) each specialise in
two economic activities. Obviously, Sweden’s and Finland’s specialisation
patterns are largely determined by the abundance of timber as a natural
resource.
At the other end of the scale are countries with a high degree of
technological diversification, such as Italy which specialises in ten
manufacturing industries, and the Czech Republic and Austria which
both specialise in nine.
Most of the Member States are under-specialised in only a very few
economic activities;France even in none of them. Exceptions are Estonia,
Malta, the Netherlands and Finland, all of which exhibit an under-
specialisation in seven manufacturing industries.
Positive correlation between patenting activity and
private investment in R&D
There is a strong positive relationship between patenting intensity
(number of patents per capita) and the level of private expenditure on
R&D (BERD as a percentage of GDP). European countries with high
levels of business R&D expenditure relative to GDP, such as Germany,
Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Switzerland, also have the largest
numbers of patent applications per million population. In contrast,
countries such as the new Member States have both low business R&D
intensities and low levels of patenting activity.
The degree of technological diversification does not seem to impede
patenting performance. Germany specialises in five manufacturing
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Figure II.4.2 EPO patent applications in the manufacturing sector - 
relative activity index (RAI), 2000-2003 (1)
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat
Note: (1) By priority year and by sector of economic activity (NACE class derived through 
concordance with IPC).
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II.5 The impacts of S&T performance on
competitiveness
Introduction
Education, scientific and technological progress and innovation have
always been crucial ingredients of economic activity and an important
source of competitiveness. The transition to the knowledge-based
economy is enhancing the level of competitiveness of our economies. On
the one hand, the industries that are most involved in the production
and exploitation of knowledge are gaining weight and having to
compete globally. On the other hand, the integration of new, competitive
knowledge in the day-to-day processes of all parts of the economy is
influencing the way productive activities are organised and thus having
an impact on overall economic output and competitiveness.
This section analyses, with the help of the relevant indicators, the impact
of scientific and technological performance on aspects of Member State
economies, such as trade in high-tech products and intangible know  -
ledge, value added in high-tech industries and in knowledge-intensive
services, and labour productivity growth.
Selling high technology products on global markets
High-tech products are products with a high R&D intensity; they there  -
fore represent the technological leading edge of traded goods. They are
also amongst the most dynamic traded internationally, and the growth in
their trade has been significantly stronger than that of other traded
goods.
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Figure II.4.3 EPO patent applications per million population(1) in relation 
to BERD as % of GDP, 2003(2)
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat, OECD
Notes: (1) By priotity year.
(2) CH: 2000; AT: 2002.
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industries and yet produces more patent applications per million
inhabitants than Sweden, which specialises in only one manufacturing
industry.  At the same time Sweden has a higher business expenditure on
R&D as a percentage of GDP than Germany. These national divergences
reveal in part substantial differences in the industrial structure of each
country.II.5 The impact of S&T performance on competitiveness Key Figures 2007 97
According to the OECD, technology-intensive exports, and high-tech
exports in particular, accounted for much of the growth in overall trade
over the past decade(9).  Producing and selling high-tech products is
important for several reasons. It reflects a country’s ability to carry out
R&D and develop new knowledge,and to turn this into advanced goods
and services sold in global markets. These activities lead to strong gains
of dynamic efficiency, increase overall productivity, and favour a virtuous
circle of learning, productivity and competitiveness.
Figure II.5.1, showing the shares of the EU Member States in world high-
tech exports in 2005 and the growth of these shares between 2000 and
2005, gives an indication of EU competitiveness in the global high-tech
market.
In 2005, EU-27 represented 31.9  % of total world exports of high-tech
products (including intra-Europe exports). Germany, France, the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands accounted for two-thirds of that world
share.  Almost all of the new Member States experienced a strong growth
of their market share between 2000 and 2005.  The rapid growth seen in
these catching-up economies reflects the restructuring process which
has been taking place in recent years. Among the R&D-intensive
countries, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark and Germany were able to
further expand their market share over recent years, while France,
Sweden, the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, Finland and Belgium
showed declining high-tech market shares.
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Spain  (0.4)
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Sweden  (-5.6)
Belgium  (-0.2)
Italy  (-2.8)
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UK  (-6.6)
France  (-6.1)
Germany  (2.2)
EU-27  (-1.6)
0.01
0.01
Figure II.5.1 World market shares of exports of high-tech products (%); 
in brackets: average annual growth rates (%), 2000-2005 (1)
Source: JRC/Ispra, DG Research
Data: Eurostat (Comext), UN (Comtrade)
Note: (1) Intra-EU exports are included. 9. OECD (2005), Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2005, Paris, p. 170-173.
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The extent to which countries’ exports are more or less focused on high-
tech products can be seen from Figure II.5.2. Of the goods exported by
EU-27 in 2004, 18  % were high-tech products (excluding intra-Europe
trade). However, the differences between European countries are
substantial; the high-tech share of total exports ranges from more than
50% in Malta to less than 3  % in Turkey and Iceland. Malta has an
especially high concentration of high-tech products in its exports, due to
sales of electronic components which have increased dramatically since
the 1980s. With the exception of Hungary, all the other new EU Member
States are below the EU average.
Between 2000 and 2004, the high-tech intensity of exports increased in
a majority of the new Member States, including Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Latvia and Bulgaria. Conversely, after a long period of
sustained growth during the 1990s, it decreased between 2000 and 2004
for the Union as a whole, as well as for a large group of technologically
advanced economies, in particular Sweden, Finland and Ireland. 
Looking at the composition of high-tech exports (Figure II.5.3), by far
the most traded group is ‘electronics-telecommunications’.Together with
‘computers and office machinery’ (another typical ICT product group),
the group accounts for more than 40 % of the high-tech exports of the
Union. However, although these two product groups make up the largest
share of high-tech exports in most of the Member States, the composition
of high-tech exports varies significantly from country to country.
France and the United Kingdom, respectively the second and third largest
exporters of high-tech products within EU-27, recorded high shares of
exports in ‘aerospace’, with 49 % and 28 % respectively, while in Denmark,
Switzerland and Slovenia high-tech exports were more concentrated in
‘pharmacy’. 
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Turkey  (-15.9)
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Malta  (-3.3)
Figure II.5.2 High-tech exports as % of total exports, 2004; in brackets: average annual
growth rates (%), 2000-2004(1)
Source: JRC/Ispra, DG Research
Data: Eurostat (Comext), UN (Comtrade)
Notes: (1) The value for EU-27 does not include Intra-EU exports. BG and RO are not included in EU-27.
(2) EU-27: BG and RO are not included.
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The economic downturn following the dotcom bubble in 2000 markedly
affected the global trade of ICT goods. According to the OECD, in 2003
the share of ICT goods in total goods trade fell back to its 1996 level in
EU-15, the OECD area and Japan(10).  Therefore, countries with a relatively
high concentration of high-tech exports in ‘pharmacy’ (e.g. Switzerland,
Denmark, Slovenia) were much less affected than countries with high-
tech exports heavily concentrated in telecommunication equipment
(e.g. Sweden or Finland) or in computers (e.g. Ireland, the Netherlands).
Trading knowledge: the technology balance of payments
As well as high-tech products, countries can also buy and sell intangible
knowledge. These transactions are measured by the technology balance
of payments (TBP), which records a country’s exports and imports of
technical knowledge and services (including licence fees, patent pur-
chases and royalties paid, know-how, research and technical assistance).
The indicator examined here relates to a country’s exports of technology
(TBP receipts), which reflects its competitiveness on the international
market for knowledge. Such trade in technology is also an important ve-
hicle for international technology transfer.
The main exporters of technology as a percentage of GDP are also
Europe’s most R&D-intensive countries: Switzerland, Belgium, Finland, the
United Kingdom, Austria, Germany and Denmark are far above the EU
average. The only exception is France, which in 2003 was clearly below
the EU average. Even though R&D-intensive countries also import foreign
technology to a large extent, their balance is generally positive (net
exporters). Conversely, most low R&D-intensive countries have low levels
10. OECD (2005), Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2005, Paris, p. 126-127.
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11. ‘High-tech’ manufacturing industries re-group the following five sectors: 1) Chemicals (including
pharmaceuticals), 2) Office, accounting and computing machinery, 3) Radio, television and commu-
nication equipment, 4) Medical, precision and optical instruments, 5) Aircraft and spacecraft (see
annex for further details).
12. ‘Knowledge-intensive high-tech services’ re-group the following three sectors: 1) post and telecom-
munications, 2) computer and related activities, 3) research and development (see annex for further
details).
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Figure II.5.4 Technology balance of payments and receipts as % of GDP, 2005 (1)
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of technology exports (as a percentage of their GDP). These countries are
mainly net importers of technology, since their technology development
relies to a large extent on the acquisition of foreign knowledge. 
TBP flows are highly internationalised and, as in the case of a number of
other indicators, multinational companies are involved in a significant
proportion of these transactions. Some of these receipts may therefore
be going to foreign affiliates based in the country in question.
High-tech industries and knowledge-intensive 
high-tech services
All industries generate and/or exploit new technology and knowledge to
some extent, but some are more technology-intensive or knowledge-
intensive than others. To assess the importance of technology and
knowledge within the industrial texture, it is useful to focus on the
leading producers of high-tech goods and on the activities, including
services, which make intensive use of high technology.  This section looks
at the share of value added accounted for by high-tech manufacturing
industries(11) and knowledge-intensive high-tech services(12). Such
indicators show the relative weight in an economy of those activities
that require both high-level R&D input and high qualification levels of
employees.II.5 The impact of S&T performance on competitiveness Key Figures 2007 101
However, when interpreting the results it should be borne in mind that
each country has a unique economic structure. At the EU level services
represented, in 2003, 72  % of total value added and their share is
increasing, while the weight of manufacturing industry in the economy
is shrinking and accounts now for less than one-fifth of total value added.
Although the increasing importance of services is a general pattern com-
mon to all European countries, in some Member States manu  facturing
still represents a very significant proportion of all economic activities
(e.g. in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Ireland, Finland and Ger-
many, where manufacturing activities accounted for 23-31% of total value
added in 2003), while others are more dominated by service activities
(e.g. Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Belgium and
France, where services represented 74-83% of total value added in 2003). 
The high-tech component of manufacturing industry
At the EU level, 19 % of manufacturing value added is accounted for by
high-tech industries. Ireland is at the top of the group, with more than
half of manufacturing value added generated by high-tech industries (the
industry sector of ‘chemicals’ – including pharmaceuticals – represents
almost half of this). It is interesting to note that among the top
performing countries there are countries with a relatively high overall
share of manufacturing in their economic base (e.g. Ireland, Finland), as
well as countries which are mainly service-based but have an important
element of high-tech activity in their manufacturing (e.g. Belgium, the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France). 
Conversely at the lower end of the range Luxembourg, as well as the
southern European countries and the new Member States, are charac-
terised by a weak presence of high-tech activities within their manufac-
turing industry. For Luxembourg and Greece, the low importance of
manufacturing industry in the economy (10  % of total value added in
both cases) should be borne in mind when considering these figures.
For the other countries in this group, however, manufacturing industry
represents a significant share (16-26  %) of the total economy and is
primarily concentrated in medium-low-tech and low-tech activities. 
This explains the relatively low shares of Austria and Italy, which have
higher concentrations of manufacturing value added in medium-low-
tech and low-tech industry. Finally, the unexceptional shares of Germany
and Sweden are due to the fact that medium-high-tech activities very
clearly dominate manufacturing activities. 
It should be expected that, with a gradual shift to a knowledge-based
economy, the value added of those industries with a higher component
of R&D would grow at the expense of other more traditional industries.
Between 1997 and 2003 the weight of high-tech industries in total
manufacturing value added in EU-27 increased from 18.4  % to 19.0  %. 
This shift towards more high-tech activities occurred at the expense of
low-tech industry, the share of which declined from 33.7 % to 33.1 % in
the same period. Medium-high-tech and medium-low-tech activities have
maintained, since the end of the 1990s, a relatively unchanged share of
total manufacturing value added at about 23.6  % (medium-high) and
24.1% (medium-low).
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
 Manufacturing 20 20 20 19 19 18 18
 Services 68 69 70 70 70 71 72
 O t h e r 1 11 11 11 11 11 11 1
 TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
 
Table II.5.1 EU-27(1) - % distribution of value added by sector, 1997-2003
Source: DG Research
Data: Groningen Growth and Development Centre
Note: (1) EU-27 does not include BG, EE, CY, LV, LT, MT, RO and SI.
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The share of high-tech industries in manufacturing value added increased
in nine Member States between 1997 and 2003, not only in countries
where manufacturing has a weak high-tech component (e.g. Greece, the
Czech Republic, Poland), but also in the Member States where high-tech
industries already represent the largest share of manufacturing activities
(e.g. Ireland, Finland, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Denmark). The high-
tech component of manufacturing industry gained ground particularly
rapidly in Finland and in Ireland. In the former this was due to the strong
expansion of the ‘telecommunication equipment’ manufacturing sector,
while in the latter the sector ‘chemicals (including pharmaceuticals)’ was
responsible for most of the growth. In contrast to Finland, Sweden’s
decreasing high-tech share was entirely due to the collapse of the
‘telecommunication equipment’ sector after 2000, where value added
(in current terms) dropped by more than 90 % in 2000-2003. 
The absence of a growing share of the high-tech component in some
Member States does not necessarily mean that there is no shift within 
the manufacturing sector towards higher-tech activities. In a lot of
countries medium high-tech industry became more important within
the industrial structure at the expense of low-tech activities, even though
no strong growth of the high-tech share was recorded. In France,
Germany,Austria, Hungary and Slovakia, for instance, the slight decrease
(or modest growth) in the high-tech share between 1997 and 2003 was
accompanied by an increase of the medium-high-tech component,
a status quo of the medium-low-tech share and a clear decline in the
low-tech segment of manufacturing value added. This increasing
importance of medium high-tech activities was primarily due to the
strong expansion of the manufacturing sectors ‘motor vehicles’ (for
France, Germany and Slovakia), ‘mechanical engineering’ (for Austria) and
‘electrical machinery’ (for Hungary). 
Finally,in the southern European countries of Italy, Spain and Portugal, as
well as in the Netherlands, manufacturing industry has become more
low-tech between 1997 and 2003. In Italy and the Netherlands, value
added in the high-tech and medium-high-tech manufacturing sectors
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Source: DG Research
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decreased (in absolute, current terms) after 2001, while it continued to
increase in the medium-low-tech and low-tech sectors. In Portugal and
Spain, value added in the low-tech and medium-low-tech sectors
increased much faster than in the two other sectors (current terms).
Knowledge-intensive activities in the services sector
Knowledge-intensive high-tech services (KHTS) play an increasingly
important role in all developed economies.They cover a sector with
high requirements for qualifications and the application of knowledge,
and this gives them a special importance for economic growth. The
development of KHTS is closely linked to the growing specialisation of
industries and the need for even more specialised services emanating
from other service and manufacturing sectors.Very often, specialisation
is conditioned by a more sophisticated demand and, as a consequence,
may lead to increases in productivity.
The value added created by KHTS is an important indicator of the overall
knowledge intensity of a given economy. Moreover, the share of value
added accounted for by KHTS has been constantly growing in the EU in
recent years. In 2003, KHTS accounted for 6.9 % of the total value added
in the services sector, against 6.1  % in 1997. The share of KHTS in the
total services sector has been growing in almost all EU Member States
between 1997 and 2003. 
However, there were quite substantial differences between individual
Member States, with the Czech Republic the top performing country,
followed by Ireland, Slovakia and Finland, while the lowest scoring
countries were Greece, Denmark and Germany.
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Labour productivity growth within the EU: convergence
between the East and the West, divergence between
the North and the South
In the long run, increasing labour productivity constitutes the surest way
to increase the standard of living of a population in a sustainable manner.
Moreover, labour productivity is heavily impacted upon by innovation
performance, as largely measured by total factor productivity. Since the
middle of the 1990s, the EU has ceased to catch up with the US in terms
of labour productivity, reflecting relatively weak innovation performance. 
Within EU-27 a first large group, consisting of all the southern and eastern
European countries, is characterised by low levels of labour productivity.
With the exceptions of Spain and Italy, which show productivity levels
around (for Italy) or slightly below (for Spain) the EU average, all these
Member States have significantly below average levels of output per hour
worked. 
Within this group, a clear distinction can nevertheless be made when
examining growth performance. The eastern European Member States, as
well as Greece, have been rapidly catching up with the rest of the Union
since 2000. In particular, the Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia
recorded a very impressive growth of more than 6  % per annum. The
opposite is true for Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Malta and Portugal, which have
the lowest growth rates of the Union (even negative in the case of
Cyprus).  As a result, Italy’s labour productivity level has now fallen below
the EU average. 
Among the remaining European countries, labour productivity is very
high in Luxembourg and Norway, is well above the EU average in
Belgium, France, Ireland and the Netherlands, and is slightly above the EU
average in the Nordic countries, Germany, Austria and the United
Kingdom. Labour productivity has been growing over the past years at
the high pace of 2-3  % per annum in Ireland, Finland, Sweden and the
United Kingdom; these countries are consequently pulling further ahead.
Conversely in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands and
Austria, labour productivity growth was rather weak between 2000 
and 2005. 
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Figure II.5.7 Labour productivity (GDP per hour worked), 2005 and average annual real
growth 2000-2005
Source: DG Research
Data: Eurostat, DG ECFIN (AMECO database)
Notes: (1) EU-27 does not include BG and RO.
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Annex: Definitions and Sources
Symbols and abbreviations
Country codes
BE Belgium SI Slovenia
BG Bulgaria SK Slovakia
CZ Czech Republic FI Finland
DK Denmark SE Sweden
DE Germany UK United Kingdom
IE Ireland EU-27 European Union
EL Greece HR Croatia
ES Spain TR Turkey
FR France IS Iceland
IT Italy NO Norway
CY Cyprus CH Switzerland
LV Latvia IL Israel
LT Lithuania US United States 
LU Luxembourg JP Japan
HU Hungary CN China
MT Malta RU Russian Federation
NL Netherlands KR South Korea
AT Austria IN India 
PL Poland
PT Portugal
RO Romania
Other abbreviations
FTE Full-time equivalent
: ‘not available’
- ‘not applicable’ or ‘real zero’ or ‘zero by default’
General Indicators
Gross domestic product (GDP)
Definition: Gross domestic product (GDP) data have been compiled
in accordance with the European System of Accounts (ESA 1995).
Since the publication of Key Figures 2005 GDP has been revised
upwards for the majority of EU Member States following the allocation
of FISIM (Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly Measured) to
user sectors. This has resulted in a downward revision of R&D
intensity for individual Member States and for the EU.    
Source: Eurostat.
Value Added
Definition: Value added is current gross value added measured at
producer prices or at basic prices, depending on the valuation used in
the national accounts. It represents the contribution of each industry
to GDP.
Sources: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, OECD.
Small and medium-sized enterprises 
Definition: For the purposes of this publication small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) are defined as enterprises having fewer than 250
employees. 
Sources: Eurostat, OECD.Annex: Definitions and Sources Key Figures 2007 106
Purchasing Power Standards (PPS)
Definition: Financial aggregates are sometimes expressed in Purchasing
Power Standards (PPS), rather than in ecu/euro based on exchange rates.
PPS are based on comparisons of the prices of representative and
comparable goods or services in different countries in different
currencies on a specific date. The calculations on R&D investments in
real terms are based on constant 2000 PPS.
Source: Eurostat
Labour Productivity
Definition: Labour productivity is defined as GDP (in PPS) per hour
worked. According to the growth accounting methodology, labour
productivity can be decomposed into capital deepening and multifactor
productivity.
Source: Eurostat, DG Ecfin (Ameco Database).
Total Factor Productivity
Definition: Total Factor Productivity (TFP) or Multifactor Productivity
(MFP) is usually defined as the overall efficiency level of the production
process. TFP is affected by factors such as labour quality/skill mix
improvements; capital quality (vintage and asset composition); pure
technological progress; sectoral reallocation effects; changes in capacity
utilisation rates and measurements errors with respect to the contri  -
butions from physical capital/labour.
Capital Deepening
Definition: Capital deepening is defined as the capital/labour ratio.
Manufacturing industry technology categories
Definition: The four manufacturing industry technology categories are
defined as follows (NACE codes are given in brackets):
(1) High-tech: office machinery and computers (30), radio, television
and communication equipment and apparatus (32), medical, precision
and optical instruments, watches and clocks (33),  aircraft and spacecraft
(35.3), pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products
(24.4)
(2) Medium-high-tech: machinery and equipment (29), electrical
machinery and apparatus (31), motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
(34), other transport equipment (35), chemicals and chemical products
excluding pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products
(24 excluding 24.4)
(3) Medium-low-tech: coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear
fuel (23), rubber and plastic products (25), non-metallic mineral products
(26), basic metals (27), fabricated metal products except machinery and
equipment (28), building and repairing of ships and boats (35.1)
(4) Low-tech: food products and beverages (15), tobacco products (16),
textiles (17), wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur (18), tanning
and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery and
harness (19), wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture
(20), pulp, paper and paper products (21), publishing, printing and
reproduction of recorded media (22), furniture and other manufacturing
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R&D expenditure                                                  
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D
Definition: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) is defined
according to the OECD Frascati Manual definition. GERD can be broken
down by four sectors of performance: (i) Business enterprise
expenditure on R&D (BERD); (ii) Government intramural expenditure
on R&D (GOVERD); (iii) Higher education expenditure on R&D (HERD);
and (iv) Private non-profit expenditure on R&D (PNPRD). GERD can 
also be broken down by four sources of funding: (i) Business enterprise;
(ii) Government; (iii) Other national sources; and (iv) Abroad.
Sources: Eurostat, OECD
Government budget for R&D
Definition: The government budget for R&D is defined as government
budget appropriations or outlays for R&D (GBAORD) according to the
OECD Frascati Manual definition. The data are based on information
obtained from central government statistics and are broken down by
socio-economic objective in accordance with the nomenclature for the
analysis and comparison of scientific programs and budgets (NABS). 
Source: Eurostat   
Tax subsidies
Definition: The relative generosity of R&D tax subsidies has been
calculated in the manufacturing sector of most OECD countries for the
years 1991, 2000 and 2006. The rate of tax subsidy for 1 euro of R&D is
equal to one minus the so-called B-index. The value of the B-index is
based on the before-tax income required to break even on one euro of
R&D outlay and takes into account corporate income tax rates, R&D tax
credits, special R&D allowances from taxable income, and depreciation
of capital assets (machinery, equipment and buildings) used in R&D.
The B-index is the present value of before-tax income necessary to cover
the initial cost of R&D investment and to pay corporate income taxes so
that it becomes profitable to perform research activities. Algebraically,
the B-index is equal to the after-tax cost of an expenditure of one euro
on R&D divided by one minus the corporate income tax rate.
Source: OECD (see OECD, Tax incentives for Research and Development:
trends and issues, 2003)
Venture Capital investment
Definition: Venture capital in the early stages of a company – i.e. seed and
start-up stages – provides financing mainly for the initial business plan,
research activities, product development and first marketing. Expansion
and replacement venture capital can provide finance for increased
production capacity, market or product development, bridge financing,
rescue/turnaround financing, refinancing of bank debt and the purchase
of existing shares in a company. Total venture capital itself is a part of total
private equity capital for enterprises not quoted on a stock market. 
Source: Eurostat
Human Resources
Researchers 
Definition: Researchers (Research Scientists and Engineers, RSEs)
include the occupational groups ISCO-2 (Professional Occupations) and
ISCO-1237 (Research and Development Department Managers). See the
“Frascati Manual” (OECD 2002a). The data for researchers are generally
given in full-time equivalents (FTE).
Sources: Eurostat, OECDAnnex: Definitions and Sources Key Figures 2007 108
Classification: ISCO: International Standard Classification of Occupation
(version 1988).
S&E graduates
Definitions: Graduates are defined by the levels of education classified in
ISCED 1997. In these Key Figures graduates include all tertiary degrees
(ISCED 5a and 5b) and PhDs (ISCED 6). The S&E fields of study are: life
sciences (ISC42), physical sciences (ISC44), mathematics and statistics
(ISC46), computing (ISC48), engineering and engineering trades (ISC52),
manufacturing and processing (ISC54), architecture and building (ISC58).
Particularities: BE: data for the Flemish community exclude second
qualifications. CY: Data exclude tertiary students graduating abroad. The
fields of study in Cyprus are limited. EE: Data exclude master degrees
(ISCED 5A). LU: Luxembourg does not have a complete university system;
data refer only to ISCED 5B first degree.  
Sources: Eurostat.
Classification: ISCED: International Standard Classification of Education
(1997 version).
Scientific and Technological Performance 
Scientific Publications
Definition: Publications are research articles, reviews, notes and letters
that were published in referenced journals which are included in the
SCI database of the Institute of Scientific Information (ISI).  A full counting
method was used at the country level, however for the EU aggregate,
double counts of multiple occurrences of EU Member States in the same
record were excluded.
Co-publications are publications by two or more authors from two or
more countries. Despite the possibility of several authors from one
country, each country involved is counted only once. 
Source: ISI, Science Citation Index; treatments and calculations:
University Leiden, CWTS.
Scientific specialisation 
Definition:The relative scientific specialisation index (or relative activity
index RAI) is calculated for 11 fields on the basis of publications from
2001-2004.The fields ‘Multidisciplinary’ and ‘Social Sciences’ have been
left out. RAI = a/b, where a = % of a country in all publications in a field
and b = % of publications of that country compared to total publication
output of all countries. Normalised score: RAI*=(RAI-1)/(RAI+1) AI*.
Scores below -0.1 mean a significant under-specialisation in a given
scientific field, scores between -0.1 and +0.1 are around field average
and mean no significant (under-)specialisation, and scores above +0.1
mean a significant specialisation in a given field. 
Source: ISI, Science Citation Index; treatments and calculations:
University Leiden, CWTS. Calculation of broad fields: DG-Research.
Triadic Patents
Definitions: ‘Triadic’ patents are the set of patented inventions for which
protection has been sought at all three major patent offices (the
European Patent Office – EPO, The US Patent and Trademark Office –
USPTO and the Japanese Patent Office – JPO). The country of origin is
defined as the country of the inventor. The advantage of triadic patents
is that they can eliminate the ‘home advantage effect’. They may also be
associated with patents of a higher expected commercial value, since it
is costly to file through three patent systems. However, it is also likely
that they tend to reflect the patenting activity of larger companies who
seek, and can afford, broader international protection.
Source: OECD based on data from EPO, USPTO and JPO.The EU and the European Research Area Key Figures 2007 109
Technological specialisation 
Definition: The relative technological specialisation index (or relative
activity index RAI) is calculated for 17 manufacturing sectors on the basis
of EPO patents from 1997-2000. RAI = a/b, where a = % of a country in
all patents in a sector/technology field and b = % of patents of that
country compared to total patent output of all countries. Normalised
score: RAI*=(RAI-1)/(RAI+1) AI*. Scores below -0.1 mean a significant
under-specialisation in a given scientific field, scores between -0.1 and
+0.1 are around field average and mean no significant (under)
specialisation, and scores above +0.1 mean a significant specialisation in
a given field. The data were classified by earliest priority date and country
of residence of the inventor.
Source: DG Research, based on OECD data.
S&T Competitiveness
High-tech trade
Definition: High-tech trade covers exports and imports of products
whose manufacture involved a high intensity of R&D. They are defined
in accordance with the OECD’s high tech product list (see OECD (1997).
Revision of the High-technology Sector and Product Classification (1997),
STI Working Papers 2/1997, OECD, Paris. The indicators used in this
report use the so-called ‘product approach’, i.e. they measure the world
market share of exports of high-tech products.
Sources: Eurostat (Comext), UN (Comtrade).
Technology balance of payments receipts
Definition: The technology balance of payments (TBP) records
a country’s exports and imports of technical knowledge and services
(including licences, know-how, trademarks, technical services, etc.). TBP
statistics are defined according to the Technology Balance of Payments
Manual of the OECD.
Sources: OECD, Eurostat, Member States.
High-Tech Knowledge intensive services
Definitions: High-Tech knowledge intensive services are defined
according to the Eurostat definition as: post and telecommunications,
computer and related activities, research and development (i.e. NACE
Rev.1 codes 64, 72, 73).
The output of knowledge intensive high-tech services is defined as the
value added of knowledge intensive services. Total output is defined as
total gross value added at basic prices according to the National Accounts
definition. 
Sources: Eurostat (SBS, CLFS and National Accounts), OECD (Science,
Technology and Industry Scoreboard).European Commission
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